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Preface and Acknowledgements 
The explanation for beginning a Ph.D. when having reached a considerable age and 
having had the pleasure and challenge of being a manager (senior middle manager and 
executive) for more than twenty years may be summarized into two different factors.   
The first and perhaps the most prominent motive for making a considerable change in 
a well developed career in the insurance business has to do with my own experiences as a 
senior manager. After having administered and managed a broad range of change initiatives, 
I became perfectly aware of the limited power and ability senior managers have with regards 
to implementing change.  First of all, it was the department heads – first line middle 
managers – that actually implemented the changes.  However, it struck me that some middle 
managers nearly always managed to implement changes and as a consequence contributed to 
an enhanced financial performance for the company, while others almost always failed.  This 
happened despite each of these groups having the same challenges and the same resource 
base (except for their personal ability to lead change).  This motivated me to dig deeper into 
the problems managers face when implementing change.  Why do some people nearly 
always succeed while others nearly always fail?  Why do senior managers and the literature 
(the ones recommended by consultants and management schools) underrate the significant 
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The second explanation I have for writing this dissertation has to do with the fact that 
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influence in change, and employee reactions to change.  My own experience had taught me 
that top managers have very little influence on the actual implementation of changes, 
although they are very important in giving directions and providing resources.  Another 
experience I had was that there were always reactions to change.  Individual reactions to 
changes based on the fact that somebody has to do something else tomorrow are natural, and 
should from my point of view not be the key issue when implementing change.  If that is the 
issue, maybe the best thing is to do nothing.  However, it is of course vital to any manager to 
listen and attend to reactions, but this must not be the main issue.  The main issue should be 
long-term, enhanced business performance.  The focus in the MBA program triggered my 
passion for change, and I wanted to enhance my own perceptions of competency in 
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from the EMBA directors, Tor Øyvind Baardsen and Lasse Lien.  Without their great 
support and personal effort to help me apply for admission to the Ph.D. program, this 
dissertation would never have been produced. 
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requires a financial backing either from the institution itself or from other sources.  My 
former employer, “INSCO1”, has been a generous financial source.  Without the financial 
support from this company, I would not have been able to continue with this project. 
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1. Introduction 
As organizations continue to pursue planned change initiatives, researchers attempt to 
increase our understanding about how to successfully implement planned change as well as 
explain the high failure rates. Top executives and middle managers play significant but 
different and complementary roles in strategic change.  Top executives focus on expected 
outcomes, boundary conditions, resource deployment, creating clarity and a shared 
understanding of these, while middle managers interpret what makes sense and what should 
be done, and not the least, manage details. Most of the strategic change literature focuses on 
top management’s important role in securing successful results.  However, lately there has 
been increased interest in how the middle management level influences change outcomes.  
While the middle manager role in strategy has traditionally been viewed as 
contributing to the implementation of top management’s intended strategies (Balogun, 2003; 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1994), which can be viewed as convergent action, there is also 
evidence that middle managers engage in divergent action (Burgelman, 1991, 1994; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Huff, Huff, & Thomas, 1992).  Such action is often seen as 
negative and unconstructive because top management may be closely identified with the 
official strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).  Divergent actions do not need to be 
counterproductive (Burgelman, 1991, 1994; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Huff et al., 
1992; Meyer, 2006), but managers are more likely to fail in effectuating strategic intent if 
there are tensions and different responses between different groups of middle managers 
(Meyer, 2006).  This study sets out to understand how middle managers influence strategic 
change outcomes, particularly by tapping into how they themselves explain and defend their 
responses to strategic change.     
The middle manager literature can be divided into two distinctive views: the dark and 
pessimistic view and the optimistic view (Dopson & Stewart, 1990, 1994).  The trend is that 
there has been a move from the first view to the latter view in the recent literature on middle 
management. Unfortunately the optimistic literature on middle management’s role in 
strategic change tends to ignore evidence from the more pessimistic stream of research, 
leading to two rather separated streams of research.  Some of the early middle management 
literature viewed organizational change as a political process focusing on middle managers’ 
self-interests and how middle managers often obstruct change initiatives.    The broad range 
of the studies in the optimistic research stream suggests that middle managers sensemaking 
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and sensegiving processes have a great and often constructive impact on the change outcome 
(e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Rouleau, 2005).  However, despite the recognition that 
sensegiving has to do with influencing the meaning construction of others, very little 
research has coupled sensemaking and sensegiving with organizational politics.  This study 
attempts to overcome these shortcomings by drawing on both the pessimistic and the 
positive research stream on middle managers to explore middle managers’ actions during 
organizational change. 
In order to expand our understanding of why middle managers behave convergently 
or divergently in the context of change, I draw on political and discourse theory.  
Sensemaking is about meaning construction and reconstruction of individuals when they 
seek to create an understanding of the intentions of a strategic change.  Sensegiving is, on the 
other hand, the process performed when somebody tries to influence others’ sensemaking 
towards the sensegiver’s perception of reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).  In addition, this 
study attempts to couple power, politics and discourse perspectives with existing knowledge 
on sensemaking and sensegiving during change since I will argue that sensegiving in 
particular is a highly political and rhetorical activity. Organizational politics is the practical 
domain of power (Buchanan & Badham, 2008), where power is about getting somebody to 
do what you want them to do, something they otherwise would not necessarily do (Hardy & 
Clegg, 1996).  It is emphasized that the struggle of meaning is closely related to the 
competition for gaining power, and that organizational politics has to do with the creation of 
legitimacy for certain ideas (Grant & Hardy, 2004; Pettigrew, 1977).  Legitimation may be 
created through discourse (Fairclough, 2003; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Vaara 
& Tienari, 2008).   
The study explores how middle managers influence change outcome through their 
involvement in power, organizational politics and discourse.  I focus on how middle 
managers have an impact on others’ sensemaking and sensegiving, and how these 
sensemaking and sensegiving processes influence the change outcome.  To enhance our 
understanding of what influences sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change, I have 
approached strategic change through the lens of power and politics and discourse.  
Regarding power and politics, I have analyzed the data to find out how middle managers 
influence the meaning construction of superiors and peers through political tactics.   
I have empirically studied organizational politics and discourse through an in-depth 
study in one organization (INSCO).  To study these phenomena a close connection to the 
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studied organization and the extensive knowledge of the organization and the business 
performed within this organization is required. On one side, knowledge of the organization 
studied is the key to observe, understand and indentify what political activity lies within the 
organization, and on the other side there is obtaining access to both observe and discuss 
controversial issues.  As an insider, I had easy access to respondents that were willing to 
openly talk about controversial issues.  In addition, knowledge of the business and 
organization was extensive, as I had worked as a senior manager in this company for more 
than eight years.  Different qualitative data have been collected over a time span of three 
years. 
The findings show that a more balanced view of middle managers’ strategic 
contributions, including both pessimistic and optimistic perspectives, provides greater 
insights into exactly how middle managers work to influence change outcome.  Middle 
managers play an important role in strategy, but this project shows that their contributions 
may be serving the interests of the company in some instances and the self-interests of the 
middle manager in others.  This suggests that while there is an increasing focus on the 
middle manager as a key resource for implementing change, we should not forget the 
findings from the more pessimistic view when evaluating middle managers’ contributions in 
the making of strategy. 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  I position the dissertation in Chapter 1.  In 
Chapter 2, the theoretical background and research perspective is presented.  This is 
followed by three empirical chapters presenting three essays that approach the overall 
research question from different angles. Chapter 3, “Discourse Constructions in 
Retrospective Assessments of Change Successes and Failures”, reveals how middle 
managers shape subjective perceptions of successes and failures.  Chapter 4, “The Politics of 
Middle Management Sensemaking and Sensegiving”, explores how a broad spectrum of 
emotional, cognitive and intentional responses to change fostered either convergent or 
divergent actions within different groups of middle managers.  The final empirical chapter, 
Chapter 5, “The Gang of Four: Discourse Strategies to Legitimize Divergent Change 
Behavior”, shows how a group of middle managers legitimize their resistance and divergent 
responses to a change initiative.  Each of the empirical essays includes theory, methods and 
conclusions, however, in Chapter 6 some overall conclusions based on all three essays are 
presented, and in Appendix A, a methodological overview including all of the data and 
analysis that were used for the three essays is presented. 
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2. Theoretical Background and Research Perspective 
2.1 Middle Managers and Strategic Change 
 A strategic change can be seen as an effort to deliberately adjust the formal 
structures, working procedures, system and processes in organizations, and the way 
individuals in organizations act and think in order to meet opportunities and threats and to 
improve the realization of organizational objectives (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Lines, 
2005).  Traditionally, top executives are seen as those who formulate and implement 
strategies.  However, a broad range of recent studies has emphasized the middle manager as 
an important character when it comes to the factual implementation of strategy (Balogun, 
2003, 2006; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997, 2000; Huy, 
2001, 2002; Mantere, 2008; Rouleau, 2005; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008).  The 
increasing focus on middle managers has lead to a more nuanced perspective on the diverse 
roles managers on different organizational levels perform.  Top executives are facilitators 
and deploy resources, while middle managers develop capabilities and execute the day-to-
day decisions that link realized strategy to intended strategy (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007).  We know from studies that middle 
managers’ involvement in the making and implementation of strategy has a direct impact on 
businesses’ financial performance (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997, 2000; Wooldridge & 
Floyd, 1990). 
Middle managers have been defined in a number of ways, but three different 
dimensions tend to consistently create the basis for a definition: the hierarchical dimension 
(Currie & Procter, 2005; Huy, 2001, 2002), the functional dimension (Balogun, 2003; Currie 
& Procter, 2001; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Likert, 1961), and the responsibility dimension 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).  A comprehensive definition of the middle manager should 
include all three dimensions.  In this dissertation, middle managers will be defined as any 
manager positioned at least two levels below the CEO, and at least one level above line 
workers and professionals.  Middle managers connect the organization’s strategic and 
operational levels; they are responsible for at least the sub-functional workflow or business 
processes, but they are not responsible for the workflow or business processes of the 
organization as a whole.  
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The functions middle managers perform include mediation, negotiation, and 
interpretation between the strategic and operational levels (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997; Mantere, 2008; Rouleau, 2005).  They may also be seen as the linking 
pins (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Likert, 1961; Mantere, 2008) 
between vertically related groups throughout the organization.  A middle manager’s main 
responsibility is for specific parts of the working/business processes in an organization.  This 
means that they are vital in managing their own area of responsibility, and in coordinating 
horizontally with their counterparts in horizontally linked organizational units.  The 
importance of this horizontal coordination should not be forgotten when focusing on the 
strategic role that middle managers perform when bridging the gaps between vertically 
linked organizational levels.   
The middle manager performs her role (both vertically and horizontally) by 
interpreting her everyday experience of the actions and behaviors of others, and the stories, 
gossip, jokes, conversations, and discussions she shares with her peers about these 
experiences (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Mantere, 2008; Rouleau, 2005).  Change issues and 
plans are formed into activities and action through these narrative and social processes, and 
the interpretation of the content and outcome of these interactions (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004, 2005; Rouleau, 2005).  This mediating role gives middle managers a significant 
influence on an organization’s strategy and change outcomes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).  
However, the uniqueness of middle managers is their knowledge of operations together with 
their access to top management, which permits them to work as mediators between day-to-
day operations and strategy (Nonaka, 1994). 
The literature on middle managers can be divided into two distinctive views: the 
pessimistic view and the optimistic view (Dopson & Stewart, 1990, 1994).  The pessimistic 
view tends to emphasize the need to reduce the number of organizational layers as an answer 
to an increasing computerization of organizational and working processes.  In this view, the 
future of middle managers is at stake as information technology has enabled senior managers 
to widen their span of control, thus causing them to see a reduced need for a large number of 
middle managers to perform planning and control (Currie, 1999; Dopson & Stewart, 1990, 
1994; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Thomas & Linstead, 2002).  From the pessimistic view, 
middle managers slow things down and act as filters and distance keepers between the 
company and responses to customers’ needs (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994).  Middle managers 
are seen as characters that increase costs and add no value.  Faced with the threat of being a 
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victim of downsizing as a result of surplus, the middle manager is caught in stress and 
demoralization, trying to find ways to survive (Thomas & Dunkerley, 1999).  The 
pessimistic view is represented by such authors as Dickson (1977) who stated, 
“Concentration of decision-making at the top levels discourages middle managers from 
believing that they can make decisions that matter” (p. 66). Others have focused on middle 
managers being in the classic position of between a rock and a hard place (Keys & Bell, 
1982), or meeting increased demands and expectations from ambitious and independent-
minded employees   (Kanter, 1986).  There has even been a focus on middle managers as a 
self-serving group who only intervene when their self-interests are challenged (Guth & 
MacMillan, 1986).  From this view on middle management, it is worthwhile to register the 
self-serving and political angle that the literature has taken.   
On the other hand, the optimistic stream of literature suggests that middle managers 
make important contributions to strategy and strategy implementation.  This view, which is 
present in recent research, tends to emphasize the increasingly important role of middle 
management in change (Balogun, 2003, 2006; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Currie, 
1999; Currie & Procter, 2005; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2000; Huy, 2001, 
2002; Mantere, 2008; Rouleau, 2005; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge et al., 2008).  
The role of middle managers has been transformed from that of a bureaucratic filter to a 
strategic actor closer to the strategic apex of the organization.  The strategic middle manager 
is a personally involved entrepreneur with strategic focus (Dopson & Stewart, 1990; Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1997; Huy, 2001; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  Dobson & Stewart (1994) 
argued that : “a slimmer middle management in a time of rapid change has a more important 
role to play than before” (p. 76).  This position has been supported by others such as 
Balogun (2003, 2006), Currie (1999) and Huy (2002) who emphasized the crucial role 
middle managers play in implementing organizational change.  Middle managers have a 
“hands on” attitude to the details of the business and are a core component in translating 
change initiatives into practical changes in the day-to-day business and in implementing the 
detailed changes.  Floyd and Wooldridge (1997) illustrated this point by stating; “middle 
managers perform a coordinating role where they mediate, negotiate, and interpret 
connections between the organization’s institutional (strategic) and technical (operational) 
levels” (p. 466).   
Wooldridge and Floyd (1990) found strong indications that middle management’s 
involvement in strategy has a positive impact on organizational financial performance.  They 
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identified two paths through which organizational performance was positively influenced by 
middle management’s participation: A) through participation in the making of strategy, 
which enhances the quality of strategic decisions and B) through enhanced implementation 
processes, where middle managers are seen as the real implementers of strategy and 
therefore given the opportunity to create a shared understanding of top management’s 
strategic intentions.  A shared understanding of intentions may foster higher strategic 
consensus and as a consequence, improved implementation.  Their finding indicates that 
both paths enhance business performance, but it is through involvement in the making of 
strategy (path A) that the outcome is most influenced.  In later studies, Floyd and 
Wooldridge (1992, 1997) developed a framework for middle management’s involvement in 
the creation and implementation of strategy.  There, they concluded that middle managers in 
boundary spanning functions such as sales, marketing R&D and procurement are more likely 
to influence strategy than others, as they are externally oriented and hence are well 
positioned to get impulses from the external environment.   
Other researchers within the more positive research stream have focused more on 
issues regarding change processes.  Balogun (2003) introduced the concept of the middle 
manager as a “change intermediary” (p. 75) containing four middle manager implementation 
tasks: (i) undertaking personal change, (ii) helping others through change, (iii) keeping the 
business going, and (iv) implementing change into departments.  She emphasized that 
middle managers act both as change implementers and change recipients, and therefore the 
term change intermediary is a better expression to embody their overall challenges as change 
implementators.  She summarizes the middle manager’s role as a change intermediary as the 
middle manager’s ability to absorb and cope with the changes, and how they pass the 
changes on to their subordinates.  This intermediation involves interpretation and translation 
of the change intent into implications for the middle managers themselves and their teams in 
terms of behavior and everyday working practices.  The four explicit change intermediary 
tasks she has introduced may be presented in a role typology with two dimensions: nature of 
activity and orientation.  The “nature of activity” dimension encompasses a sensemaking 
activity and a coordination and management activity.  The “orientation dimension” is 
divided into two different orientation states: orientation towards the team (the middle 
manager is heading) or towards self/peers.  This division of activity and orientation gives us 
four distinctive middle manager implementation roles: Undertaking personal change is a 
combination of sensemaking and orientation towards self.  Through change, middle 
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managers face changes in roles and responsibility.  This requires that they engage in the 
development of their new roles at the same time as they make sense of their new roles and 
responsibilities both practically and cognitively.  Helping others through change is a 
combination of sensemaking and orientation towards the team.  This is more to be seen as a 
sensegiving activity, where they need to translate and communicate the planned changes to 
their subordinates.  This is also about handling resistance and providing support, coaching, 
and training.  Keeping the business going is a combination of orientation towards peers/self 
and a coordination and management activity.  During change, responsibilities and tasks 
change hands, as do staff.  In this atmosphere of semi-coordinated chaos, middle managers 
have to take responsibility for tasks that are not their responsibility in the new organizational 
setting but were their responsibility in the old setting, as well as tasks that definitively are 
theirs.  The main objective is to take care of all tasks so that the business does not suffer.  
Implementing changes to departments is a combination of orientation towards team and 
coordination and management activity.  New working practices are developed together with 
other improvement issues, such as e.g. cost savings and quality improvements.  In addition, 
gray spots - areas where dividing and responsibility lines between different departments and 
business units are unclear - must be enlightened and clarified.  This is a task that may fall 
into the hands of the executing middle manager in the respective areas.  
Much of the positive middle management research is grounded in a sensemaking 
perspective on change.  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, p. 442) defined sensemaking as “[it] 
has to do with meaning construction and reconstruction by the involved parties as they 
attempted [sic] to develop a meaningful framework for understanding the nature of the 
intended strategic change”.  Individuals make sense of situations in which they find 
themselves by communicating about reality as a continuous achievement.  As a consequence, 
sensemaking is an interpretative process where individuals discover their inventions through 
interpretations of the intended changes.  These interpretations have an impact on how the 
change recipients’ create change and affect the change outcome (Balogun & Johnson, 2004).  
The counterpart to sensemaking is sensegiving.  Sensegiving may be defined as “the process 
of attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a 
preferred redefinition of organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442).  
Sensegiving has to do with influencing others’ interpretations and hence meaning 
construction through different types of communicative and interactive behavior (Maitlis, 
2005).   Sensemaking and sensegiving are social processes where the sensemaker and 
 19 
sensegiver are engaged in different and multifaceted negotiation processes to create their 
own mental picture of the changes (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991; Maitlis, 2005).  The sensemaking perspective on change points out the challenging 
tasks middle managers perform related to both making sense of changes themselves and 
helping others make sense of planned change. 
A related approach to middle management, which emphasizes roles during 
organizational change rather than tasks, was presented by Huy (2001).  While Huy did not 
explicitly frame his research within a sensemaking perspective, his findings emphasize the 
important role middle managers play in terms of translating strategic goals into more 
operational practices.  He also showed how middle managers take on a supporting role for 
subordinates during change.  The four middle manager change implementation roles he 
introduced are: (i) the entrepreneur, (ii) the communicator, (iii) the therapist, and (iv) the 
tight rope artist.  The entrepreneur role is associated with middle managers’ position near the 
frontline, which allows the ability to see new possibilities in both problem solving and 
opportunity detection.  Middle managers are often experienced, with great functional 
knowledge of the business, which makes them fertile ground for new ideas of growth and 
change.  The communicator role has to do with establishing a positive attitude throughout the 
organization regarding proposed changes.  Here middle managers play a vital role.  They 
translate the initiative into language and metaphors their subordinates and peers understand.  
Middle managers very often have a widespread web of contacts in the organization, and they 
know whom to contact to get things done.  Through this web of contacts, they are able to 
spread the word about the changes, and secure support for the initiative.  The therapist role is 
middle management handling uncertainty and fear.  Uncertainty may trigger demoralization, 
depression and paralysis.  The middle manager is not in a position where she can ignore this 
fact, but has to face and handle these issues, in order to take care of employee well-being.  
Because of their proximity to their employees, they are in a position to tailor communication 
so that it suits each individual recipient.  Finally, the tight rope artist shows how the middle 
manager needs to balance her attention between a set of different issues. Attention on issues 
such as having focus on the actual change implementation while she simultaneously needs to 
focus on the day-to-day business and employee morale.  Negligence to either of these issues 
may lead to underperformance in one field or the other. 
In summary, the optimistic view on middle managers emphasizes various ways in 
which middle managers constructively influence the making and implementation of strategy. 
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Although the optimistic view can be seen as a response and balance to a previously overly 
negative view on middle managers, one might argue that this later stream of (optimistic) 
literature tends to ignore the evidence of more counterproductive activities by the middle 
managers. There have been only a few studies over the past years accentuating middle 
management’s important strategic role, while also highlighting how dysfunctional role 
conflicts may have a negative impact on the construction and implementation of strategy 
(Laine & Vaara, 2007; Mantere, 2008; Meyer, 2006; Wooldridge et al., 2008).  Furthermore, 
while middle manager’s strategic activity encompasses a wide range of activities, such as 
issue selling, championing alternatives, implementing deliberate change and responding to 
change, the middle management literature focus mostly on middle managers strategic role as 
either participators in the making and implementation of strategy or as recipients of strategic 
change.  Balogun (2003) is a notable exception as she emphasized the challenges that middle 
manager meet by acting both as a change recipient and as a change implementer in 
combination.  This suggests that there is a need to investigate how middle management 
response to strategic change initiatives influences change outcomes. Therefore in the next 
section, I present some key contributions on responses to organizational change.  
Research on responses to change can be divided into two main research streams: 
organizational (macro-perspective) and individual responses to change (micro-perspective) 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).  The first category is concerned with 
explanatory factors and responses at the organizational level (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, & 
Hunt, 1998; Lozeau, Langley, & Denis, 2002; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007), and the latter 
focuses on how individual responses to change initiative may interfere with proposed 
changes (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Huy, 2002; Lines, 2005; Piderit, 2000; Stensaker & 
Falkenberg, 2007).  This couples responses to change, to sensemaking and sensegiving, and 
is as such a result of how individuals make sense of proposed changes.  It is argued within 
the bulk of research on individual responses that organizations do not as such respond to 
changes, it is the different actors within the organizations who respond to change initiatives 
and that it is the different responses at an aggregated level that shape the organizational 
responses (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).   While responses at the employee level serve to 
shape strategic change outcomes, both the pessimistic and optimistic research on middle 
managers suggest that middle managers are in a particularly powerful position in terms of 
influencing change outcomes.  Existing research suggests that middle managers behave both 
convergently and divergently when faced with change.  One explanation behind their 
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behavior lies in how they make sense of change and the interpretations upon which they act.  
A deeper understanding of these responses demands more insight into how middle managers 
explain and legitimize their behavior and how through their actions and communications 
they influence others’ perception of change.  
Piderit (2000)  categorized individual responses to change in three dimensions: (i) 
cognitive, (ii) emotional, and (iii) intentional responses.  The cognitive dimension refers to 
an individual’s belief system.  How the individual beliefs are regarding the proposed 
changes, whether they are negative, positive, or neutral, has an impact on change recipients’ 
attitudes related to the changes.  The emotional dimension refers to individual feelings in 
response to proposed changes.  The intentional dimension refers to individual intent or 
decision to take some action related to the changes.  In this context, intention is related to an 
employee’s intent to act as a response to a new event, since a change initiative per se is a 
novel event.  In the same context, behavior is seen as an active intervention that actually 
takes place (or has been taking place) distinguished from the intention to act.  Intentions may 
range from an intention to support an initiative, to an intention to oppose it (Piderit, 2000).  
This categorizes intention as a reflection in the same way as emotion and cognition, in 
contrast to active behavior.  Responses to change may of course be characterized as either 
negative, where change recipients react and act negatively regarding all three dimensions, or 
positive, where change recipients react and act positively in all three dimensions.  However, 
it is more likely that responses to change initiatives are more ambivalent and complex than a 
simplistic two-dimensional approach: either negative or positive.  Piderit (2000) emphasized 
the multidimensional perspective on responses to organizational change and the need for 
further empirical research on the phenomenon.   
This multidimensional approach towards change attitudes may enhance our 
understanding of middle managers’ responses to change, and as a consequence increase the 
possibility of achieving desired change outcome.   Recognizing and understanding 
potentially ambivalent attitudes among middle managers can help us gain insight into both 
constructive and less constructive behavior on behalf of the middle managers in their role as 
change implementers.  In addition, it is important to gain a better understanding of how 
middle managers, in their important dual role as change recipients and change agents, 
resolve potential ambiguities.  For instance, if they have negative feelings and thoughts 
about a particular change, will this result in divergent behavior?  Likewise, how will middle 
managers explain and legitimize changes that they disagree with vis-à-vis their subordinates?   
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In summary, despite a growing emphasis and literature on middle management’s 
influence on strategic change processes and outcomes, we lack a clear understanding of what 
makes middle managers sometimes take on an active role in contributing to implement 
change and other times vividly work to not implement planned change.  One reason for this 
could be that the middle management literature has been divided into two camps.  The broad 
range of the studies in the optimistic research stream suggests that middle managers 
sensemaking and sensegiving processes have a great impact on the change outcome (e.g. 
Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Rouleau, 2005).  While sensegiving has to do with influencing 
the meaning construction of others, it is remarkable how little research there is coupling 
sensemaking and sensegiving with organizational politics. Yet we know from the more 
pessimistic literature on middle managers that organizational change is a political process 
where middle managers’ self-interest or their beliefs of what is best for the organization is 
challenged (Buchanan, 2008; Buchanan & Badham, 1999, 2008; Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; 
Mintzberg, 1985; Pettigrew, 1975, 1977).  One reason for the lack of linkages between 
sensemaking/sensegiving and politics may be that organizational politics is a phenomenon 
debated in literature (Buchanan & Badham, 2008).  Some would argue that it is 
unprofessional, unsanctioned and illegitimate, and others that it is inevitable, desirable and 
necessary to engage in organizational politics.  In this study, I will attempt to draw on both 
streams of middle management literature in order to get a broader understanding of middle 
management responses to planned change initiatives. 
2.2 Developing A Research Perspective   
In this section I develop and present the overall research perspective underlying this 
study (figure 1).  I then illustrate how the perspective is used in the three essays.  The model 
highlights that political and discursive responsive aspects of middle management 
sensegiving and sensemaking are tied together and linked to change outcome.  The model 
also attempts to illustrate the main contribution of the study.  The overall objective for this 
dissertation is to show how middle managers influence change outcome through their 
responses to change and subsequently through their convergent or divergent behavior.   
The light shaded boxes in the model illustrate how middle management involvement 
in strategy implementation affects the change outcome (e.g. Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 
2005).  Middle management’s involvement in the making of strategy enhances businesses 
financial performance (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge et al., 2008).  The final 
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change outcome may for example be positively affected if middle management are given the 
opportunity to create a shared understanding of top management’s strategic intentions (Floyd 
& Wooldridge, 1992, 1997, 2000; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990).  On the other hand, how 
individuals respond to change initiatives may interfere with change outcome as individuals 
may respond either convergently or divergently to proposed changes. Sensemaking and 
sensegiving processes amongst middle managers have been found as vital explanatory factor 
for understanding how middle managers influence change outcome.  
The highlighted (dark) boxes illustrate the role of power, politics and discourse in 
affecting the sensemaking that takes place during organizational change. These parts of the 
model illustrate how middle managers, through engagement in organizational politics and 
discourse, affect others’ sensemaking and sensegiving, and how these sensemaking and 
sensegiving processes influences the change outcome. The perspective is based on the 
assumption that power, politics and discourse have a significant impact on middle managers 
sensemaking and sensegiving and hence the change outcome.  Individuals may behave or 
have intentions to behave in one way, but in the same time they may have emotional and/or 
cognitive responses in the opposite direction (Piderit, 2000).  Power and politics influence 
individuals’ actions through the creation of legitimacy for certain ideas, which may be in 
conflict with the same individual’s originally cognitive and/or emotional and/or intentional 
position.  Such legitimation may be created through discourse.  It is argued that middle 
management sensemaking and sensegiving is a highly political process, where discourse 
plays a key role.  
 
Figure 1: Research perspective 
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Organizational politics is the practical domain of power (Buchanan & Badham, 
2008).  Power is about getting somebody to do something you want them to do even if it is 
against their will or that they else would not do it (Hardy & Clegg, 1996).  Pettigrew (1977) 
introduced a widely cited definition of politics:  “Politics concerns the creation of legitimacy 
for certain ideas, values and demands – not just actions performed as a result of previously 
acquired legitimacy.  The management of meaning refers to a process of symbol 
construction and value use designed both to create legitimacy for one’s own demands and to 
“delegitimize” the demands of opponents” (p. 85).  Sensegiving is tight coupled to others’ 
meaning constructions as it has to do with the attempt to influence others’ sensemaking.  As 
sensemaking is about how individuals make sense of organizational reality, or the 
organizational reality the sensegiver want them to see, sensemaking and sensegiving is tight 
coupled to organizational politics.  Pettigrew (1977) holds out that politics is about the 
creation of legitimacy and the struggle for legitimacy is a struggle for the opportunity to 
influence meaning.  The sensemakers struggle for influencing others’ perception of reality 
and meaning construction may lead to actions that would not have taken place without the 
sensegivers influence.  An underutilized approach for exploring organizational politics is 
discourse (Gordon, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2009; Grant & Hardy, 2004; Hardy, 2004; Hardy, 
Palmer, & Phillips, 2000; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Mantere & Vaara, 2008). 
Organizational discourse has to do with the struggle for meaning  (Grant & Hardy, 
2004), and as such is directly related to sensegiving.  Discourse encompasses written and 
spoken text, visual images (e.g. pictures, art works), symbols, buildings and other artifacts 
(e.g. body language, dress code) (Fairclough, 2005; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004).  
Heracleous & Hendry (2000) defines discourse as “any body of language-based 
communicative actions, or language in use” (p. 1258).  Discourse is a means to create 
legitimacy (Fairclough, 2003; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Vaara & Tienari, 
2008) for example for actions taken during change, such as divergent or convergent action.  
Discourse is connected to legitimation through the fact that specific discourses serve 
legitimizing purposes (Fairclough, 2003; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Vaara & 
Tienari, 2008).  Discourse has to do with the struggle for meaning, and the struggle for 
meaning can also be viewed as a fight for power (Grant & Hardy, 2004; Hardy & Phillips, 
2004).   
Studying sensitive and perhaps also controversial issues such as politics and 
discourse, demands specific approaches towards research.  This is because the potential 
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controversial sides of organizational politics on one side and the tight coupling of politics 
and discourse on the other.  Skilled political actors may not reveal their real intentions 
through what they say or do in only one setting.  They reveal their real intention through 
their daily doings and communication.  As a consequence of my former professional 
connection to the analyzed organization possible advantages in studying these issues are:  (i) 
I have an extensive knowledge of the organization, the industry, and the business performed 
in the studied organization, and (ii) I had established personal relations with the respondents 
which gave me access to information they might have held back for complete strangers.   
The recent strategy-as-practice research, which focuses on practices regarding the 
tacit and symbolic practices through which strategy is constructed (Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008) lends itself to such a focus and has successfully been 
applied in several studies on organizational discourse.  Social practice is the core of the 
strategy-as-practice research stream (Whittington, 2007).  It is engaging in people’s strategy 
activity and how they influence strategic outcome, what they do, opposed to a more classic 
approach that strategy is something firms have (Hoon, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Johnson, Melin, 
& Whittington, 2003; Whittington, 2006, 2007).  The strategy-as-practice perspective 
assumes that strategy is shaped by a broad spectrum of managers and practitioners at many 
different levels in organizations, not only top managers (Balogun, 2007; Balogun & Johnson, 
2005; Hoon, 2007; Rouleau, 2005). 
2.3 Outline and Brief Summary of the Essays 
This dissertation is composed of three different essays approaching the overall 
research question from different angles.  In this paragraph, I will show how the three essays 
are connected to different parts of the model presented in Figure 2.  The colored ellipses 
show where each essay has its focus.  Essay One, “Discourse Constructions in Retrospective 
Assessments of Change Successes and Failures” focuses on the connection between 
discourse and sensemaking/sensegiving.  Essay Two, “The Politics of Middle Management 
Sensemaking and Sensegiving” has its overall focus on the political and power aspects of 
sensemaking and sensegiving.  Finally in Essay Three, “The Gang of Four: Discourse 
Strategies to Legitimize Divergent Change Behavior” the discursive sides of organizational 
politics are explored.  Each of the essays is briefly introduced below.  
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Figure 2: Research perspective related to essays 
The essay presented in Chapter 3 shows that middle managers’ evaluation of change 
outcome is not necessarily based on objective analysis and facts.  Cognitive and emotional 
responses play an important role when change initiatives are evaluated.  “Discourse 
Constructions in Retrospective Assessments of Change Successes and Failures” is an 
empirical essay, which argues that whether a change initiative is a success or a failure is a 
subjective matter.  The discourse construction applied to communicate the change outcome 
has a direct impact on whether the outcome is viewed as a success or a failure.  This study 
reveals how discourse constructions applied by middle managers limit the scope of others’ 
sensemaking and by that shape their perception of reality.  The retrospective assessments of 
two change initiatives are analyzed in-depth with a focus on middle managers’ application of 
four discourse constructions: the rationalistic, the cultural, the role-bound and the 
individualistic construction of change outcomes. The findings suggest that the rationalistic 
and the role-bound discourse construction especially served as effective tools for sensegivers 
in limiting the scope of discussion.  The rationalistic discourse constructions were effective 
for constructing change successes, in line with a more aggregated overall business oriented 
perspective, while the role-bound discourse constructions were shown to be effective for 
constructing failures and as a tool to create scapegoats responsible for the failures.  In the 
cases analyzed, an informal group leader took process control (e.g. Hardy, 1996) very early 
on in the discussion.  This leading figure took a role as the leading sensegiver (Gioia & 
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Chittipeddi, 1991) in the group processes, guiding the others sensemaking (Weick, 1993) in 
a direction that suited the sensegiver’s perception of reality (Hardy, 1996).  Regardless of 
whether the “sensegiver” defines a project as a failure or as a success, s/he is in a unique 
position to structure and influence the other group participants’ sensemaking.  In this way, 
the sensegiver is able to limit the scope of the discussion, and even be in position to guide 
the discussion in certain directions.  The findings draw and extend recent research on 
discourse constructions by Vaara (2002) by showing how discourse constructions also serve 
to influence others’ sensemaking and their perception of change outcome  (Hardy, 1996).  
Hence, discourse constructions are closely tied to mechanisms for power and politics (e.g. 
Buchanan & Badham, 1999).  
This study contributes to the strategy-as practice and middle management literature, 
as middle managers’ discourse micro-practices are able to form the perception of strategy.  
This study also enhances the literature on organizational discourse by exploring middle 
managers’ view on strategy by performing conversation analysis (Laine & Vaara, 2007).  
Finally, this study enhances our understanding of the four discursive constructions of success 
or failure in change narratives introduced by Vaara (2002) by showing how different 
discourse constructions have political aspects as they may serve different personal and 
organizational objectives when middle managers define change initiatives as successes or 
failures. 
Chapter 4 reveals how middle managers’ responses to planned change may constitute 
a broad mix of cognitive, emotional and intentional reactions.  “The Politics of Middle 
Management Sensemaking and Sensegiving” explores how responses to change initiatives 
foster political activities and actions.  The study reveals how several middle managers 
deliberately respond to the change initiative with divergent action. Other middle managers 
loyally implemented the change and hence showed convergent actions. This study 
contributes to the existing literature and extends it by revealing tactical actions and political 
skills that lie behind divergent and convergent action at the middle management level.  The 
analysis reveals how middle managers mobilize different sources of power and rely on 
different types of political skills in order to influence other’s sensemaking.    By mobilizing 
process and resource power, several middle managers were able to influence meaning 
making (Balogun, Gleadle, Hailey, & Willmott, 2005; Hardy, 1996) and position themselves 
as major sensegivers, with great influence on others’ sensemaking (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991).  The findings in this study suggest that these sensegiving processes contain a wide 
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range of political means to gain control over the processes, ranging from the active pre-
project political ploy involving taking control over process and meaning construction in an 
open process, to the more closed processes where secrecy and manipulation were important 
means for influence.  The study shows the tight coupling between power, politics, 
sensemaking and sensegiving.  The study shows that those who are able to exert the power 
of process are able to have an influence over other people’s meaning construction.  The 
study also shows a tight link between the power of resources and the power of process; here, 
expertise is especially vital if actors manage to maneuver themselves into a position where 
they can control the process.  Expertise as a basis for exerting the power of resources also 
has an impact on an actor’s ability to exert the power of meaning. 
This study contributes to existing literature on power and politics by providing access 
to rich qualitative accounts from respondents taking part in political behavior that gives 
insight into how politically skilled actors operate.  This study also contributes to existing 
sensemaking and sensegiving literature through providing evidence for a tight coupling with 
power and politics, showing that sensegiving is politics in action.  Finally, the study 
enhances the existing strategy-as-practice literature by showing the tight coupling between 
practice, politics and change outcome. 
In Chapter 5 we see how organizational change may trigger oppositional responses.   
“The Gang of Four: Discourse Strategies to Legitimize Divergent Change Behavior” reveals 
both emotional and cognitive responses to change.  It is an empirical essay that shows how 
middle managers attempt to legitimize deviant and oppositional behavior during 
organizational change.  Four explicit legitimating strategies have been identified: emotional, 
group-loyal, rational, and argumentative strategies.  Despite an overall shared goal of 
making sure that the suggested structural changes were not implemented, each middle 
manager in the study described different reasons for their divergent change behavior.  They 
legitimized their actions using various discourse strategies.  The emotional strategy was 
rooted in one particular individual’s anger at being ignored and not given a voice, the group 
loyal strategy was based on one particular individual’s loyalty to the management team of 
which he was a part, the rational strategy was grounded in statistical evidence, and the 
argumentative strategy was founded in the need to have a voice in the project. 
This study enhances our understanding of middle managers and change by explaining 
the role they play in altering the path of change and shaping the change outcome.  The study 
further contributes to the literature of discourse studies through a better understanding of 
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legitimation, and to the strategy-as-practice field through improving our knowledge of how 
skilled players operate.  
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3. Discourse Constructions in Retrospective 
Assessments of Change Successes and Failures 
3.1 Abstract 
Many organizational change efforts are reported as failures.  However, recent 
literature on discourse reveals that whether a change initiative is a success or a failure is a 
subjective matter, and the discourse construction applied to communicate the change 
outcome has a direct impact on whether the outcome is perceived as a success or a failure.  
Middle managers play a key role in implementing change. This study reveals how middle 
managers through discourse constructions limit the scope of others’ sensemaking and shape 
their perception of reality.  The retrospective assessments of two change initiatives are 
analyzed in-depth with a focus on middle managers’ application of four discourse 
constructions: (i) the rationalistic, (ii) the cultural, (iii) the role-bound and (iv) the 
individualistic construction of change outcomes. The findings suggest that especially the 
rationalistic and the role-bound discourse constructions serve as effective tools for 
sensegivers in limiting the scope of discussion.  The rationalistic discourse constructions 
were effective for constructing change successes, while the role-bound discourse 
constructions were shown to be effective for constructing failures. 
3.2 Introduction 
 In recent literature, middle managers have been identified as the most important 
actors regarding putting change initiatives to work (Balogun, 2003, 2006; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Dopson & Stewart, 1990; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Meyer, 
2006).  How middle managers make sense of change initiatives has had a great impact on 
how changes actually get implemented and the outcome of change (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).  Although research has identified 
that many planned change initiatives fail, whether a change is considered as a success or 
failure is a subjective matter dependant on the discourse used to communicate the outcome 
(Laine & Vaara, 2007; Vaara, 2002).  This essay examines the active role of middle 
managers in constructing perceptions of change success and failure.  
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How change outcome is viewed and communicated is closely connected to discourse 
and discourse constructions (Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous & Hendry, 2000; Vaara, 2002; 
Vaara & Tienari, 2008).  Much of the recent literature on middle managements role in 
strategy implementation and strategic outcomes has taken a sensemaking perspective on 
change (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007) but 
without explicitly linking sensemaking and sensegiving to the organizational discourse.  Yet, 
organizational discourse is essentially about the struggle for meaning (Grant & Hardy, 
2004), which can be understood as the attempts to construct organizational reality (Hardy, 
2004) similar to sensegiving.  Likewise, discourse produces power relationships and as such 
are political tools (Hardy & Phillips, 2004).  Politics is about influencing individuals’ 
perceptions of reality (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Hardy, 1996), yet the linkages between 
discourse, power and sensegiving have not been made explicit.  Hardy & Phillips (2004) 
highlighted that discourses produce power relationships, and as such constitute the social 
world.  This draws attention to the subjectivity of discourses and to the way discourses limit 
and restrict the way of talking and behaving regarding the topic on which the discourse is 
constructed (Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Laine & Vaara, 2007; Vaara, 2002). This essay sets out 
to explore how the linkages between discourse constructions, power and 
sensemaking/sensegiving influence perceptions of change outcome. 
In order to examine these linkages, I apply a strategy-as-practice perspective, which 
implies a focus on practices regarding the tacit and symbolic practices through which 
strategy is constructed (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008).  Strategy-
as-practice research deals with micro-practices of what people do, engaging in their strategy 
activity and how they influence strategic outcome, rather than focusing on strategy as 
something firms have (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008; Stensaker & 
Falkenberg, 2007; Whittington, 2006, 2007).   Social practice is the core of the strategy-as-
practice research stream (Whittington, 2007); the actual activities associated with strategy 
making (Balogun, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004).  As such, the strategy-as-practice appears 
suitable for studying socially situated practices related to discourse and power issues.  
Existing research within this perspective has for instance shown that  discourse has a 
significant impact on the formation of strategy (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & 
Whittington, 2008; Laine & Vaara, 2007) and Vaara (2002) found that  different discourse 
constructions were applied when change actors categorized change initiatives either as 
failures or as successes.   
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In this essay, I apply a critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995, 2005; Fairclough 
& Wodak, 1997; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Mumby, 2004; van Leeuwen, 2008a; Wodak & 
Meyer, 2001) examining how discourse constructions affect power relations and middle 
managers’ perception of reality regarding successes and failures in strategic change 
initiatives.  In the analysis, I focus on how different middle managers describe and 
categorize change initiatives they have experienced: either as failures or as successes.  
Specifically, I identify which discourse construction they use to position themselves and how 
through their discourse construction they influence other people’s understanding of the 
change outcome. 
The findings indicate that middle managers play an active role, not only in 
implementing change, but also in retrospectively constructing change outcomes as either a 
success or a failure.  This has significance for the strategy-as practice and middle 
management literature as middle managers’ discourse micro-practices are able to structure 
the perception of strategy.  Furthermore, this study enhances the literature on organizational 
discourse by exploring middle managers’ view of strategy by performing conversation 
analysis (Laine & Vaara, 2007). 
3.3 Discourse and discourse constructions 
Change may lead to unintended outcomes (Balogun & Johnson, 2005) as a 
consequence of change recipients’ reactions to change and how these recipients make sense 
of the intended changes (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).  Unintended outcomes may be seen 
as failures or as successes.  They may retrospectively be valued as failures when the 
intention of the change program was not reached such as not implementing intended 
organizational structures.  On the other hand, they may retrospectively be evaluated as 
successes if organizational objectives such as enhanced economic performances were met.  
However, what is defined as success and what is defined as failure are not solely grounded 
on objectivity.  What is defined as success or failure is dependent on the interpretation of the 
objectives and how these objectives are met.  The discursive constructions for which these 
interpretations are met have an impact on how individuals subjectively conclude these 
issues.   Laine & Vaara (2007, p. 30) defined subjectivity as “a discursively constructed 
sense of identity and social agency in specific context”. 
 33 
This means that the same change initiative may be considered as both a success and a 
failure (Vaara, 2002) by different individuals or groups within an organization.  We further 
know that how individuals attribute success and failure are tightly linked with one’s own 
relationship to the project.  If an individual has been active and participative there is a 
tendency to define the outcome as a success rather than a failure.  This tendency is tightly 
linked to individual self-interest regarding prestige and career.  As a consequence, 
individuals tend to link success to own actions and failure to the actions of others or to 
external matters (Vaara, 2002). 
As a result of the fact that there may be different interests in defining a change 
initiative either as success or failure, different actors may apply various discursive strategies 
to present the project outcome and to attempt to influence other people’s assessment of the 
change outcome.  In this essay, discourse will be defined in accordance with the definition 
applied in Heracleous & Hendry (2000, p. 1258): “any body of language-based 
communicative actions, or language in use”.  This definition of discourse encompasses 
written and spoken text, visual images (e.g. pictures, art works), symbols, buildings and 
other artifacts (e.g. body language, dress code) (Fairclough, 2005; Phillips et al., 2004).   
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995, 2005; Fairclough & Wodak, 
1997; van Leeuwen, 2008a; Wodak & Meyer, 2001) is a key analytical approach in many 
recent studies of discourse.  CDA is a method through which one may analyze the role 
“played by language in the construction of power relationships and reproduction of 
domination” (Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006, p. 792).  CDA has to do with the thorough 
examination of the relationship between discourse and power, attempting to explore the 
relationships between discursive practices, events and text on one side, and social and 
cultural structures, relations and processes on the other (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; 
Mumby, 2004; Wodak & Meyer, 2001).  The objective is to explore how social practices, 
events and texts “arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and 
struggles over power” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 135).  Hardy and Phillips (2004) emphasized 
that when actors produce text, they can only do so by drawing on existing discourses, which 
again are limited and shaped by the construction and interpretation of the prevailing 
discourse.  This observation pinpoints the inherent power struggle in discourses and the 
limitations actors have in these struggles.  This study also reveals how the relationship of 
power and struggles over power with regard to who leads the discussion and thus structures 
the discourse. In addition it shows how these power relationships/struggles develop through 
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conversation when middle managers discuss and define change programs as failures or 
successes.  The conversation analysis will be performed through the perspective of discourse 
constructions introduced by Vaara (2002). 
Vaara found four different discursive constructions of success or failure in change 
narratives: (i) the rationalistic, (ii) the cultural, (iii) the role-bound, and (iv) the 
individualistic.  The rationalistic discourse construction typically comprises references to 
traditional business performance measures such as profits, sales, costs, turnover etc.  Success 
refers to increasing profits, increasing sales, reduced costs, satisfied customers, low turnover, 
a moderate level of conflicts, enhanced productivity, and other unquestioned performance 
measures.  Failure refers to the same indicators but with the opposite sign.  The 
argumentation applied in rationalistic discourses is exerted from a management perspective, 
where performance measures used to argue one’s position are legitimate performance 
measures used in the organization.  In other words this kind of argumentation may be said to 
be neutral because it refers to more or less objective performance indicators.  This neutral 
argumentation is suited to hiding internal politics (Buchanan & Badham, 1999) among the 
decision-makers. 
On the other hand, the cultural discourse construction is not neutral in the sense of 
argumentation.  This construction takes into account that actors involved represent different 
parties in change initiatives.  This representation may occur regarding subculture identity, 
national identity (in multinational corporations), and identity to premerger organizational 
entities.  Success is seen from the perspective of one particular cultural identity, where the 
objective is to have success from own point of view at the expense of the other side (the 
other cultural identity).  From this discourse construction success is not measured against 
rational and objective performance indicators, but is measured by to which extent their own 
solutions, ideas, working practices, etc are the surviving ones.  Success has to do with being 
on the winning team at the expense of the losing side.  In other words, cultural discourse 
illustrates “confrontations between different camps” (Vaara, 2002, p. 238). 
The role-bound discourse construction has the role-identity within the corporation as 
a building block.  Organizational actors are bound by their institutionalized positions in the 
organization. Organizational competition between different areas of responsibility makes the 
basis for this discourse construction.  This competition has to do with different areas of 
responsibility endeavors to have their specific needs (such as resources, projects, funding 
etc) fulfilled at the expense of other areas of responsibility.  Success is measured related to 
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achievements in this internal competition, rather than on overall business performance.  All 
in all, it has to do with conflict of interest between different decision-makers. 
The individualistic discourse construction contrasts the cultural and role-bound 
discourse constructions where the first has to do with individuality and personal 
characteristics and the latter ones have to do with actors being tied to their social position.  
Individualistic discourse constructions are individual autobiographies, where effects from 
specific people (even themselves) are emphasized.  As an attribution tool accentuating 
individual performances, this discourse construction may serve effective purposes.  Heroes 
and scapegoats are created.  Credit given or taken for successes produces heroes, and blame 
given for failures produces scapegoats – in the end, this is an individual-level power game. 
Vaara (2002) emphasized that different discourse constructions may appear in 
combination.  He suggests this is more common for failure accounts and when one wants to 
legitimize and justify own actions.  The cultural, role-bound, and individualistic discourse 
allows for problematization and relativization of success and failure. This enriches the 
possibilities for interpretations of the narratives, which can give a more pluralistic and 
critical perspective on changes (Vaara, 2002).  In contrast, the rational discourse offers few 
such alternatives.   
3.4 Sensemaking, Sensegiving, and Discourse Constructions  
Sensemaking is a retrospective effort to make sense of situations in which individuals 
find themselves by communicating about reality as a continuous achievement.  “People 
make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed what they believe”  
(Weick, 1995, p. 15).  Sensemaking may be seen as individuals’ discovery of their 
inventions.  As a consequence of this argument, language games and text may be seen as 
artifacts of the sensemaking processes (Weick, 1995).  This perspective is a direct link to 
Heracleous & Hendry’s (2000) definition of discourse, where language-based 
communicative actions or the language in use are the key elements.  Gioia & Chittipeddi 
(1991) emphasized sensemaking as a meaning construction and reconstruction to interpret 
and understand intended changes.  Balogun & Johnson (2004) called attention to the fact that 
individual’s interpretation of intended changes will have an impact on the change outcome.  
If interpretation of intentions has an impact on the outcome, then the retrospective evaluation 
and interpretation of whether an initiative was a success or a failure will be affected by how 
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individuals made sense of the intentions.  Discourse constructions (Vaara, 2002) will serve 
as effective tools in this sensemaking process.  
Sensegiving may be defined as “the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442).  It has to do with having an 
influence through the use of different types of communicative behavior, which ultimately 
has a major impact on change for both leaders and stakeholders (Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007).  Sensegiving is a socially constructed negotiation process (Maitlis, 2005), 
which engages sensemakers and sensegivers in different and often multifaceted negotiation 
processes (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005).   Further it is a political process where 
individual sensemaking is affected by the persuasive techniques employed by the sensegiver 
(Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007).  When sensegiving is a communication-based political 
inducement technique, discourse constructions may serve as effective tools for influence. 
 Discourse analysis is a method for examining the linguistic elements in the 
construction of social phenomena (Vaara, Kleymann, & Seristö, 2004).  Weick (1995) 
described sensemaking as a social and cognitive process where the sensemaker develops 
interpretative schemes as systems of meaning through experience and socialization.  
Discourse constructions are tools where individuals use different discursive strategies to 
shape their perception of reality.  Discourses are both socially conditioned and socially 
constructed: they are socially conditioned by being formed by particular social actors in 
specific settings, and socially constructed through their key role in social sensemaking 
activity (Vaara et al., 2004).  From this we know that sensemaking and sensegiving are 
tightly linked to discourse constructions.  However, we have yet to explore how sensegivers 
are able to affect other individuals’ sensemaking through the use of discourse constructions.  
In addition, sensemakers use of discourse constructions in organizational politics should be 
further explored. 
3.5 The study 
I conducted a study of middle managers in a major Nordic insurance company – 
INSCO.  The company had been through several strategic change processes in the last 
decade, such as mergers, organizational restructuring programs and changes in working 
practices and business procedures.  In the group of middle managers studied there had been a 
 37 
relatively low turnover over the last seven years.  The study was conducted on a group of 
first line middle managers and their superiors (higher level middle manager) attending a 
strategy seminar.  During the seminar, a practical exercise organized as modified focus 
group interviews or dialogues (Patton, 2002) was arranged.  Modified focus groups are in 
this instance meant as focus group interviews without moderator; hence they must be seen as 
self-governed groups.  The objective for this exercise was to engage the participants (middle 
managers) in an evaluation loop from past change programs regarding reasons for success 
and failures, process issues and skills issues, so that the division management could receive 
feedback and preferably enhance the division’s ability to implement changes in the future.  
To do this it was necessary to let the groups create a mutual understanding within the group 
of the change programs that were successful and the change programs that were failures. 
To give the focus groups a tool to guide the discussion, a structured open-ended 
interview guide was used (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).  The overall guiding premise in this 
interview guide was to create an agreement of one change program that the group defined as 
a success and one that the group defined as a failure.  To ensure open and effective 
discussions, the interview objects were, as far as possible, randomly placed in groups where 
they shared similar background (middle managers in the same company), but were 
unfamiliar with each other’s work (worked in different sections and departments).  Six 
groups with five participants each were appointed.  The interviews were arranged 
simultaneously, as it was a premise from the company that the practical exercise would be 
conducted simultaneously.  As a consequence of only being one researcher and having six 
simultaneously working focus groups, one person in each group was given the responsibility 
to tape-record the discussion and document the discussion in writing in a preformatted 
PowerPoint presentation formatted in accordance with the interview guide.  No one was 
specifically given the responsibility to be a group leader.  The objective was to have as open 
a discussion as possible without the limitations and biases a pre-defined group leader could 
bring to the discussion.  Actors can only produce text by drawing on existing discourses, 
which again are limited and shaped by the construction and interpretation of prevailing 
discourse (Hardy & Phillips, 2004).  The objective was to limit the impact on the discussion 
of one specific individual’s perception of reality.  However, in each group a leading figure 
emerged throughout the discussion, without any formal appointment from the researcher or 
acceptance from the other participants in the group. 
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The exercise lasted for three hours.  All data from the group interviews were 
transcribed verbatim totaling approximately 400, together with the Power Point 
presentations. 
The focus groups followed the structured interview guide, however, the unguided 
discussions led to interesting findings that emerged through the discussions.  One interesting 
finding was that in two different instances one group defined a project as a success and 
another group defined the same project as a failure.  Fortunately, these findings represented 
four different focus groups, which secured a rich set of data.  Data from the two remaining 
groups have not been analyzed in this essay.  The findings presented and discussed in this 
essay consist of only two different change projects, which constitute the cases (see Figure 1 
– Cases).  Each case consists of two embedded units of analysis  (Yin, 2003) unit one 
represents one group that considered the project a success and unit two represents one group 
that considered the project as a failure.  To secure anonymity for the respondents, each 
individual is identified with one capital letter in Figure 3 and when the data is presented. 
 
Figure 3: Cases – Modified Focus Group Study 
A narrative strategy was applied when analyzing the data (Langley, 1999; Van 
Maanen, 1979).  First, a “thick description” was developed (Balogun & Johnson, 2004), and 
from this a first order analysis (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Rouleau, 2005; Van Maanen, 
1979) was developed.  The “thick description” and the first order analysis comprise the 
fundament for the analysis presented in this essay.   However, it should be emphasized that 
narratives are my own interpretations of data, and as such are not unaffected by my analysis 
(Brown, 2006).  
Discourse constructions as they are presented in Vaara (2002) are used extensively as 
a tool to analyze the relations of power and struggles over power in the dialogues found in 
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the data. The criteria applied for categorizing each discourse construction is presented in 
Table 1. 
Discourse Construction Criteria 
The rationalistic discourse construction Focus on measurable objectives or objective 
performance indicators 
The cultural discourse construction Focus on confrontation between different sub 
units with their own shared values and basic 
assumptions.   
The role-bound discourse construction Focus on role-identity related to their 
institutionalized organizational position.   
The individualistic discourse construction Focus on individual characteristics such as 
attribution to make heroes and/or scapegoats. 
 
Table 1: Discourse Constructions Criteria 
3.6 Background 
In the last decade, The Norwegian branch of INSCO had been through many 
different changes.  However, the data in this article refer to two different projects: (i) a major 
organizational restructuring program in the year 2000, and (ii) a task-specific change in 
claims-handling procedures and customer dialogues. 
3.6.1 Organizational Restructuring Program 
The organizational restructuring program was a complete break with the traditional 
branch-specific organization where each branch was organized in own sections or 
departments, e.g. motor vehicle claims and buildings and contents claims.  It even 
abandoned the traditional separation between the corporate and private market segments.  
All claims handling, regardless if it was a corporate or a private customer, should be handled 
by the same people in the same division.  In this company this was perceived as a 
revolutionary idea.  In addition, when changing the traditional branch-specific organization 
to what was called a “process oriented organization”, all the company traditions regarding 
how to organize claims handling were left in place.   
The “the process oriented organization” was organized into four sections and a 
division staff (see Figure 4 – Process Oriented Organization).  Section One was defined as 
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the main entrance to claims handling regardless of claims type and size; this was the front 
office (call centre) section.  They handled all the customers’ first contact with the 
organization.  Due to extensive analyzes of previous years claims, it was concluded that the 
front office section would handle 78% of the claims themselves, and the other 22% would be 
passed on to two of the other sections – section two and three: back office section motor 
vehicle claims and personal injury claims, and back office section buildings and contents 
claims.  78% of the claims represented only 20 % of the company’s total claim 
compensations.  The idea was that by establishing the front office section, one could enhance 
speed and customer satisfaction regarding the vast majority of claims, thus isolating the 
more costly and time consuming claims in the specialist sections where they had the time 
and resources to handle those claims properly. 
To cope with the large amount of claims and the diversity of claims in the front office 
section, one essential idea was to have all claims-handlers handle any claim type regardless 
of their basic training and experience, which meant that a traditional motor vehicle claims-
handler also handled buildings and contents claims and travel insurance claims, and vice 
versa.  The section was organized into six mixed departments – called “virtual teams”.  As a 
support tool, the company would make a substantial investment in a new customer relation 
management system (CRM-System), which contained supportive scripts (check lists) for any 
type of claims. 
The fourth and last section was a procurement and surveyor section, where one 
would focus on establishing routines, procedures and contracts for the entire claims-handling 
division regarding suppliers and contractors.  One of the main objectives was to 
commercialize surveyor procedures to reduce claims costs and to enhance customer 
satisfaction.   
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Figure 4: Process Oriented Organization 
The restructuring program had four basic objectives: (i) customer satisfaction, rated 
by an external agency, should be increased to a defined level, (ii) claims handling cost 
should be reduced by a certain predefined level, (iii) claims costs should be reduced by a 
pre-defined amount, and (iv) the procurement section should be able to document 
expenditure cuts at a level of several hundred million NOK.   These objectives should be 
reached by the end of 2003.  It turns out that all these objectives were reached on time by 
good margins. 
However, other things did not turn out as planned.  The CRM-system was never 
developed to give the anticipated support for the front office section.  The front office 
section had to abandon the idea that any claims-handler should be able to handle all claim 
types.  After six months, the front office section was reorganized into branch-specific 
departments, but the front office idea was not abandoned.  During the first two years, the 
division had a turnover that exceeded the company norm. 
3.6.2 Customer Dialogue – “Sales Tip”  
INSCO-Norway experienced a market share decline of around 20% during the first 
six months of the year 2005.  A new pricing strategy was launched late in 2004, and 
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consequences were seen very soon when customers abandoned the company for other 
cheaper alternatives.   
As one of a series of actions to enhance sales and keep loyal customers, the claims-
handling division launched a project they called “sales tip”.  The claims-handlers were in 
dialogues with nearly 100, 000 customers a year but they were not authorized to sell new 
products to these customers.  However, they were in a unique position to identify customers’ 
missing coverage through customer dialogues.  The claims-handling predefined customer 
dialogues did not contain specific questions to reveal missing coverage.  The “sales tip” 
project’s objective was to develop and implement customer dialogues, which contained 
questions so that missing coverage was revealed, so that these could be reported to the sales 
organization.   The tips sent to the sales organization would contain information as to which 
customer it was, and what coverage was missing.   
To secure implementation in the different departments, “sales tips” were incorporated 
in each department’s balanced scorecards (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) with a specific number 
of tips each department should make available for the sales division.  The CRM-system was 
adjusted to handle these tips.  Some departments managed to produce the expected results 
but some did not.  In summary, the front office section – which was the section that was the 
main executer of the project – managed to produce overall better results than expected. 
However, this case was debated late in an introductory campaign period.  It was 
decided that there should be an introductory campaign first, so that the organization could 
practically evaluate whether this should be a permanent procedure or not.  When the 
discussions regarding this specific project took place, it was defined from corporate 
headquarters that this would be a permanent action to be taken by the claims division.  It was 
to be fully implemented in the succeeding month (September 2005).  The introductory 
campaign was regarded as a success from both the head of division and the management 
team in INSCO.  As a consequence, the CEO decided the initiative to be a permanent action, 
and even used the initiative in internal communication as an example of a successful 
contribution to the company’s overall performances in other areas than own areas of 
responsibility.   
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3.7 Case 1 – Organizational Restructuring 
3.7.1 Organizational Restructuring as a Success 
In the focus group that defined the organizational restructuring as a success, different 
discourse constructions were in use, however, as will be shown in this section, the most 
effective discourse strategy in this focus group was the rationalistic approach.   One of the 
group participants in the discussion took a rationalistic approach very early when the group 
was discussing whether the project was a success or a failure.  This specific person was not 
employed by the organization when the reorganization process took place, so she had no 
personal experiences to relate to the explicit process.  The discourse she drew on when 
constructing her text of what happened must have been colored by interpretations and 
discourses presented by her peers and superiors.   However, her argumentation was 
rationalistic-based combined with a role-bound discourse.  She took the lead in the 
discussion and acted as a sensegiver when conclusions were drawn. 
They have reached the objectives. Three specific objectives were set for the 
reorganization: quality [as a means to reduce claims cost], customer satisfaction, and a 
third I do not remember. […]They reached the three objectives in 2003. 
 […]  
The three objectives were quality, claims handling cost and customer satisfaction. (L) 
  There were no disagreements within the group whether the objectives were reached 
or not.  The focus group concluded that the project was a success in a rationalistic 
perspective.  In this perspective, the individual who took the lead in the discussion stated 
very early that from an objective, measurable point of view this was a success.  This ended 
all discussions regarding the objective criteria.  Nevertheless, other perspectives regarding 
the change project that were considered as less successful were debated.  In this debate other 
discourse constructions were applied. 
The change program had severe initial problems regarding dividing claims handlers 
into one front office section and into two back office sections – claims handlers that prior to 
the changes had been organized in branch-specific departments would now leave their 
traditional branch specific organization and start working in a more concept oriented way.  
The problems this brought about were perceptions of status.  The overall organizational 
perception was that those who were placed in back office sections obtained a higher status 
than those placed in the front office section.  This had to do with seniority and wages.  The 
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most senior claims-handlers, with the highest wages, were placed in back office sections.  
While debating this issue, a role-bound discourse construction was applied by several focus 
group participants. 
The front office section employees felt like a B-team in relation to the back office 
sections being an A-team, regarding wages and status […] (M) 
Then a problem with the reorganization is that you have an A and a B team quite 
clearly. (L) 
I believe it [the A and B team problem] was the feeling more in the beginning of the 
project, because they placed the most experienced and senior – those with the most 
lengthy service in the company, not necessarily the best qualified – in the[ back office 
sections], while the latest employed were placed in[ the front office section].  Many had 
the perception that working in [the front office] was seen as working in the B-team.  
During this process it was necessary to raise salaries in the [front office section] 
considerably to reduce these differences, and that made some impact on the situation. 
(M) 
The focus group agreed that the management team had managed to cope with the 
status problem.  When debating this issue, the management team introduced a role-bound 
discourse, but also cultural discourse was used in this debate, when the development in front 
office employees’ perceptions was debated. 
They have managed to establish a balance regarding status, at least in the motor claims 
area. (M)  
What was it with the change program that led to not having an A and a B team any 
more? (L) 
[…] they [the management team] have taken action regarding the A and B team issue. 
(G) 
And that is appreciation! (S) 
Appreciation! They have been praised a lot.  They have actually been praised regarding 
different issues. [The front office section] has been brought up as something very 
positive. (M) 
It has very much been about [the front office section]. (G) 
[…] 
The [front office section] is the spearhead in it [the project].  That is how they have 
appeared and profiled themselves. (G) 
Here they use the metaphor “spearhead” as a positive expression for a basic 
assumption (Schein, 1992) within the front office section, an assumption that seemed to go 
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beyond the front office section and into the more basic assumptions among some managers 
too.  Despite having agreed upon the change program being a success, issues such as 
abandoning the “virtual team” idea, a very top run process with next to no middle 
management involvement, conflicts, and the status discussion were emphasized as elements 
with the project that were not considered very successful.  However, there was a consensus 
that the project was a success.  Even six years later, no changes in the overall project plan 
except abandoning the “virtual-team” idea had been introduced.  Loyalty to decisions was 
emphasized, and no replays had been introduced after implementation. 
When debating conflicts, individual discourse constructions were used once.  Here 
the head of division is attributed as being aware of conflicts and not accepting them. 
We had conflicts over a long period of time really. 
[…]  
I remember this very well, and I also remember the message that there was no room for 
trouble here.  It [reduction in level of conflict] was very focused at that time.  [Head of 
division] did put pressure on his head of sections, which again did put pressure on their 
head of departments. (D)  
As seen above in this focus group, all four discourse constructions were used when 
group participants debated project achievements retrospectively.  However, the most 
prominent discourse construction applied in this case was the rationalistic construction.  By 
taking a rationalistic approach very early in the discussion, one actor managed to set the 
agenda.  Taking this active approach to the rational managerial measurable factors for 
success, she managed to elevate the discussion to a strategic long-term discussion rather than 
to focus on narrow, short-term conflicts and stress.  Nevertheless, the group did discuss other 
more emotional issues that were not successful, applying discourse constructions such as 
role-bound and cultural constructions.  The former head of division was recognized through 
an individualistic discourse construction when the question of conflict was raised.  He was 
credited that conflicts were under control from the very beginning of the project. 
The effective strategy we see in this focus group process is that one person took a 
rationalistic approach to the project very early in the debate.   
When seeing the change program in retrospect, I do not immediately agree that it was a 
success. Regarding some issues it was not a success. (G) 
From my point of view, the change program was most of all about the establishment of 
the front office section. (D) 
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 […]  
A lot of those who were placed in the front office section were placed there against their 
own preferences, which made it rather noisy.  There was a lot of turnover in that period 
of time.  If we look in retrospect, they did not reach their objectives. (G) 
They have reached the objectives. […] (L) 
They increased the staffing greatly to accommodate to the new organizational structure, 
did they not?  Today there is considerably more staff than prior to the changes.  
Basically a staff reduction was to be generated. (G) 
That is the great mystery […] why they needed to increase the staff to do the same. (D)  
[…] 
It is actually a reality that the three objectives that were set, were all reached before 
schedule. (L) 
OK, yes, but… (G) 
[…] 
The objectives have been reached.  It took three years. (M) 
[…] There were some heavy challenges, a lot of unsolved claims, and a lot of conflicts, 
were there not?  Many in the front office section felt as a B-team.  […] Even if we have 
reached the objectives, there have always to some extent been some conflicts under the 
surface. (M) 
That is correct. (G) 
This structured the context for the entire discussion throughout the focus group 
discussion.  This is what Hardy and Phillips (2004) emphasized as the limiting and shaping 
effects of existing discourses.  Being pro-active and elevating the discussion to an objective 
level framed the discussion.  In this way one individual managed to take control over the 
process (Balogun et al., 2005; Hardy, 1996), thus controlling the sensegiving process.  One 
basic premise that gave this individual this kind of leading role in the sensegiving process 
may be that performance measurement is highly developed and accepted as a management 
tool in this organization. 
3.7.2 Organizational Restructuring as a Failure 
In the second focus group debating the organizational restructuring project, the 
discussion took a completely different direction.  As in the focus group defining the 
organizational restructuring project as a success, this group also established the debate 
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around one strong leader-like person, who from the start initiated the base line from where 
the discussion should start.  His approach to the project was biased by his negative attitude to 
some of the initial solutions in the project that were abandoned – the “virtual team” idea.  
When initially debating the project, the discussion was structured in a role-bound discourse 
construction.  The focus group attendees clearly defined themselves as one group regarding 
the project, and what must be seen as the division management team as the opposite group.  
The management team is initially referred to as “One”, to really emphasize the distance 
between the management team and the focus group attendees who were first line middle 
managers within the company.  This distance really outlines the conflict of interests between 
the two groups. 
Seen as a change process, it has even been going on for, and been established for, 
years.  We have lived with it for the last several years [2000 – 2006].  Especially, the 
first implementation must be regarded as relatively unsuccessful. (G) 
One retreated in some issues; one has not implemented all of it, regarding the vision, 
yet. (B) 
No, not at all really, some of the premises have been dropped, for an example, the script 
supporting tool.  That was the rationale from the start, was it not? […] (G) 
Yes, I do agree, regarding the vision, it has not been successful. (B) 
[…] 
One did not achieve the objectives one wanted to achieve […] if you think about the 
vision one had for the change program in year 2000, where everybody should be 
working within all claims fields [virtual tams] because one had a tool to support the 
scripts, which should guide you through each claim.  The tool was just around the 
corner, but has not yet arrived [in 2006]. (G)  
As we can see, the role-bound discourse is evident where they consequently refer to 
the conflict between their own position and the position of the management team.  However 
they did also apply a rationalistic discourse construction to really outline the failure 
regarding objectives, emphasizing not having implemented the CRM-supported scripts and 
having to abandon the idea of “virtual teams”.   The approach chosen may have both a short-
term horizon and a long-term horizon.  The short-term horizon considers that they “are still 
living with” the organizational structure implemented by the project, (the branch specific 
departments in the front office section,) after being forced to abandon the idea of “virtual 
teams”.  The long -term horizon considers they have not even implemented the CRM-
supported scripts as yet. 
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Their focus primarily appeared to evaluate what was called “the virtual teams” and 
the management’s decision to abandon that part of the project.  They had no focus on other 
parts of the overall project objectives or project issues.  However, they were strongly 
engaged in defining what went wrong and why:  first of all establish a new organizational 
structure without having the main premises in place.  They continued to apply the role-bound 
discourse construction. 
First one made the change, and then one hoped the supporting tool would arrive. (B) 
This should be fixed after time passed, without really having any understanding of the 
consequences of the decision before having it all in place. (G)  
One had to reverse it.  It had to be reorganized again, make a split between motor 
claims handling and buildings and contents claims handling. (B) 
They also questioned the objectives, in this case the objectives from their perspective: 
“the virtual teams”. 
The main objectives in a way, at least many of the main objectives defined, were not 
achieved.  And maybe they were not even possible to achieve. (G) 
Maybe the objectives were unrealistic? (B) 
You could instead raise a question about unrealistic objectives improperly established 
commitment for the objectives, and perhaps not even a properly understood reality.  
Map and terrain do not fit. (G) 
They consequently applied a role-bound discourse construction, all the time from 
their perspective as operational middle managers and the division management team as their 
opposite part.   
[W]e may draw the conclusion that lower middle managers [first line managers], which 
we consider as professionals related to the specific branch, were not involved in the 
decision phase. (K) 
This position was even more strengthened with the following quotations from the 
discussion regarding time and resources.  
[We] were given no time to establish a good atmosphere regarding the project among 
employees.  [We] were not given time for adequate training, one could not wait for the 
necessary tools one expected would be of good use.  One placed employees in boxes, 
and hoped it would work over time. (G) 
[Y]ou were not supplied with enough resources, regarding training or manning. (R) 
None, none!  Hardly any external conditions were in place.  No adequate training, no 
adequate supporting tools, no adequate commitment, and not enough resources. (G) 
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In great contrast to the group that found this project to be a successful project, this 
group could not find any positive issues regarding the project.  Where the first group showed 
initial divergent opinions, and the discussion led to the group’s final consensus, this group 
had a collective negative opinion right from the start.  Their conclusion was quite clear, and 
still applied a role-bound discourse construction.   All participants in this group were lower 
level middle managers not taking part in the division management team.  All of them were 
appointed as heads of departments that were heavily influenced by the change program and 
surrounding conflicts and turnover problems that were debated in the other group.  It seems 
that the discourse they use as a fundament for constructing new discourses (Hardy & 
Phillips, 2004) are more or less shared, as everybody seemed to agree upon the perception of 
reality that this project was a failure. 
This must be a principal instance of an unsuccessful change program (G) 
I believe that is a feeling many of us had when this was launched – this solution cannot 
last.  Even those of us who were managers – middle managers – should be loyal, but I 
believe all of us agreed upon that this was completely without meaning. (K) 
By starting this discussion through a role-bound discourse construction, the scene 
was set to instigate the negative focus on the project.  One basic premise for this continuous 
negative focus, was the leading role one key actor and main sensegiver took from the start.  
In this way he managed to narrow the perspective of the discussion, and managed to draw all 
the participants’ attention to his initial discourse, rather than to elevate the discussion to a 
level where more rationalistic based objectives and results could be evaluated.  However, it 
seems that he had great support for his perception of reality among the other group 
participants.  In this case, a role-bound discourse construction was applied.  Vaara (2002) 
made a point of the narrow perspectives that may appear when applying role-bound 
discourse constructions, where the focus may be more on self rather than on overall business 
performances.  In this discussion, there are evident elements of narrow focus on self and own 
dissatisfaction rather than on overall business needs and performances. 
3.7.3 Case 1 – success vs. failure 
In both groups analyzed above, one key actor took the lead in the discussion even if 
no one was assigned a leading role.  The discourse construction the leading figure applied 
when outlining the discussion may have had an impact on how the discussion in the group 
progressed, and how the group’s conclusions were drawn.  Here, we see the link between 
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discourse and power, where the leading actor produced a text that shaped the baseline 
discourse from which the discussion constructed the success or failure discourses.  The 
social world is constituted by bringing certain phenomena into being (such as success or 
failure).  Here the leading actor’s discourse disciplines and limits the discursive context, 
which is the exercise of power (Hardy & Phillips, 2004).   From the perspective of the 
management team, the project was seen as a success because the overall financial objectives 
were met.  The individual who structured the discussion within the group that defined the 
project as a success managed through a rationalistic discourse construction to allow the 
group to accept the project as an overall success, despite the many difficulties and setbacks 
underway.   By elevating the perspective to an overall rationalistic discussion, she managed 
to establish the agreement of this being a successful change early in the discussion, and by 
that allow the group to discuss the setbacks the project had during implementation.  We see 
how the rationalistic discourse construction enabled one actor to structure the discussion and 
produce a system of power. 
On the other hand, the other group concluded early on that the project was a failure.  
Here, the leading actor managed to get the group to conclude the project was a failure near 
the beginning of the discussion because some intentions were not implemented.  This group 
applied a combination of role-bound and rationalistic discourse constructions.  They pointed 
out that some objectives regarding the organization and IT support were not met, which was 
an undisputable fact.  However, they did not elevate the discussion to other rationalistic 
perspectives, such as if the measurable financial objectives were met.  They chose to have 
their focus on the issues that were not met, and structured this part of the discussion in a 
role-bound discourse, where they as first line middle managers had conflicting interests with 
the division management team.  Even if the leading actor early and thoroughly established a 
discursive context that the project was a failure, he did not challenge the other group 
members’ perception of reality, and by that allow a struggle for power.  This way the 
relationship of power was created and strengthened rather than conflicted. 
3.8 Case 2 – “Sales Tip” 
3.8.1 “Sales Tip” as a Success 
To understand the sensegiving processes in this case, it is essential to have an overall 
understanding of the premises in the internal agreements with the trade unions regarding 
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monitoring and measurement.  The main premise was that the measurement figures for one 
single employee’s performance would be only available to the superior placed at one level 
above the individual measured.  This implied that managers on higher levels would not be 
entitled to view one individual’s performance.  In this case, the major sensegiver is 
organizationally placed one level above the individual claim-handlers’ department heads.  
When discussing whether this project was a success or not, the main sensegiver – the 
most senior manager in the focus group, and head of the front office section – applied a 
rationalistic discourse construction. 
[The change initiative] has been through a developmental process starting as an idea, 
via a pilot [project], via a [introductory] campaign to an established process that 
should last forever. (S) 
He has pinpointed facts of what has been going on, facts that easily can be checked.  
His rationalistic approach is followed up by other group participants using the same 
discourse construction. 
What you really have is a clear definition of an end result that can be quantified. (U) 
The only reason for us establishing those [quantitative] goals was to establish “sales 
tip” as an integrated part of our day-to-day business.  The goals were only an agent, 
not more, not less. (S) 
However, the group as such did not completely agree to this being a success at this 
point, despite having the initiative established as a permanent procedure. 
Then we should discuss whether this is a 100% success, because you let go of some of 
your tasks for a period of time to focus on other, at that specific time,  highly 
enlightened tasks, it is another issue when the [introductory] campaign is finished, and 
you need to focus on everything again. (L)  
Here the opponent questions the simple rationalistic approach.  She actually 
questions if any other tasks have been put aside just to fulfill a short-term objective.   Within 
the focus group, they agreed that the initiative at this point was not fully integrated in the 
day-to-day business, but that the process seemed to be a success at the time of the interview, 
which was conducted at the end of the introductory campaign phase.  To have this initiative 
regarded as a permanently successful initiative was dependant on the next implementation 
step.  They stressed the fact that a permanent success was dependant on the middle 
managers’ active engagement and their ability to do the day-to-day follow up, using the 
scorecards as one effective agent.  Here we see the argumentation changes the discourse 
construction from a rationalistic to a role-bound construction, where this focus group defined 
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themselves as the ones who understood this action and questioned whether the other middle 
manager have done the same. 
If we have this discussion one year from now, we don’t know if it is a success, even if it 
is established as a parameter in the scorecards, the managers need to use the 
scorecards and govern by them, or else it might fail. (U) 
They stressed the rationalistic measurement issues related to implementation 
relentlessly.  Nevertheless, they had a critical assumption held by employees of the 
development of the overall perception of the business, even if critical initiatives were 
measured in the scorecards.  Here they applied a role-bound discourse construction to 
emphasize the challenges that they as managers had regarding having their employees 
internalize “sales tip” as a necessary and important part of their daily production. 
Even if the claims handling division produces [“sales tip”] on or above target, this does 
not say that the claims handlers have a better perception of the overall business. (U)  
Where do the employees have their thoughts regarding “sales tip”? […] What is 
focused on regarding a task?  What is “sales tip” with regard to the total monthly 
production, and what is our objective regarding registering “sales tip”? Let us say a 
surveyor’s objective is to produce 1.5 “sales tips” a month.  How many customers does 
he meet every month? If he says;” OK, now I have talked to three customers so far, and 
I have produced two “sales tips”, now I can stop focusing on “sales tip” for the rest of 
this month”, then you have not made any real change.  Regarding what to produce day-
to-day, what do they focus on? What is “sales tip” regarding their total production 
demands every month?  What is our objective having them to produce “sales tip”?  You 
do not achieve the intention by having a surveyor contribute 1.5 “sales tips” on average 
a month. (O) 
Even if they doubted any particular development in employees’ overall perception of 
the business, they nevertheless stressed the need for using measurement tools to secure the 
implementation.  Again, they returned to a rationalistic perspective to emphasize that success 
had been achieved. 
We actually define the success by the fact that we have taken an initiative from an idea 
to something definitely measurable that can be a subject for follow up. (U) 
One manager referred to the challenge of how to get “sales tip” internalized in 
everybody’s state of mind of how to do business, and returned consequently to a rationalistic 
perspective of how to gain future success.    
I mean the other issues we have discussed here are effects we of course desire, but the 
objectives have been communicated in numbers.  Numbers have been the objective.  We 
need to achieve at least that much. (L) 
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Individualistic discourse constructions were also applied when emphasizing what 
efforts were made to have the organization realize the importance of this project.  Here he 
focuses on what he and the rest of the management team have done to bring the message to 
everyone’s attention.  In the following quotation we can see how the management team was 
credited for their efforts.  A role-bound discourse construction is applied in combination 
with the individualistic, so as to emphasize how the management understands, and how they, 
the management team, need to have the others understand the issues too. 
We have had three to four meetings with every department where we have had some 
focus on numbers, but most of all we have focused on why we should do this, why  this is 
important for INSCO, what do we [the company] gain,  how does our customer 
experience this: everything to establish an understanding.  Even if the objectives and the 
follow up measures are related to numbers, the motivation […] has focused on efforts to 
establish the right attitudes. (S) 
Despite the focus group’s doubts regarding to what extent the need for the “sales tip” 
initiative as a tool to increase sales was internalized in the minds of most managers and 
employees as a basic contribution for increased sales from the claims division, the group still 
considered the project a success.  First of all this was because of the fulfillment of the 
quantitative objectives, and the discourse construction used to emphasize that fact is purely 
rationalistic. 
The result so far is that we have reached our quantitative objectives. (A)   
Secondly it was argued this was a success because it was decided that the project 
should be established as a permanent action in the division.  The discourse constructions 
applied in this argument are a combination of rationalistic (which focuses on measurements, 
balanced scorecards, and measurable objectives) individualistic (which focuses on how the 
CEO has supported the project) and role-bound (when emphasizing that at least middle 
managers and some employees believed in the project). 
We established a quantitative objective, and we have concluded this to be an established 
process within the claims handling division.  The pilot project gave the justification of 
that.  We have decided to implement it [permanently] on the scorecards from [this] 
September.  Objectives for each section and department have been set.  We have even 
decided  to provide the project with extra resources this fall – the process is of great 
importance for us.  The CEO has supported the project […], given us credit for it, and 
expressed that this project is to be continued.  Going from an idea, this is something 
people, at least middle managers, believe in – even a large portion of our employees as 
well. (S) 
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However the group also concluded that there were declining results regarding “sales 
tip” at the end of the pilot program.  The declining results were explained through a 
rationalistic discourse construction, namely by focusing on the broad specter of different 
numerical objectives by which managers have to govern their departments on one hand, and 
a role-bound discourse construction on another. 
They think this is a good project, but at the same time you see they choose not to focus 
on it, when there is no follow up. (L) 
 
Even middle managers who believe in this will skip this if we not were measured 
because we are evaluated by so many different variables. (S) 
One of the focus group members summarized the discussion in the following way, 
and established an immediate consensus within the group, which in any circumstance is 
considered a rationalistic discourse. 
The criterion for success is really being measured. (U)  
In this group the most prominent discourse construction applied was the rationalistic 
construction.  The overall perception for this being a success was based on the fact that the 
measurable objectives were achieved.  The central sensegiver in this group took the lead 
very early in the discussion by emphasizing the importance of achieving the measurable 
objectives, and by taking this early approach, he established the fundamental form from 
where the discussion should start.  His active engagement from the start in establishing a 
rationalistic approach as the theme of discussion was an important premise throughout the 
entire focus group debate.  Other discourse constructions were later applied as well.  The 
individualistic discourse construction served to credit the management team’s effort to 
establish this successful project.   The role-bound discourse construction was mainly used to 
show that somebody – mostly managers – had understood the purpose with the project but 
others had not – mainly employees. 
In this case, as we see in the other success case, the rationalistic discourse 
construction is s most influential and powerful.  This has to do with key actors taking early 
process control (e.g. Hardy, 1996).  In addition, one should not underestimate the effects of 
having an organization with long and considerable experience in monitoring and measuring 
performance.  
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3.8.2 “Sales Tip” as a Failure 
The second group using “sales tip” as an example, introduced the project as a failure.  
In a sense, their perspective was perhaps broader and deeper than the first group discussing 
the project.  They focused on the noticeable success regarding the overall “sales tip” number 
generated in the pilot project on one side, and the fact that the sales and customer handling 
divisions were not able to transform those tips into sales activity.  The latter was because the 
number of tips went far beyond what was expected.  Another issue this group discussed was 
how the implementation was seen by different departments.  In some departments, “sales 
tip” was integrated into each employee’s working procedures, and by that considered 
successful. However, in others only a couple of claims handlers performed the expected 
tasks.  This led to great variances in results generated by different departments.  The focus 
group regarded this as verification that the process was a failure.  In this group, as in all the 
others, one specific person took the leading position in the group.  In this case, it was a 
person leading one of the back office sections.  In his starting argument, he combined a 
rationalistic discourse construction with a role-bound discourse construction.  Here he 
emphasized that from a measurement perspective the objectives were met, but the other 
division was not able to handle the huge amount of tips.  Said rhetorically: “we managed, but 
the others did not”, which is a classic example of a role-bound discourse. 
[W]e agreed the number of tips were far better than expected.  Then you can ask what 
did we expect? We did not know.  We had no baseline from which to establish the 
objectives.  There were a large number of tips coming in, and we concluded this was 
great.  Because of the large amount of tips, those receiving them did not manage to 
handle all the tips. (R) 
His role-bound discourse was followed up by one of the others, applying the same 
discourse construction. 
It went absolutely down the drain; they did not manage to follow up. (W) 
As a consequence of these role-bound approaches, the overall conclusion was drawn 
very quickly. 
Said in other words, it was successful on paper, a successful project phase, but an 
unsuccessful continuance phase. (E) 
Regarding implementation, there were some disagreements, but all-in-all, they 
concluded that the entire implementation was unsuccessful.  However, the implementation 
was supported by a department-wise competition, where the department producing the 
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highest number of tips would win a trip abroad.  This competition gave some initial 
motivation to compete for the prize, but when the different departments discovered that one 
specific department took a tremendous lead, they backed out.  To augment that the 
implementation failed, a role-bound discourse construction was applied.  Here the person 
talking creates a distance to the management initiative by speaking about management as 
“they”. 
I’m not happy with the implementation either.  In my opinion they were not able to tell 
those sending the tips how to do it.  They answered vaguely on a lot of questions in the 
starting phase, which pulverized the motives.  At least this is the opinion in my 
department; they crushed the intention, and we were left with an extra workload.  
Actually this task is a task for the sales division.  Then you get an attitude saying: this is 
not my job; others are employed to do this. (H) 
However, the focus group had a discussion as to whether the upfront information and 
motivation was adequate or not.  Again, the role-bound discourse construction was applied 
in such a manner that the group attendees distanced themselves from the entire project and 
project outcome. 
[I]t is my impression, and the feedback from my subordinates is, that the planning was 
not properly done.  [My subordinates] were insecure about what to do. (H) 
Did we manage to see the intention, or did it drown in the employees’ frustrations? (E) 
I believe so.  I think there is a difference between different departments.  My department 
did probably have the intention […]. They did actually motivate themselves, and they 
did receive some carrots along the way.  Your department had some nice results the 
first month, you received the second place, and then the results fell.  What I think is: 
they did a nice job in the introduction, they managed to motivate my staff, something 
must have been right, but, you could say, the follow up later on was not the same. (V)   
Different departments received the initiative in different ways, and met the 
challenges differently.  In one department, they were very eager to win the campaign, and 
everybody took the initiative to produce good results, while in other departments, just a 
couple of claims handlers took the initiative.  Obviously, there were differences in how 
department heads met the challenge.  One manager who had success with the “sales tip” 
project” applied a combination of an individualistic and a role-bound discourse construction, 
actually de-emphasized own role, and emphasized group processes in own department. 
I introduced this, as I do with every new initiative.  When it started I saw them push and 
motivate each other.  I saw them motivated for this campaign, and I started the follow 
up procedures.  I did not want to be the one who cooled them down, so I sent them 
weekly updating and follow up mails.  I did this for four months. (V) 
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One other manager explained why the results were prominent in his department 
during the first period, before they started to decline.  Here he applies an individualistic 
discourse construction to level the efforts done by two specific employees.  He also applies 
an individualistic discourse while blaming himself for not taking proper action to produce 
the results expected. 
Even in departments producing good results, only one or two produced tips, and still 
do. (W) 
That was the reason my department had good results the first month.  I had two 
employees producing a lot, and then they became ill, went to a course, and were absent 
in the subsequent month.  When they returned, they discovered the others had not 
produced a single tip, and the entire project fell to the ground.  Obviously, this points 
directly to me as a leader, for not standing up and taking action, no doubt about that. 
(H)   
The management team’s basic motivation for the project was an issue for debate.  
There were different views regarding if this was actually a task for claims handlers.  Some 
meant it was, and argued for the initiative based on the fact that increased sales secured jobs.  
Others were skeptical.  They saw the need for everyone to take action to secure jobs, but 
they were not convinced this was the way they should contribute to the company’s bottom 
line.  Clearly not everyone saw their role as active contributors, and projected the motivation 
task to the project’s managers. 
I feel that many middle managers […] are waiting to say: didn’t I say this would not 
work.  Said in other words; we did not get the message through. (E) 
The main sensegiver – in this case a senior middle manager – took the lead and 
structured the discussion by applying a role-bound discourse.  Through this tactic he 
constrained the debate – exerting power through discourse – and guided the group to an early 
conclusion that this was a failure.  When the group discussed the basis for the project being a 
failure, individualistic discourse constructions were applied by different actors. This 
discourse construction was primarily applied to emphasize the employees’ efforts for making 
the project a success, secondarily it was used to de-emphasize own efforts.  However the 
most prominent discourse construction used when defining this project as a failure and 
arguing for why it was a failure was a role-bound discourse construction. 
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3.8.3 Case 2 – success vs. failure 
In this case, we see an extensive use of rationalistic discourse constructions and role-
bound discourse constructions.  However, in contrast to the findings in Case 1, here the 
group who defined this project as a success used a rationalistic discourse construction to 
narrowly focus on one division’s overall achievements, but did not elevate the discussion to 
debate whether this has been an overall organizational success or not.  We see the execution 
of power through the construction of a narrowly focused discourse.  In contrast, the group 
who defined this project as a failure emphasized that their own division managed to produce 
results above target, but these results had limited overall effects since those who were to 
receive the produced “sales-tips” were not able to transform them into measurable sales 
results. 
Focusing on how the rationalistic discourse constructions are applied, we see here 
that the group defining the project as a success applied this discourse construction to limit 
the scope of the discussion, while the “failure” group used the rationalistic discourse 
construction to broaden the scope to an overall perspective.  The same discourse construction 
may thereby be used in several ways.  The other group leader headed a section which had 
only a minor interest in the project, and who viewed the project as an added workload for his 
employees.   
Their active influence using discourse constructions can be viewed as sensegiving.  
Despite actors’ use of rationalistic discourse constructions to underpin objectivity, defining 
whether a change is a failure or a success is a matter of subjectivity.  Discourse constructions 
may be a tool for individuals, no matter what intentions they have, to structure discussions 
and influence how others make sense of situations, which is not only sensegiving but also 
highly political.  This is per se political activity (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Hardy, 1996). 
3.9 Discussion 
All group discussions analyzed above have one common denominator: a strong and 
active, although informal, group leadership (Yukl, 2006).  The two success cases were 
dominated by a rationalistic discourse construction, and the two failure cases were heavily 
influenced by a role-bound discourse construction.  In this section, the informal group 
leaders’ structuring activities and the effect of the dominant discourse constructions and the 
purpose they seemed to play will be discussed.  Through this discussion, I will show how 
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Vaara’s (2002) discourse constructions can serve as to frame discussions and how different 
constructions also serve different political purposes.  
3.9.1 How Discourse Constructions Act as a Framing Device 
The analysis above has accentuated how the informal group leaders managed to 
guide the discussion through the application of different discourse constructions in certain 
directions that may have served their particular interests.  This is the exercise of power to 
create a specific meaning in line with the leader’s political interests (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; 
Hardy & Phillips, 2004).  Politics is about creating a perception of legitimacy through the 
management of meaning, often also called sensegiving.  Management of meaning is a power 
game, where the ability to impose ones’ interpretation of events upon others in competition 
with other meanings offered is the goal (Buchanan & Badham, 2008).  It has to do with 
shaping a perception of reality and imposing this perception of reality on others (Brown, 
1995; Hardy, 1996).  In the cases analyzed in this essay, the interpretation of reality in the 
different groups were deliberately influenced in the direction of the “framer’s” version of 
reality (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). 
In the success cases, the group leaders managed to guide the discussion to a 
rationalistic perspective despite other discourse constructions introduced by other group 
members.  In this way, both of the informal group leaders managed to limit the scope of the 
discussion, and steer the sensemaking of others (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).  Through their 
rationalistic discourses, they contributed to the other group participants’ retrospective 
sensemaking (Weick, 1995) of the results achieved and the perspective of the sensegivers 
(Maitlis, 2005).  By keeping the debate at the company level – focusing on overall change 
objectives – and not allowing the considerations of impact on individuals, the changes were 
defined as a success.   
By structuring the discussion into a rationalistic discourse, the sensegivers elevated 
the discussion from a narrow focus on self and the immediate short-sighted problems the 
change processes caused, to an overall perspective of what the projects might have to say for 
the overall business performance.  However, the two groups approached the overall 
perspective differently.  “Sales tip” was successful regarding rationalistic objectives in the 
claims handling division, but not an overall success since the sales organization seemed 
unable to handle the vast amount of tips.  Here we can see indications of the limitation a 
strong group leadership may cause on a group’s ability to see complex contextual issues.  In 
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the “sales-tip” as a success group, we can see how the group leader managed to keep the 
focus on a narrow division of specific performances.  By only focusing on division-specific 
performances and division-specific challenges, the overall organizational challenges and 
performance were overlooked.  Through the limitation of the perspective of the debate to the 
rationalistic, the leading actor deliberately could create an illusion of success despite any 
individual and overall organizational problems it might have caused.  It shows further the 
limitations a rationalistic discourse construction may cause in sensemaking processes, when 
discussions mainly are carried out on the premise of so called rational objective facts. 
On the other hand, the organizational restructuring process group discussed problems 
introduced through other discourse constructions than the rationalistic, but the group leader 
never let go of the overall rationalistic objectives.  This strategy made it possible for 
everybody to discuss the negative and unsuccessful sides of the project without losing the 
overall perspective that the project – rationalistically – was a success.  In this group, the 
main sensegiving strategy applied by the group leader was a continuous repetition that the 
rationalistic objectives were met, objectives the company was able to measure by the bottom 
line.  In this way, the group leader allowed a broad discussion, without leaving the overall 
perspective that the project was a success.  In this particular case, the rationalistic discourse 
approach made the basis for a broad and open discussion rather than limiting it.  By stating 
an overall rational and objective performance in accordance with the overall objectives for 
the business, she made room for a broad and open discussion. 
In the failure cases, the informal leaders started their sensegiving processes by 
structuring the discussion into the perspective that some others did not cope with the 
challenges.  This way both leaders managed to establish a kind of groupthink process (Aldag 
& Fuller, 1993), where the focus groups were the ones in control and someone outside of the 
group did not cope with the situation.  By applying this role-bound discourse construction, 
the group leaders as prominent sensegivers established the premises for the others’ 
sensemaking, and by that they structured the discussion to own perspectives.  The main 
perspective in both cases is the shortsighted and self-centered focus.  Both cases focused on 
short-term effects regarding self and own employees rather than raising the discussion to a 
level where the overall business perspective was the main issue.  This kind of perspective 
was strengthened by the use of role-bound discourse constructions, whose nature is 
conflicting interests among different groups rather than a focus on overall business (Vaara, 
 61 
2002).  We see evident distance taking regarding the projects throughout both groups, where 
“others” were the problem, not themselves. 
The group defining the organizational restructuring as a failure was guided by their 
informal leader straight into a shortsighted narrow perspective of the results achieved, or 
rather the results not achieved.  Through his sensegiving process, the group leader managed 
to narrow the discussion strictly to procedural and content related questions, and not to 
overall outcome issues.  If the discussion in this group is compared with the discussion in the 
group defining the project as a success, they both focused on the same issues as problematic 
and unsuccessful.  But where the failure-focused group continuously chose to focus on the 
shortsighted negative issues, the success-focused group managed to elevate the conclusion 
away from the shortsighted narrow perspective to a more overall business perspective.  In 
this specific case, it is evident that the informal group leader influences the sensemaking 
processes for the other group participants, and no one in the group challenges him or even 
tries to approach the project through another perspective (Aldag & Fuller, 1993). 
In the focus group defining “sales tip” as a failure, the project was defined as a failure 
when the discussion was lifted to a role-bound discussion regarding the tip receiving 
division’s lack of ability to constructively receive the tips.  Here it is possible to see how this 
setting legitimized the project as a failure, despite the fact that some departments in the 
claims division actually managed to produce tips above expectations.  The sensegiving tactic 
that is applied here is the role-bound discourse construction bringing the divisional conflict 
of interest to the table.  In doing this, the leading sensegiver was able to structure the 
sensemaking processes in everybody’s mind that this project was an overall failure, despite 
some successes in the micro organizational level. 
3.9.2 How Rational Discourse Constructions Serve Overall 
Organizational Values 
In the groups that defined the change projects as successes, the dominating discourse 
construction was the rationalistic one.  Through rational discourse the informal group leaders 
managed to create a foundation for the discussion in line with a strong cultural artifact in the 
organization: “the criterion for success is really being measured”. 
By framing the discussion in line with prominent values in the organization, the 
agenda was set in accordance with the only accepted way of measuring successes or failures.  
Either you reach a measurable objective, or you do not.  Through the establishment of an 
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early accept for using rational measurable objectives as the overall evaluation criterion for 
whether a project was a success or not, the discussion could be opened up for other 
perspectives.  This way it was possible to open-mindedly discuss other sides of the projects 
without compromising the overall values in the organization. 
3.9.3 How Role-Bound Discourse Constructions Create 
Scapegoats 
The dominating discourse construction in the groups defining discussed projects as 
failures was the role-bound discourse construction.  In these groups the informal group 
leader focused especially on how “others” were the reason that the projects failed.  The role-
bound discourse constructions do not support the existing core values in the organization. 
In the “sales-tip” case, the leading character emphasized how the sales and customer 
service division were not able to handle the tips produced by the claims handling division.  
The discourse construction applied was used to make the sales and customer service division 
the scapegoat responsible for the lack of commitment to the project in the claims handling 
division.  In the restructuring project, it was the division management who were the 
scapegoats.  They tried to implement an organizational structure that was abandoned, and 
they were not able to provide the claims handlers with adequate IT-solutions. 
3.10 Conclusion 
In this essay I have shown that middle managers play an active role in constructing 
change outcomes as either a success or a failure.  As seen, this contributes to the strategy-as-
practice and middle management literature since middle managers’ discourse micro-
practices are able to form the perception of strategy outcome.   
In all four cases analyzed, an informal group leader took process control (e.g. Hardy, 
1996) very early in the discussion and by that tried to establish a power base.  This leading 
figure took a role as the leading sensegiver (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) in the group 
processes, guiding the others’ sensemaking (Weick, 1993) in a direction that suited the 
sensegiver’s perception of reality (Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Phillips, 2004).   
Regardless of whether the “sensegiver” defines a project as a failure or as a success, 
the sensegiver is in a unique position to structure and influence the other group participants’ 
sensemaking by being the one that frames the discourse from where the discussion starts 
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(Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Hardy & Phillips, 2004).  In this way the sensegiver is able to limit the 
scope of the discussion, and even be in position to guide the discussion in certain directions.  
The findings draw and extend the discourse constructions by Vaara (2002) by showing how 
discourse constructions also serve as power tools influencing others’ sensemaking and their 
perception of change outcome (Hardy, 1996).  Hence, discourse constructions are closely 
tied to mechanisms for power and politics (e.g. Buchanan & Badham, 1999).  This study 
therefore enhances the literature on organizational discourse by exploring middle managers’ 
view on strategy by the performance of conversation analysis (Laine & Vaara, 2007).  
Finally, this study enhances our understanding of the four discursive constructions of success 
or failure in change narratives introduced by Vaara (2002) by showing how different 
discourse constructions may serve different personal and organizational objectives when 
middle managers define change initiatives as successes or failures. 
The rationalistic discourse construction was found powerful in elevating discussions 
from shortsighted and narrow perspectives to a more aggregated overall business oriented 
perspective.   Nevertheless, this may not be a finding that could easily be generalized, even 
the findings supporting this view are found in different cases.  A limitation regarding these 
findings is that the findings are related to an organization engrained with a basic assumption 
(Schein, 1992) that all performance indicators should be measured, and success is related to 
what extent measurable objectives are realized. This organizational context and culture most 
likely makes rationalistic discourse constructions particularly powerful.   
The role-bound discourse was found powerful in narrowing perspectives when 
sensegivers want to guide conclusions in directions that suit their personal perception of 
reality.  On the other hand, we have also seen role-bound discourse constructions open up 
perspectives (even if in this particular case, these resulted in broadening the perspective so 
that a project was classified as a failure).  In the cases analyzed in this essay, role-bound 
discourse construction has been effective when defining projects as failures and as a tool to 
create scapegoats responsible for the failures.  Even if these findings support findings by 
Vaara (2002), it is not possible to generalize that role-bound discourses are specifically well-
suited strategies to define failures.  
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4. The Politics of Middle Management Sensemaking and 
Sensegiving* 
4.1 Abstract 
Middle managers play an important role when organizational change is to be 
implemented.  The objective of this essay is to identify what political tactics middle 
managers exert to influence change outcome.  The study reveals how middle managers 
through political actions influence the sensemaking of others, including their superiors.   
Drawing on sensemaking and sensegiving theory and political literature, middle managers’ 
convergent and divergent actions during change implementation are examined.  The findings 
suggest that middle managers have an influence on superiors’ sensemaking by exerting the 
power of meaning.  Middle managers mobilized resource power, such as expertise in the 
business, as a powerful platform for controlling the change process.  
4.2 Introduction 
Top executives are not able to affect change outcome solely on their own.  They are 
the key in defining change intentions, but the real change implementers are the middle 
managers.   Top executives and middle managers play significant but different and 
complementary roles related to strategic change.  Top executives are facilitators and deploy 
resources, while middle managers develop capabilities and execute the day-to-day decisions 
that link realized strategy to intended strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 2000; Helfat et al., 
2007).  Recent middle manager literature suggests that middle managers make important 
contributions to strategy and strategy implementation (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 
2004, 2005; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997, 2000; Huy, 2002; Whittington, 2002; 
Wooldridge et al., 2008).  Middle managers play an active role in implementing top 
management’s change initiatives, where they act as linking pins and mediators between the 
organization’s strategic and operational levels (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 
2005; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Likert, 1961). Recent studies have called for research on 
the interactions between senior and middle manager interactions in strategic change (e.g 
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Hoon, 2007; Rouleau, 2005).  This study reveals the micro practices that occur in the schism 
between middle and senior management when declining performances are met with 
organizational changes. 
The sensemaking and sensegiving literature focuses on how change initiators and 
change recipients develop shared cognition, perceptions and interpretations of change 
initiatives.  However, it is remarkable how little focus politics has been given in this 
literature, especially when sensegiving has to do with influencing the meaning construction 
of others.  Trying to influence others’ meaning construction is, per se, political behavior (e.g. 
Buchanan & Badham, 1999).  Politics is traditionally seen as self-serving, but recent 
research has shed more light on this perspective, and recent literature on organizational 
politics emphasizes that political behavior may be triggered as well by selfless motivation 
and actions (Buchanan & Badham, 2008).   
The strategy-as-practice perspective focuses on the micro-practices of what people do 
through their day-to-day strategy activity and how they influence strategic outcome 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; 
Johnson et al., 2003; Whittington, 2006, 2007).  The practice perspective must also take into 
consideration the activities individuals actively choose not to do.  It is the non-practices as 
much as the practices that make the difference in politics (Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 
2008).  To enhance our understanding of strategy-as-practice, we need to further explore 
how middle managers’ actions regarding change initiatives include political behavior, and 
how this behavior affects the final change outcome.   
In this essay, I examine the political ploy that emerges when middle managers face 
top management’s intentions to confront declining organizational performance with 
organizational change.  I identify the political tactics middle managers apply to position 
themselves to exert power to influence the change outcome.  I especially focus on how 
specific political tactics affected the middle managers as sensegivers, who tried to affect 
others sensemaking so that they were able to influence change outcome.  I draw on 
sensegiving theory (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Pye, 2005; Weick, 1995; 
Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), middle manager literature (Balogun, 2003; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997; Huy, 2002), literature on convergent and divergent actions (Burgelman, 
1994; Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007), and literature on power 
and politics (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; S. R. Clegg, 1989; Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Clegg, 
1996; Hartley, Benington, & Binns, 1997; Mintzberg, 1985; Pettigrew, 1977)  
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The study is designed as an embedded single case study (Yin, 2003) conducted in a 
Nordic insurance company (INSCO), where a strategic change project was followed for 
eight months.  Real-time, longitudinal data (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 
2005; Pettigrew, 1992; Van De Ven, 1992) was gathered from a multiple set of sections and 
departments.  The study examined an organizational change in the Norwegian claims 
handling division of INSCO. 
This essay contributes to existing literature on power and politics by providing access 
to rich qualitative accounts from respondents taking part in political behavior.  Such 
accounts are rare (Buchanan, 1999), and give insight into to how skilled political actors 
operate, which enhances our understanding of the nature of power struggles and politics in 
organizations.  Furthermore, this study expands existing sensemaking and sensegiving 
literature through providing evidence for a tight coupling with power and politics, showing 
that sensegiving is politics in action.  Finally, this essay provides a supplement to existing 
strategy-as-practice literature by showing the tight coupling between practice, politics and 
change outcome. 
4.3 Theory 
4.3.1 Middle managers divergent and convergent actions 
The traditional middle manager role in strategy is implementing top managements’ 
intended strategies. However, studies show that this perspective is too simplistic (Balogun, 
2003; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997).  Middle managers play a significant role in 
strategy processes, both in strategy formation and implementation.   
The traditional middle manager role in strategy as an implementer of top manager’s 
intended strategies (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1994) can be viewed as convergent action.  
However, we know from the literature that middle managers’ responses to change initiatives 
are more diverse than responses that lead to the performance of activities that are in line with 
top management’s or corporate intentions (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Stensaker & 
Falkenberg, 2007).  Middle managers frequently engage in divergent action to develop a new 
strategic orientation (Burgelman, 1991, 1994; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Huff et al., 
1992).  This kind of action is often seen as negative as top management may be closely 
identified with the official strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997).   
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Divergent actions do not need to be destructive (Burgelman, 1991, 1994; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Huff et al., 1992; Meyer, 2006), but managers are more likely to 
fail in effectuating strategic intent if there are tensions and different responses between 
different groups of middle managers (Meyer, 2006) and such actions are often seen as 
negative and unconstructive (Helfat et al., 2007).  As actors having wide-ranging contact 
with the external environment, and through that, first hand information of external 
environmental changes, middle managers are in a position to play an important role in 
bringing divergent thinking into the shaping of strategy (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Hoon, 
2007).  Middle managers’ divergent actions regarding change can be the result of either 
unintentional misunderstandings of corporate intentions, or the result of more deliberate 
misinterpretations (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).   
Convergent actions are viewed as middle managers responding and acting in 
accordance with corporate intentions (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).  As in divergent 
actions, the convergent action may be both upwardly and downwardly oriented.  The latter is 
related to what has been seen as the traditional middle manager task in strategy – 
implementing deliberate strategy – “managerial interventions that align organizational 
action with strategic intentions” (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, p. 155).  The upward 
orientation action is related to synthesizing information – the interpretation and evaluation 
of information [that] affects top management perceptions […] within a given strategic 
context (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, p. 155).  Issue selling has been introduced as a concept 
for middle managers to help shape the strategic agenda (Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, Hayes, & 
Wierba, 1997; Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, & Lawrence, 2001).  Issue selling may be seen as 
sensegiving and as a means to affect others attempt to make sense of strategic initiatives 
(Dutton, Ashford, Lawrence, & Miner-Rubino, 2002; Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
Recent studies have indicated that how middle managers make sense of change 
initiatives, and how sensemaking and sensegiving processes affect action are important for 
understanding what lies behind middle managers’ convergent and divergent actions 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).   I therefore turn 
to sensegiving and sensemaking theory next. 
4.3.2 Sensemaking and Sensegiving 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991, p. 442) define sensemaking as “[it] has to do with 
meaning construction and reconstruction by the involved parties as they attempted [sic] to 
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develop a meaningful framework for understanding the nature of the intended strategic 
change”.  This introduces sensemaking as an interpretative process, where the change 
recipients’ interpretations of the intended changes have an impact on how they create change 
and affect the change outcome (Balogun & Johnson, 2004).   
How individuals make sense of change initiatives affects whether the change 
outcomes are in accordance with the anticipated outcomes – convergent action, or are in 
conflict with the anticipated outcome – divergent action (Balogun, 2006; Stensaker, 
Falkenberg, & Grønhaug, 2007).  Such sensemaking may take place in either horizontal 
communication and interaction or as a result of top-down communication.  Research shows 
that most sense is made through the social processes of sensemaking at the inter-recipient 
level, which leads to the conclusion that the change outcome, whether it is in accordance 
with the intent or not, is largely determined by the interpretations of the change recipients 
(Balogun, 2006).  The social processes of sensemaking are processes where change 
recipients interact in exchanging stories, gossip, rumors, jokes, conversations and 
discussions with each other to form an interpretation of what they should do to put their 
superiors’ change plans into action (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Maitlis, 2005).  Maitlis 
(2005) emphasized that individuals’ interpretations, and thereby individuals’ sensemaking, 
may be shaped by other’s sensegiving efforts. 
Sensegiving can be defined as “the process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442).  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) 
emphasized that sensegiving is a sequential and reciprocal process where the sensegiver and 
the sensemaker respectively are primarily dealing with influence and understanding.  
Sensegiving has to do with interpretation and how different players work to influence each 
other through different types of communicative and interactive behavior (Maitlis, 2005).     
To sum up, from the sensemaking literature, we know that sensemaking is a social 
process (Maitlis, 2005), which engages sensemakers and sensegivers in different and often 
multifaceted negotiation processes (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005).  It is an 
interpretation process where change receivers make their own visualization of the changes 
through conversation and interaction with others (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  Change output may be different than intended due to individual, 
different interpretations of corporate intentions (Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Stensaker & 
Falkenberg, 2007).   
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Sensegiving is described as a political process, where others’ decision making is 
affected by the sensegivers influence on their interpretations (Hoon, 2007; Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007).  Despite this however, organizational politics have been largely ignored in 
the sensemaking and sensegiving literature; hence there is still room to explore how politics 
may have an impact on sensemaking and sensegiving.  I turn now to the literature on power 
and politics. 
4.3.3 Power and politics 
In a classic historical perspective such as the works of Marx and Weber, power in 
organizations has been tightly coupled to domination.  Marx’s position was linked to the 
ownership and control of the means of production, while Weber’s position was not only 
linked to ownership and control over the means of production, but was also a result of 
knowledge of operations (S. Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Hardy & Clegg, 1996).  
These power foundations may be seen as based in the hierarchical dimensions of 
organizations, and are historically labeled as legitimate power.  In contrast, power exercised 
outside formal hierarchical structures has been considered as illegitimate power (Hardy & 
Clegg, 1996).  It is emphasized in the literature that the study of power in a management 
perspective traditionally has been a study of so-called illegitimate power, or power exerted 
by organizational members without hierarchical and structural sanctioning of their behavior 
(S. R. Clegg, 1989).  In contrast to the bureaucratic “Weberian” perspective of power, other 
researchers view power as a struggle for own interests or as conflict of interests, where 
control over scarce resources increases power for those who control these resources at the 
expense of those who do not control these resources (Mintzberg, 1984; Pettigrew, 1975, 
1977).  This perspective is labeled “the functionalist perspective” (Hardy & Clegg, 1996) 
and views the use of power as dysfunctional, illegitimate and unsanctioned.  This position is 
based on an assumption that the power that rests in organizational structures as functional 
authority is an unquestionable legitimate power, while power exerted outside the lines of 
command in a bureaucratically structured organization is illegitimate (Hardy & Clegg, 1996; 
Mintzberg, 1985).    Hardy and Clegg (1996) presented a definition of power that may seem 
rather  negative, but nevertheless is the basis of a broad stream of literature regarding power: 
“[T]he ability to get others to do what you want them to do, if necessary against their will, 
or to get them to do something they otherwise would not do” (p. 623).  Hardy (1996) 
differentiates three different types of power: (i) the power of resources, (ii) the power of 
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process, and (iii) the power of meaning through which individuals can influence change 
outcome.  The power of resources is linked to control over scarce resources.  The power of 
resources is exercised by the deployment of key resources on which others are dependant.  
Decision outcomes may be influenced through individual control and management of 
resources such as: information, expertise, budgets, rewards, and punishments in directions 
that support their objectives.  The power of process is related to influencing outcomes by 
controlling those who participate in decision-making processes and those who do not.  This 
highlights another side of the power of process because it is possible to influence outcomes 
by indirect participation; you control who takes part in decision making rather than 
controlling decision making directly.  This reveals a vision that the most powerful decision 
makers are not the ones we see, but the men/women behind the scenes.  The power of 
meaning has to do with controlling or shaping perceptions, cognitions and preferences, 
which is per se sensegiving.  This is possible by influencing what information is given, and 
how, and to whom, it is presented.  It has to do with controlling language symbols and 
rituals.  Balogun et al. (2005) described the power of meaning as “a process of symbol 
construction and use designed to legitimize one’s own actions and delegitimize those of 
opponents” (p. 263). 
Politics is power in action, where individuals use tactics and other techniques of 
influence to foster their will or objectives upon others (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Hardy, 
1996).  A common consensus of the definition of organizational politics does not exist 
(Buchanan & Badham, 2008).  Nevertheless Pettigrew (1977) introduced a definition that is 
broadly cited (e.g. Buchanan & Badham, 2008, p. 77; Hardy & Clegg, 1996, p. 630): 
“Politics concerns the creation of legitimacy for certain ideas, values and demands – not just 
actions performed as a result of previously acquired legitimacy.  The management of 
meaning refers to a process of symbol construction and value use designed both to create 
legitimacy for one’s own demands and to “delegitimize” the demands of opponents.” (p. 85).  
Organizational politics is a phenomenon debated in the management literature (Buchanan & 
Badham, 2008), however, Mintzberg (1985) emphasized that political behavior is “neither 
formally authorized, widely accepted nor officially certified” (p. 134).  On the other hand, 
Hardy & Clegg (1996) raised the question “in whose eyes is power deemed illegitimate, 
unsanctioned or dysfunctional?” (p. 629), which actually questions to what extent the 
organizational elites (e.g. senior management) serve organizational or personal objectives. 
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Recent research has emphasized the role power and politics play during change 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Buchanan, 1999, 2008; Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Hardy, 
1996).   Political activity is more commonly applied in conditions of uncertainty and conflict 
(Ferris & Kacmar, 1992; Pettigrew, 1975).  In the literature, there is an ambivalence 
regarding political activity: on one hand, whether it is informal and illegitimate activity and 
hence unprofessional and unnecessary, or inevitable and desirable and necessary activity on 
the other (Buchanan, 1999; Buchanan, Claydon, & Doyle, 1999).  Political behavior has two 
faces – “the nice and the nasty”.  They may be both positive and negative for observers and 
recipients (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992). Nevertheless political activity is not necessarily an 
activity that is deployed with personal objectives, such as personal career objectives and/or 
organizational power.  It might as well be a means for managers to serve organizational 
goals when they have diverse opinions and beliefs about change objectives.   
Politics is about creating a perception of legitimacy through the management of 
meaning, which may be seen as sensegiving.  Management of meaning is a power game, 
where the ability to impose ones’ interpretation of events upon others in competition with 
other offered meanings is the goal (Buchanan & Badham, 2008).  It has to do with shaping a 
perception of reality and imposing this perception of reality on others (Brown, 1995; Hardy, 
1996).   Fiss & Hirsch (2005) based the influencing processes in framing on how the 
interpretation of reality in different audiences is deliberately influenced in the direction of 
the “framer’s” version of reality.  Mobilization for and legitimation of strategic change may 
be found in framing.  It is a process in which events are emphasized and encoded to create 
meaning by presenting some elements and withholding some elements (Fiss & Zajac, 2006).  
Fiss & Hirsh (2005) accentuated the political character of framing by stating “framing 
emphasizes the external strategic process of creating specific meaning in line with political 
interests” (p. 31).  They further held that framing is similar to sensegiving, which is the tool 
individuals apply when attempting to influence the meaning construction of others.  
Summarized, there is support in the literature to uphold sensegiving and framing as similar 
concepts that are political tools through which it may be possible to influence the 
construction of meaning.  As seen above, sensegiving is the core in political struggles and 
the fight for power. 
In this study, I examine the role of power and politics in sensegiving and 
sensemaking by exploring how middle managers seek to influence the change outcome 
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through the power of resources, the power of process and the power of meaning.  These 
analyses are based on the conceptualization of power as introduced by Hardy (1996),  
4.4 The Study 
The study was conducted in a Nordic insurance company (INSCO).  INSCO conducts 
business within the general insurance industry in four Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland.  It is a top-three company in general insurance in the region, with 
4,500 employees.  The Norwegian branch has 1,800 employees, mainly situated in the 
country’s largest cities.   The study examined an organizational change in the Norwegian 
claims handling division, which has approximately 350 employees.   
The division management team in the claims handling division recognized that they 
were unsatisfied with the claims handling processes.  The claims handling processes were 
too time-consuming, too costly, and the level of accessibility for customers was too low.  As 
a consequence the division management team decided to perform an analysis to identify 
areas where performance could be enhanced.  The results of the analysis concluded that 112 
different actions needed to be taken.  These were mostly minor actions, but some were rather 
time-consuming and costly.  The most dramatic action was to implement a new 
organizational structure (see “Intended change outcome”, Figure 5).    
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Figure 5: Baseline Structure, Intended Structure and Realized Structure 
In contrast to existing procedures, it was decided that all claims (see “Baseline 
organizational model”, Figure 5) should be handled at the customer call centre regardless of 
the claim’s size, complexity or cost.   Three new sections were to be established: (i) travel 
insurance claims, (ii) motor vehicle and bodily injury claims, and (iii) buildings and contents 
claims.  By having all claims handlers in the front office working in a call center-like 
environment, the objective was to enhance accessibility and by that customer satisfaction. 
This would eliminate the need for back office experts, and simultaneously give every claims 
handler the opportunity to handle all kinds of claim complexity.   There were no differences 
in formal qualifications between the majority of claims handlers, so they were qualified to do 
any claim within their area of expertise.  By establishing new procedures for how to handle 
the low complexity and low cost claims, more resources could be put on claims where it was 
possible to reduce claim handling costs and claim costs.  The new organizational structure 
was to be implemented by October 15, 2007.   
Upon implementation, different organizational structures emerged in the sections (see 
“Realized change outcome”, Figure 5).  In both the travel insurance claims section and the 
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motor vehicle insurance claims section, the new organizational structure was implemented as 
planned by the project.  For the claims section for buildings and contents however, the 
structure remained divided between the front office and back office departments, although 
one of the two back office departments was closed down.  The personal injury claims 
departments, with a few minor alterations, were organized as before.  
4.5 Methods 
4.5.1 Data Collection 
The study is an embedded single case (Yin, 2003) study, where the change project 
was followed for eight months.  Real-time, longitudinal data (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992; Van De Ven, 1992) was gathered from a multiple set 
of sections and departments within the claims handling division.   
The primary methods for collecting data were interviews and personal “diaries” 
(Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Denzin, 1989; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). 
To triangulate data (Eisenhardt, 1989), secondary data sources were collected, including 
internal company documents such as: decision memos, consultancy reports and written 
inputs from middle managers outside the decision process.  In addition, more informal 
conversations between the researcher and middle managers took place over the telephone, 
over a cup of coffee, or as a quick chat in the company hallway or in middle managers’ 
offices.   
The personal “diaries” were personal reflections related to the change process 
recorded by the recipients in preformatted MSWord files, where five explicit themes were to 
be reflected. (i) What have you been working with over the last two weeks? (ii) What has 
been working well in the project so far, and what is the reason it has been working well? (iii) 
What has not been working well in the project so far, and what is the reason it has not been 
working well? (iv) What challenges for the project do you see in the following weeks?  (v) Is 
there anything related to the project that you are lacking in order to be able to do your job as 
effectively as possible? (Resources, skills, guidance, information, etc.)  A total of 29 diarists 
were recruited, consisting of 3 heads of sections (middle managers), 14 department heads 
(middle managers), and 12 ordinary claims handlers, where 3 participated in the project 
organization.  The diarists were instructed to send their diaries by e-mail to the researcher 
every second week, starting May 18, 2007 and ending December 22, 2007. 
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Two types of interviews were performed.  One group of interviewees was 
interviewed following a structured, standardized, open-ended interview guide (Patton, 2002; 
Yin, 2003), and one group was interviewed following a semi-structured, open-ended 
interview technique (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).  Interview techniques were adjusted during 
the data collection process as a consequence of the emergence of new and interesting themes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), such as deliberate political actions from a group of divergently 
responding middle managers.  Each interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.  A total of 
25 interviews were conducted.  Of these, 14 were semi-structured interviews and 11 were 
structured interviews.  All interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim.   
4.5.2 Data Analysis 
First-order analysis 
The data analysis was organized in a first and second-order approach  (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  Here, first-order analysis is a narrative or a story developed through a 
journalistic approach.  The objective is to create a story as near the reality of what happened 
as possible.  The application of multiple data sampling techniques enhances the level of 
precision (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, despite the use of multiple data sampling 
techniques, a first-order data analysis will be subjective, even though every effort has been 
made to make it as objective and neutral as possible.  It will be marked by how the members 
of the organization interpret what is going on in the organization and the researcher’s own 
interpretation of the observed (Van Maanen, 1979).  It is essential to get the first-order 
analysis as correct as possible, else it may lead to second-order concepts that are “thin, 
hollow and perhaps altogether faulty” (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 542). 
The main data analysis strategy that has been applied is the narrative strategy 
(Langley, 1999).  Recent literature applying qualitative research methods (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 
2007; Stensaker et al., 2007) uses an analytical approach based on the narrative strategy.  
This strategy is associated with the construction of a detailed story, based on the raw-data – 
the first-order analysis (Langley, 1999) – which tells the story from the perspective of the 
research participants.  By writing up narratives or pure descriptions for each case 
investigated, it is possible to acquire each unique story as a stand-alone entity (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  These stories are vital to the generation of insight because they help us to organize 
huge amounts of data.   
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The objective of the data analysis was to capture the entire complexity and different 
actions that took place during the process investigated; this provided the development of a 
“thick description” (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Langley, 1999).  The thick description was 
created by pulling together data from diaries, interviews, document studies and secondary 
data sources as small talk and telephone follow-up conversations.  From this process, the 
data was organized in accordance with two completely different responses to the change 
initiative: convergent response and divergent response.  The data were organized into two 
broad categories labeled divergent behavior and convergent behavior.  In each category, 
several sub-categories were identified and established, for instance related to departments 
and/or branches.  In the divergent behavior category, one specific sub-category had to do 
with actions leading to an alternative change outcome than what had been intended.  Two 
subcategories evolved in the category of convergent behavior. The first included statements 
about open and direct conflict with those representing the divergent responding category.  
The second included statements of proactive and convergent behavior, where middle 
managers deliberately and actively managed to influence the meaning construction in the 
management team through framing.  For these three categories, the data were coded in 
accordance with: how they behave and what tactics did they apply when trying to manage 
meaning, how did they act and respond, what did they do, why did they do it, and who 
actually did what.   
Second-order analysis 
The second-order analysis is a theoretical analysis of what was unfolded in the first-
order analysis.  Here the researcher examines the first-order findings for underlying 
explanatory dimensions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), “interpretations of the interpretations” 
(Van Maanen, 1979, p. 541).  The objective is to discern deeper patterns, dimensions of 
understanding, patterns not necessarily perceptible to organizational members (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  In this way, theory emerges from the first-order data.  In the second-
order (Van Maanen, 1979), determination of a deeper understanding is attempted by 
performing a more theoretical analysis where the first-order findings are examined to find 
deeper patterns and dimensions based upon a theoretical perspective (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). 
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4.6 First-Order Findings 
In these first-order analyses three different narratives regarding the same strategic 
change initiative are presented: (i) middle managers’ convergent action in the motor vehicle 
claims branch, (ii) middle managers’ divergent action in the buildings and contents claims 
branch, and (iii) middle managers’ convergent action in the buildings and contents claims 
branch.  These narratives are three different stories about how middle managers’ 
interventions in the process led to different change outcomes.  Narrative 1 – The Proactive 
Players – gives an insight into the political tactics middle managers applied when trying to 
frame the challenges the organization were up against, and how these challenges could be 
solved organizationally.  Narrative 2 – “The Gang of Four” – gives insight into the political 
tactics applied by middle managers who deliberately fought senior managements’ change 
initiatives, and the tactics they applied when they were trying to delegitimize their opponents 
among their peers.  Narrative 3 – “The Unsuccessful Followers” – gives insight into the 
passive attitude that develops when middle managers are supporters of proposed changes and 
the political tactics they apply when their perception of reality is threatened.  Key events in 
each narrative are presented graphically in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Timeline Narratives 
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4.6.1 Motor vehicle claims – Convergent Action – “The Proactive 
Players” 
The motor-claims branch was divided into one front office and one back office 
section, as was the rest of the division before the change initiative took place.  The surveyors 
were organized in the back office section, but served both front office and back office.  In 
the fall of 2006, both the front office managers and the surveyor managers experienced a 
declining quality in the treatment of customers and business partners (such as garages, car 
rental companies etc.)  In the front office section, there was a united call from the entire 
motor vehicle claims management team to take action. 
We desperately needed to rethink our approaches. The front office motor vehicle claims 
departments were totally ineffectual (the Norwegian expression would be that we were 
"running on the wheel rim”).  We were not coping with the volume, with quality 
regarding customer treatment and adjustments, and with being up to date.  Neither were 
we able to satisfy our employees’ call for development and more challenging tasks. 
(Middle manager front office, motor vehicle claims)  
The action the front office middle managers took was to arrange a workshop that 
included all of the front office motor vehicle claims middle managers, where issues of how 
to meet these challenges were debated.  In the following workshop, they developed a 
consensus on what they viewed as an ideal solution regarding working procedures, how to 
exploit their resources, how to give employees the opportunity for growth and development 
and how not to enforce restrictions on the tasks the individual employee could do.  Based on 
these conditions, they created a model of how they wanted the future organization to look.  
They wanted to merge the back and front office sections, where individual needs and wishes 
could be taken into consideration when a task was distributed, and an increased flexibility 
throughout the entire motor vehicle claims branch.  The proposals and conclusions were 
presented in full scale in a management meeting in the front office section. 
In the other part of the motor vehicle claims branch, the back office, the motor 
vehicle surveyors found problems similar to the middle managers in the front office section. 
They were dissatisfied with the working practices used in the claims-handling departments. 
They were especially dissatisfied with the old fashioned ways dialogues with customers were 
performed: an extensive use of post, a limited use of e-mail, and low telephone availability. 
They documented this by making a telephone test to their own company and its three major 
competitors, and by feedback from the large players in the auto-repair branch, such as the 
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major car importers in Norway.  The telephone test gave the results that are presented below 
in Table 2:  
 INSCO COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 
Average time to 
response in sec 
55  30 33 20 
Number of test calls 95 45 54 42 
 
Table 2: Average Time to Response – Motor Vehicle Claims in Norwegian Insurance 
Companies2  
When the division management team decided to go on with an evaluation of how the 
division performed, and how it best could meet actual and future challenges, it was decided 
that it would be interesting and necessary to hear how different middle managers saw the 
situation.   Two middle managers were invited, one representative from the motor vehicle 
branch in the front office management team, and one surveyor manager.  The first one was 
the one who had arranged the middle manager workshop earlier that fall, and the second one 
was the one who performed the telephone test (Table 1) and who constantly challenged the 
organization on how performances could be better. 
Both middle managers involved in these presentations strongly indicated the need for 
organizational and procedural changes.  The surveyor manager stressed the immediate need 
for altering claims handling procedures and supportive IT solutions to enhance the 
customers’ and suppliers’ experience when contacting the company.  He stressed the need 
for enhanced telephone availability and enhanced electronic communication with customers 
and suppliers.  He pointed out that the technology and the systems were already in place, but 
the procedural changes were not properly implemented.  His main objective was to show the 
management team that by altering the claims handling procedures, the time spent on each 
claim would be reduced; as a consequence, there would be more time to answer telephones.  
He argued that it was possible to enhance efficiency, quality and customer satisfaction 
through handling claims by only one telephone conversation per claim.  Finally, he 
introduced a merger between the front office departments and the back office departments.  
In their communication with the division management group, both managers stressed the 
                                                 
2 Source ppt presentation created by a middle manager and surveyors, to be presented to the division management team 
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need for changes in both working practices and organization even though they may have had 
slightly different approaches and reasons for their arguments. 
The organization project, which was one of the main actions to be taken in the claims 
analysis project, was launched, with no middle managers from the motor vehicle branch 
participating in the project group.  However, the surveyors were represented in the reference 
group, and expressed satisfaction regarding how the workload was divided.  The final result 
regarding both working practices and organization seemed to be in line with some of the 
ideas that were introduced in the management presentations held by the two middle 
managers. 
In the two weeks since implementation (15.Oct.07), I do have an impression of a 
positive development in the organization.  There are NO queues on the telephone.  This 
is how I dreamt it would be…  In my opinion the reason is that the division management 
team did not deflect the wishes of some employees to keep their old habits.  A leader has 
to bear the brunt of taking some decisions that can seem painful for some – until they 
get familiar with the new situation… (Middle manager motor vehicle claims) 
In Table 3 a list of applied tactics used by the convergent response group “The 
Proactive Players” is summarized, containing quotations from interviews, diaries, small talk 
and telephone follow-up conversations. 
Applied tactics Purpose Evidence 
Arranged a 
workshop 
Establishing a 
shared perspective 
We were rather united in our view of how bad things had become, and all of us 
met the same challenges from our employees.  We were facing demands for 
more challenging tasks, and a risk for increased turnover. To start meeting 
these challenges, several of us took the initiative to arrange a workshop where 
these issues and how we could cope with them were discussed.  (Middle 
manager front office, motor vehicle claims) 
 
We wanted to use our employees where it was wise regarding the company’s 
needs and the individual’s wishes.  We developed criteria for how it could be 
practically arranged. (Middle manager front office, motor vehicle claims – in 
telephone follow-up conversation) 
Compared own 
performances with 
competitors’  
Documenting the 
need for change 
and the urgency 
involved 
We cannot accept being ranked as the poorest performer by the garages.  If we 
don’t elevate our performance to a level where we are the best performer in 
our professional dialogue with the garages without any competition, they will 
prioritize our competitor’s customers, and not ours. (Middle manager 
surveyors, motor vehicle claims) 
Presented unified 
perspective for 
own management 
group 
Establishing 
support for a 
change initiative 
Based on our discussions at the workshop, a future organizational model was 
developed.  We wanted increased flexibility for each employee.  This was best 
taken care of in an organizational model where front office and back office 
were merged.  We wanted to have a smarter utilization of our employees.  This 
was presented in a management meeting in the front office section.  (Middle 
manager front office, motor vehicle claims) 
Made presentation 
for division 
Establishing 
support, 
“Paul” urged me to come to the division management team and give my 
opinion of the trials we had within the field of handling motor vehicle claims, 
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management understanding and 
initiative regarding 
change suggestions 
at divisional level 
and how I thought these challenges could be met. (Middle manager motor 
vehicle claims front office) 
 
I was asked to come to the division management team to introduce my 
thoughts about how we could enhance performance within the field of motor 
vehicle claims handling.  (Middle manager motor vehicle claims surveyors) 
Presented 
metaphors of 
actual and 
prospective 
solutions 
Sensegiving I’m not very skilled at expressing myself in writing, so I used this opportunity 
to create metaphors of high-level customer treatment for them. (Middle 
manager motor vehicle claims surveyors) 
Gaining and 
gathering support 
from peers and 
superiors 
Establishing 
support for a 
change initiative 
There is a need for enhanced challenges in the front office departments and a 
need for a removal of workload in the back office departments.  In the front 
office we may have a turnover challenge, and in the back office we may have a 
wear and tear problem.  Is a merger between the two sections the answer? 
(Middle manager surveyors, motor vehicle) 
 
I showed how we could develop our working processes and how this could be 
combined with a development of our claims handler’s skills.  These thoughts 
were received positively from “Roger” [head of back office section Motor 
vehicle claims], “Victor” [Head of Front office section], and “Susan” [Head of 
claims handling division]. (Middle manager front office, motor vehicle claims) 
Accepted 
appointment to 
reference group 
Securing being 
informed, and 
having the 
opportunity to 
speak up and 
influence decisions 
and solutions 
I am participating as a member of the project reference group.  This position 
suits me fine, “William” [branch expert motor vehicle claims] take care of the 
project group.  We share the same opinion, and we share information. (Middle 
manager motor vehicle claims surveyors) 
 
Table 3: Applied Tactics “The Proactive Players”  
4.6.2 Buildings and Contents Claims – Divergent Action – The 
Gang of Four  
In another claims handling branch – buildings and contents – the process took a 
completely different direction.  First of all, no one was involved or invited to express their 
thoughts in advance of the claims analysis project.  The buildings and contents branch had 
been affected by conflict between the front office and back office sections for years.  The 
conflict may have had its roots in different perceptions of what are the important and 
demanding tasks within the buildings and contents branch: having to expedite service 
routines and a high level of upfront customer service on one side, or being required to do the 
time-consuming claims handling of medium-sized, complex claims on the other.  The total 
claims volume is approximately 34,500 claims each year, where only 3,500 claims are 
related to the latter category.  The conflict was mostly about working conditions, criteria for 
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when to pass on one specific claim from the front office to the back office, differences in 
target figures – did the differences really reflect the differences in complexity, and the 
removal of load when telephone caller intensity was out of control.  One middle manager 
expressed why the buildings and contents claim branch was not involved before the project 
launching. 
We have had a latent conflict within [our] field for years.  The back office guys look at 
themselves as more qualified than our front office employees, despite that they have the 
same formal and practical qualifications.  We have what we call an A and B team.  My 
impression is that the division management team doesn’t want the conflict on their 
table. (Middle manager buildings and contents claims) 
However, after the division management team decided to launch the claims analysis 
project and tried to shelter the core business, the front office and the back office section 
management teams chose different approaches.  The back office management team took an 
active approach to try to control what happened in the project. This is when the notion “The 
Gang of Four” came to life.   
[…] it is clear we are four – what was the name of the Chinese leadership in earlier 
days – “The Gang of Four”, yes, that was when “The Gang of Four” came to life.  
(Middle manager buildings and contents claims back office group) 
“The Gang of Four” was very active in the claims analysis project from the start.  
Despite the division management team’s wish to shelter the core business, one of the most 
central core business players from the back office was positioned in several important 
positions in the project.  By controlling a set of major positions in the analysis project, they 
could influence much of what was happening.  One of the first things they did during the 
analysis was to rewrite the entire base of interview questions that was to be used in the data 
collection in the analysis project.  In this way, “The Gang of Four” took control over the 
issues that would be focused on in the analysis.  In order to make sure their arguments were 
properly understood and considered by the project, they took control over the production of a 
memo that was distributed among the reference group members on a consultation basis.  
However, the front office representative in the reference group did not receive the memo 
before the reference group meeting where it was to be discussed.  The memo was thereafter 
passed on to the project management and the steering committee (division management 
team).  In the memo, they not only focused on working practices, but they also took the 
opportunity to say something about the organization’s future. 
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“The Gang of Four” was challenged by the fact that their opinion regarding future 
organization seemed to not be supported by the project organization as a whole, despite them 
having control over the most vital positions in the project regarding buildings and contents.  
This challenge resulted in considerable political action.  They felt sure that they had low 
odds for gaining support for their position within the project without actively taking action.  
Having managed to situate their allies in almost every position in the project was not enough 
to take control over the project’s overall position.  This led to another type of engagement 
and action.  Specifically, the actions that were taken mostly regarded gaining control over 
information: making sure “gang members” and their allies had always prepared their 
arguments and tried to foresee what arguments their opponents would apply, that 
information was deliberately spread or held back (like not distributing their memo to their 
opponents), and that information was gathered from a wide range of sources.  Despite the 
influencing tactics employed, the propositions from the project group were to organize the 
division in contrast to the interests of “The Gang of Four”.   
A new head of division was appointed before the final conclusions regarding how to 
organize the division were made.  The new management team started working right away 
with the organizational project as a steering committee and as a decision team.  The head of 
“The Gang of Four” was appointed as a member of the new division management team.  The 
atmosphere in the management team was principally to follow the suggestions from the 
organization project.  Following the project’s suggestions led to some disagreement in the 
buildings and contents claims field as a result of “The Gang of Four’s” position regarding 
how the section was to be organized.  These disagreements led to a series of meetings and 
postponements while the management team tried to reach a unified conclusion.  
Nevertheless, the management team made a decision to follow the solution suggested by the 
organization project.  In the effort to get another decision than the original one, the head of 
“The Gang of Four” started manipulating the new head of division.  This strategy actually 
produced the results he and his allies wanted.  The most prominent influencing tactic he used 
was to have a personal meeting with the new head of division, where he could present his 
view and position without interruption.  In the meeting he emphasized his broad experience 
within the buildings and contents branch, which included positions as surveyor, head of 
surveyors, head of claims handling departments, and finally head of back office section.  He 
managed to maneuver the decision in a direction where the buildings and contents section 
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would still be organized into one front office and one back office milieu.  The decision was 
in favor of the “Gang of Four”, and against the project and the rest of the management team. 
In Table 4, a list of tactics applied by the divergent response group “The Gang of 
Four” is summarized, containing quotations from interviews, diaries, small talk and 
telephone follow-up conversations. 
Applied tactics Purpose Evidence 
Disobeying 
management 
decisions about 
project 
representation 
Securing 
caretaking of own 
interests 
Should I not fight for what I believe in?  Should I not have the opportunity to 
be of influence? […] The project has not even bothered to interview those who 
have been head of sections, asking for example, what do you think about the 
future?  Seen from the main direction, what are your thoughts, do you have 
some contributions to the project?  It hasn’t been interesting to get an idea of 
what we knew, what we were thinking, or anything else. […] When they don’t 
reach out their hand; please come and tell us whatever you like!  Then I say 
OK, we can start with something else.  That is what I have done; I have been 
hurrying intensely with my three trusted men.  And they have had extraordinary 
loyalty.  (Middle manager buildings and contents back office group) 
 
If I had been a “good boy” waiting on the sidelines we wouldn’t have been 
where we are today.  […]  I’m not accepting that.  When argumentation doesn’t 
work, you have to take another approach.  (Middle manager back office 
buildings and contents claims back office group) 
Handpicking loyal 
and skilled 
personnel to 
project positions to 
get control over the 
entire subproject 
staffing 
Taking control 
over all processes, 
analysis and 
conclusions 
produced in the 
project 
Then I chose my A-team.  Of course I did, because I want to have influence.  I 
get that through the participating actors.  I will not be a passive observer for 
twelve months, and see such things happen. (Middle manager back office 
buildings and contents claims back office group) 
Taking control 
over the entire 
subproject staffing 
Taking control 
over conclusions 
and decisions 
If [we] had chosen somebody else to participate in the claims analysis project, 
these things would never had come up in this way (Middle manager buildings 
and contents back office group) 
 
There is a game going on. […] It’s about positioning and influence. (Middle 
manager buildings and contents back office group) 
Placing the most 
trusted man in 
many different 
positions 
Being sure that 
the main idea 
regarding own 
position is 
properly taken 
care of 
I decided to put my trusted men in as many positions as possible: to make sure 
we were able to pass on our experience, and the contents in projects that have 
been running for years.  I even made sure that our surveyors were also broadly 
represented in the processes.  (Middle manager buildings and contents claims 
back office group) 
 
Of course, I want to have influence, which I get through those who are 
participating (Middle manager buildings and contents) 
Taking control 
over the 
information 
gathering in the 
analysis by taking 
Taking control 
over the 
perception of 
reality 
[The basic foundation] presented by the consultants was of no use to us in 
buildings and contents.  The subproject team had to rewrite the entire base of 
questions completely. (Middle manager buildings and contents) 
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control over what 
questions are to be 
asked and what to 
focus on during 
data sampling 
 
 
Developing a 
memo supporting 
and giving the 
reasons for own 
position and 
objectives 
Influencing 
others’ perception 
of reality 
Simultaneously we took the opportunity to have an opinion about the [future] 
organization.  This was synthesized in a memo regarding working procedures, 
segmenting and organization.  (Middle manager buildings and contents claims 
back office group) 
Manipulating the 
flow of 
information by 
holding back 
information, and 
by distributing 
only bits of 
information 
Making sure that 
the opposition 
was less informed 
and unprepared 
when issues were 
up for discussion 
and decision 
The memo was produced as an input to the OD project in [the division].  In 
week 20, this memo was submitted on a consultative round to the reference 
group of the OD project.  I took care of the submission and the follow-up 
procedures regarding [the division management team].  (Middle manager back 
office buildings and contents claims back office group) 
 
I found it strange to not receive the memo from [the subproject manager].  
(Middle manager front office building and contents claims front office group) 
 
One hour before attending [a reference group meeting] I received a call from 
the subproject manager [buildings and contents] [member of “The Gang of 
Four”] who was to inform the meeting about a memo they had produced.  
(Middle manager buildings and contents front office group). 
 
It is to make sure that information is spread both here and there, and that you 
are at any time as well oriented as possible.  I do believe I was better informed 
[…] than anybody else. (Middle manager buildings and contents claims back 
office group) 
 
I have used some means I never thought I would use.  The policy instrument 
was actually to make sure [specific “gang” member] controlled all possible 
arguments. […] That is the real policy instrument, which is what we have done 
all the way, to try to have an influence.  The project saw this a long time ago.  
(Middle manager buildings and contents claims back office group) 
Questioning 
consultants’ 
expertise   
Shaping 
perception of own 
expertise 
It is my opinion that the claims analysis project is governed by consultants. I do 
believe it is wise to use consultants, but it is, in my opinion, wrong that 
propositions related to future organizational solutions will be prepared for the 
steering committee mainly by consultants and other persons with little relevant 
experience from claims handling and next to no knowledge of what challenges 
the organization will meet.  I also react negatively that some have preferences 
related to future [organizational] solutions, which they bring into the project 
without having them subsumed with the challenges we will meet. (Middle 
manager buildings and contents back office group) 
Taking advantage 
of having a new 
head of division 
and his lack of 
historical 
background and 
direct experience 
in the particular 
Making sure 
unfavorable 
decisions were not 
made 
[The head of division] understood the seriousness in what I said.  He wanted 
information about my opinion, and why.  We had a session on this issue where 
he asked a lot of questions.  […] He understood my opinion and why.  That is 
when I think he found arguments and a solid foundation for it being wise to 
alter the strategy (Middle manager buildings and contents back office group) 
 
It was to call attention to the risk of choosing the main process [the project’s 
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branch suggestion].  For this field there would be a significant risk that what we had 
built up during the latter six to seven years would disintegrate.   (Middle 
manager buildings and contents back office group)  
 
 
Not accepting 
unfavorable 
decisions and by 
that securing 
replay on vital 
decisions 
Making sure only 
favorable 
decisions were 
made 
How this happened? I didn’t accept [the proposed solutions regarding future 
organizational model].  [The new head of division] understood the seriousness 
of what I told him. (Middle manager buildings and contents back office group) 
 
 
Arranging a one-
to-one meeting 
with new head of 
division 
Making sure the 
new division 
head’s 
perceptions were 
in line with own 
interests 
Then we had a separate meeting where he posed a lot of questions, a lot. […]  I 
believe that he found a reasonable argumentation for why it was wise to deviate 
from his position. (Middle manager buildings and contents back office group) 
 
I have put all my professional expertise into this. […]   I’ve used the knowledge 
I’ve got, the experience I’ve got from it. [...] I’ve seen so many models and 
solutions throughout the years; I’ve seen what works and what doesn’t.  
Something that didn’t work earlier may work now, but then something new 
must be added, another variant or something else so that it may work better at 
the next crossroad.  (Middle manager building and contents claims back office 
group) 
 
Table 4: Applied Tactics “The Gang of Four” 
4.6.3 Buildings and Contents Claims – Convergent Action – The 
Unsuccessful Followers 
As we have seen, the conflict-ridden buildings and contents branch were divided into 
a front office and a back office section.  A perception of an A and a B-team has developed 
over time.  The line of conflict is between the front office milieu and the back office milieu, 
with the latter the milieu that is viewed as the A-team.  “The Gang of Four” represented the 
interests of the back office milieu. On the other side, the front office milieu has not acted as 
actively as “The Gang of Four”; nor were they able to organize themselves in the same way.  
The ones that represented the front office milieu in the political struggle that arose as a 
consequence of top management’s intentions to alter organizational structure were 
department heads in the front office section.  Their superior – head of the front office – 
decided to leave the company before the real political struggle regarding the future 
organizational structure commenced.  These department heads were not as organized and 
coordinated as “The Gang of Four”, hence they are labeled “The Unsuccessful Followers”. 
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Like “The Gang of Four”, “The Unsuccessful Followers” were also not invited to 
express their point of view at the beginning of the claims analysis project; nor did they take 
any active action to be players in the analysis project.  They decided to follow the decision 
that no managers from core business should take part in the project organization even after 
confronting their superior with the fact that the back office managers had managed to get 
themselves placed in vital positions in the project.  The choice to stay loyal to management 
decisions was clear. 
However, frustration about how the project was staffed found expression in a diary. 
The subproject has an unbalanced staff [related to how the division is organized].  Out 
of 6 delegates, only one is from [front office] the largest part [of the organization]. 
(Middle manager buildings and contents front office group) 
The different positions the two milieus held were explicitly expressed by front office 
managers, who due to process loyalty were not in a position to maneuver within the project.  
Because of lack of representation and through that, lack of information to one of the parties, 
conflict between the two milieus seemed to intensify.  One of the project’s objectives was to 
solve the conflict, not to intensify it.  
I seem to remember that there were one or two meetings we [head of departments] 
participated in, when results were presented. […] It was, of course a challenge that [the 
front office managers] and [the back office managers] were each stuck in their own, 
separate positions (Middle manager buildings and contents claims front office group) 
The level of conflict was rather intensified during the project.  As progress was made, 
the different positions were crystallized.  When the back office milieu launched the memo 
they had produced within the boundaries of the buildings and contents subproject, reactions 
were intense from the front office managers.  On short notice, they drafted a reply to the 
memo the “The Gang of Four” had produced, and sent it simultaneously to the project 
management and the steering committee (division management team). 
When the project presented their conclusions, many of the back office issues were 
taken care of in the analysis project.  However, when the project reached a conclusion later 
on regarding future organization, the front office perspective was the perspective that was 
reflected in the recommendations from the project.  For a long time, it seemed that the 
recommendations from the project would be the end result of the organization project. 
Due to the front office milieu’s belief in the process and decisions made in the 
division management team, appointment of a new head of division and a new management 
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team, and the fact that their representative in the management team had left the organization 
without having been replaced by any other front office representative in the management 
team, the front office milieu had no alternative arena or channel to direct their input to but 
the project.  The project, on the other hand, had already drawn its conclusions.  Without a 
natural arena and communication channels, “The Unsuccessful Followers” entered a “wait 
and see” state of mind. 
When conclusions regarding the future organization were reached, and the front 
office manager’s and the project’s position were not any part of the conclusions, disbelief 
and dissatisfaction arose. 
When you get a new [head of division], he often chooses the safest solutions (Middle 
manager front office) 
Special claims [back office], as they now call themselves, have really come out of this 
well off.  What we sense is how happy they are with themselves. They are making 
comments such as “now the unsolved cases are moved to the other departments”.  
Unsolved cases from the “old” [back office] departments have now been moved to the 
other departments [front office].  Of course when employees [in these departments] 
hear this, they are not very happy… (Middle manager front office building and 
contents) 
In Table 5, a list of tactics applied by the convergent response group “The 
Unsuccessful Followers” is summarized, containing quotations from interviews, diaries, 
small talk and telephone follow-up conversations. 
Applied tactics Purpose Evidence 
Loyalty to 
managements’ 
decisions and by 
that taking no 
positions in the 
project 
Taking care of 
day-to-day 
business, and 
trusting in fair 
processes for the 
project 
We did not participate in the process at all.  Claims handling analysis should do 
the job, period. (Middle manager buildings and contents front office group) 
 
For me it has to do with loyalty regarding running processes.  That you take 
care of “business as usual”, and have hope and believe in those who have the 
position to make decisions to make reasonable ones.  I wouldn’t bother to take 
the fight to them either. (Middle manager buildings and contents front office 
group) 
Trying to replay 
project 
appointments 
Securing a more 
balanced 
subproject team 
We notified “Victor” [our superior] about [how back office representatives had 
been appointed to project positions], but he didn’t want a replay on this issue.  
(Middle manager buildings and contents front office group) 
 
I made the project management team and “Victor” [head of front office section] 
early on aware of the unfortunate manning of the project team.  Some were 
appointed to too many different positions. […] How a project is staffed and 
organized may have a considerable impact on the outcome; not the least having 
an influence on the perception of the process.  The outcome may be influenced 
by the process, and I think it has been so in this case. […] We did meet 
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[“Steve”] everywhere.  (Middle manager buildings and contents front office 
group)  
Taking the 
problem of an 
unbalanced 
subproject team to 
the project 
management 
Securing a more 
balanced process 
After the meeting I asked for a brief meeting with [the project manager and the 
head of the consultant team].  I felt I had to report that the way the subproject 
team was put together in no way reflected the building and contents claims 
organization. (Middle manager buildings and contents front office group) 
 
Early on we saw the patterns of [the one-sided] project appointments. This was 
very unfortunate.  The reason we chose not to fight for having our [own 
representatives on board] for long, was that we would never have finished such 
a fight.  We would only be fighting that issue.  We have had our fights for 
years, so this we know. […] They used ulterior motives to have their own 
representatives on board. The division management and “Joe” [the project 
manager] were warned, but they did not see the patterns. (Middle manager 
buildings and contents front office group) 
Wait and see, 
trusting the project 
management 
succeeding in their 
effort to 
implement their 
proposed solution 
Having their 
preferred solution 
implemented 
without open fight 
They must have done something, and we [their opposition] must have been a 
bit naïve;  I have to admit that, in  believing our initial arguments were 
outstanding.  [Representatives for] the division management team presented 
arguments in favor of [our preferred] solution.  (Middle manager buildings and 
contents front office group) 
Writing a reply 
memo to the memo 
produced by the 
opposition 
Securing that their 
position and 
perception of 
reality were 
brought to the 
decision makers 
One hour before attending [a reference group meeting] I received a call from 
the subproject manager [buildings and contents] [member of “The Gang of 
Four”] who was to inform the meeting about a memo they had produced.  […]  
I was then told that I could present my own memo or make my own comments 
to the subproject recommendations.  (Middle manager buildings and contents 
front office group). 
Arguing in favor 
of own position in 
management 
meetings 
Trying to steer 
decisions in 
desired direction 
It was I opposing the rest.  That was how I felt.  I repeatedly argued in favor of 
[our position], opposing “Steve” [head of department back office].  This 
management meeting turned out just as expected, and that was hard.  “Paul” 
[head of back office section] gave me credit for my endurance, so I thought, 
OK, doing it my way may however be right then. (Middle manager buildings 
and contents front office group). 
 
Table 5: Applied Tactics “The Unsuccessful Followers” 
4.7 Second-Order Findings 
I have shown how structural changes were met by both convergent and divergent 
actions. Convergent actions were applied by two groups of managers (“The Proactive 
Players” and “The Unsuccessful Followers”) to support processes and decisions that were in 
line with the change initiative’s original idea.  The other group of managers (“The Gang of 
Four”) applied divergent actions to achieve an alternative decision.  In this specific case, 
both convergent and divergent actions were successful strategies; however one group of 
managers (“The Unsuccessful Followers”) who applied a convergent action strategy failed.  
Both successful groups – “The Gang of Four” and “The Proactive Players” – argued that 
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they had “noble” intentions. Contrary to a great deal of the political literature, which presents 
the use of power as self-serving, Buchanan (2008) argued that “political behavior […] is not 
necessarily perceived to be self-serving” (p. 61).   The two groups simply had completely 
different perceptions of the right way of organizing the business to take care of both 
customer needs and the company’s need for extensive cost control. 
In this second-order analysis, the political tactics, the sensemaking activities, and the 
sensegiving activities found in the first-order analysis for “The Proactive Players”, The Gang 
of Four” and “The Unsuccessful Followers” will be theoretically analyzed.  
4.7.1 Politics, sensemaking and sensegiving – “The Proactive 
Players”  
Floyd & Wooldridge (1992, 1994, 1997) introduced the middle manager change 
activity, “synthesizing information”, as a convergent upwardly influential activity.  “The 
proactive players” used the opportunity to respond to the division management’s call for 
analyses to identify why performance was declining by introducing sincere suggestions of 
how the challenges of declining performance could be met.  Middle managers are not 
objective channels for information (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994).  They interpret changes in 
internal and external environment, and propose solutions in accordance with how they 
interpret and make sense of assumed changes in their environment. Sensemaking is not 
getting things right that are based upon facts by creating the truth.  Sensemaking is about 
creating the emergent story by incorporating emergent data as one sees it to create a story as 
broad as possible, thereby being more resistant with regard to criticism (Weick et al., 2005).  
“The proactive players” gathered information as they saw it, arranged it and presented it to 
the management team.  This is practical sensegiving (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Pye, 2005) or framing (Fairhurst, 2005; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Fiss & 
Hirsch, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), where the objective is to influence the meaning 
construction for the recipients.  This is politics in action where the framing activity has one 
overall objective, which is to create a claim for legitimacy for how “The Proactive Players” 
interpreted the internal and external challenges (Pettigrew, 1977). 
“The Proactive Players” constituted two different milieus that constructed a shared 
perception of how to meet future challenges, though they were based on quite different 
approaches about how to gather and present facts regarding these challenges.  The claims 
handlers arranged a workshop to create a shared understanding of the challenges and how to 
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meet them.  In this way, they created a shared interpretation of the situation and a shared 
understanding of how the organization should approach these challenges.  By organizing the 
workshop and being able to reach a consensus, they managed to establish a legitimate claim 
to future organizational solutions.  This is a claim actually based on the front office 
managers’ narrow interests, but with no alternative claims presented, this claim might have 
been seen as desirable, proper and appropriate (Brown, 1994, 1998).  
On the other hand, the surveyors chose an alternative approach to create legitimacy 
for their claim to change organizational practices.  Their key concept was to do a “survey” 
gathering facts of how poorly the organization performed today.  These facts were used as a 
legitimation tool for the propositions they introduced.  Using the facts to establish a need for 
change and to create favorable images and metaphors of how a future organizational solution 
could look like, they managed to frame the perception of reality in a way that supported their 
cause (Fairhurst, 2005; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2006).  This framing process was 
a construction of reality based upon the selective gathering and construction of events (Fiss 
& Zajac, 2006). 
The politics applied by both milieus was the creation of a legitimate claim for 
organizational changes based on the ideas presented by these actors (Pettigrew, 1977).  
These ideas were supported by facts framed as an objective presentation of internal and 
external challenges.  In this way they were able to delegitimize alternative claims, with 
stakeholders of these claims not even being given the opportunity to make presentations.   
4.7.2 Politics, sensemaking and sensegiving – “The Gang of Four” 
“The Gang of Four” was not given the opportunity to present their perception of 
challenges and opportunities regarding the claims handling division up front.  When they 
became aware that the claims analysis project could be predisposed regarding future 
solutions, they started their political activities.  Their political ploy comprised a broad 
spectrum of legitimizing activities regarding own ideas, and a broad spectrum of tactics 
applied to delegitimize the ideas and proposals from their opponents (Pettigrew, 1977).  It is 
interesting to observe that the data set that served as “facts” for both the project team and 
“The Gang of Four” was the same, but they emphasized different aspects and evaluated parts 
of the data differently when they were framing their positions. 
“The Gang of Four” faced a predefined process, where the process would be guided 
and managed by external consultants with support from some internal non-managerial 
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resources.  These external resources may be labeled change agents (Balogun, 2006; 
Buchanan & Boddy, 1992; Hartley et al., 1997).  Effective change agents need to be aware 
of the power constellations in organizations and be able to maneuver tactically within these 
constellations to manipulate the context to their advantage (Balogun, 2006; Buchanan & 
Boddy, 1992).  In this case, we see how the change agents continuously adapted to the 
demands from “The Gang of Four” without letting the overt political ploy of “The Gang of 
Four” have an impact on the conclusions that had been drawn.  They could do this because 
the power base from which they had their mandate was very strong.  However, power is 
relational, not something anyone possesses (Balogun et al., 2005).  When shifts in relations 
occur, the powerbase may also shift.  This is what happened to “The Gang of Four”.  A new 
head of division was appointed, one member of the division management team left, and a 
new management team was appointed as a consequence of the organizational changes.  
These changes shifted the power base from that in which the change agents had their 
mandate: not immediately, but after a while.  Here, we see how the relational aspect of 
power is displayed.  The former head of division was responsible for appointing the change 
agents.  This gave them a strong base of power and legitimacy for their proposals.  However, 
when the principal changed, the same strong relationship was not transferred, and the power 
base declined.  The arena opened the way for others to promote their agency – “The Gang of 
Four” – as internal change agents (Hartley et al., 1997).  When the power base changed, 
“The Gang of Four” managed through politics to manipulate the context to their advantage 
(Balogun et al., 2005).  In this case, we are able to identify the relational aspect of power 
(Balogun et al., 2005) and as a consequence the relational aspects of the legitimacy of certain 
ideas, values and demands (Pettigrew, 1977).  The power base for the head of “The Gang of 
Four” was relational.  When the new head of division appointed him as a member of the new 
management team, the head of “The Gang of Four” gained a new and stronger power base.  
This led to a shift in the legitimacy of the proposed solutions, where solutions proposed by 
“The Gang of Four” created the basis of meaning construction in the division at the expense 
of the propositions introduced and supported by the project management team. 
4.7.3 Politics, sensemaking and sensegiving – “The Unsuccessful 
Followers” 
“The Unsuccessful Followers” took early steps to try to create a power base for 
themselves at the expense of those who had managed to establish a powerbase within the 
subproject buildings and contents.  “The Unsuccessful Followers” obviously had different 
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value preferences than their opponents – “The Gang of Four” (Brown, 1994).  When they 
tried to have a replay on project appointments, they framed their arguments around what 
they saw as unbalanced project appointments.  In this way, they tried to legitimize their own 
struggle for a replay on the project appointments, and delegitimize their opponents’ position 
in the project.  They did not succeed in their struggle for reappointments because their 
superiors did not want a replay on this issue, and by that intensify a well known but 
unwanted conflict between the front office and back office milieus. However, there is strong 
evidence in the supporting data that their opponents had a rather weak power base within the 
project despite their controlling most of the positions within the subproject. 
Confident that the project management represented their position in the analysis 
project, they continued to do “business as usual” until further notice.  There is no evidence in 
the data for this being a significant act in the legitimizing process for their position.  
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence in the data that “The Unsuccessful Followers” held a 
position that was supported by the project management and the project team.  It should be 
debated to what extent “The Unsuccessful Followers” obedience to overall decisions 
strengthened their position as the ones who represented the true version of reality (Fiss & 
Zajac, 2006).   
When “The Gang of Four” produced a memo to the steering committee, this was an 
attempt to frame their position and present their version of reality, and try to gain support 
from key stakeholders in the organization (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Weick 
et al., 2005).  When their opponents, “The Unsuccessful Followers”, were given the same 
opportunity to present their version of reality in a memo presented simultaneously, two 
distinctively different versions of reality were presented.  We have seen that the project 
management supported the version of reality presented by the “Unsuccessful Followers”.  
When the division management as the project steering committee decided (in the first 
instance) to support the perspective and the suggestions supported by “The Unsuccessful 
Followers”, this position may be more one of plausibility than accuracy (Mills, 2003; Weick, 
1995; Weick et al., 2005).  Plausibility tends to occur when stories seem to be in line with 
other data, ongoing projects, an aura of accuracy, a sense of current climate, and a 
prosperous future (Mills, 2003; Weick et al., 2005).  At this stage in the project, it seemed 
that “The Unsuccessful Followers” had a solid base of power, since decisions were made in 
favor of their position.  However, power is a relational resource (Balogun et al., 2005), and 
when relations changes, the power base might change as well.  When changes were made in 
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the division management, the power base that “The Unsuccessful Followers” rested on was 
diminished.  New superiors perceived their opponents’ position as more plausible (Weick et 
al., 2005). 
4.8 Discussion – How sources of power are used in 
sensegiving and sensemaking 
As indicated above, framing, sensegiving, and organizational politics are interrelated 
as all three concepts are about controlling and shaping others’ meaning construction and 
perceptions of reality (Fairhurst, 2005; Fiss & Hirsch, 2005; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Hardy, 1996; Weick et al., 2005).  Politics is the practical domain of 
power (Buchanan & Badham, 1999, 2008), and politics is about creating legitimacy for 
certain ideas to influence meaning construction.  Organizational change is a power struggle 
(Mintzberg, 1984), where individuals and groups seek legitimacy to gain power (Brown, 
1998), either as a reinforced power or as redistributed power.  Organizational politics are 
especially apparent during change when ambivalence and uncertainty are at their peak 
(Buchanan, 2008).  During change there is fertile ground for alternative perceptions of 
reality, but only one “reality” will end up as the dominant and surviving “reality”.  
Therefore, the political struggle will be about the power of meaning.  The power of meaning 
has to do with shaping others perceptions, cognitions and preferences (Hardy, 1996), which 
is about controlling what position will end up as the preferred solution.  In this case, we have 
seen different tactics applied to manage meaning – the power of meaning.  The tactics 
applied have been used to establish both resources power and process power as the means to 
establish power of meaning. 
Being able to gain power over the process seems dependant on the actors having 
power over two kinds of resources: expertise and close connection to management.  In 
controlling the resource expertise, you control a legitimizing resource in the sense of having 
power of meaning.  However, this is a factor you need to have some degree of control over, 
whatever actions you take – convergent or divergent.  The ability to foster some control over 
meaning construction is dependent on how the sensemaker perceives the sensegiver’s 
expertise.   On the other hand, the power of process gives actors control over who 
participates in the decision-making processes and who does not, which is a considerable base 
of power with regard to meaning construction.  The data shows the need for tight control 
over process to achieve decisions in the direction you desire.  We see the successful 
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convergent action middle managers (“The Proactive Players”) manage to take an early 
control over process and by that the entire meaning construction processes in their part of the 
business.  The unsuccessful convergent action middle managers (“The Unsuccessful 
Followers”) did not take this kind of active control over process, and by that more or less left 
the arena open for the divergent action middle manager group (“The Gang of Four”) – who 
eventually succeeded. In the end, the latter group’s success was mostly founded on their 
ability to gain control of the top manager’s meaning construction.  First, they were 
unsuccessful, perhaps as a result of not controlling the process entirely despite having 
control over most of the project positions.  Then, as a consequence of having the power of 
resources through expertise and organizational position (gang-member appointed to 
management team position), they managed to position themselves to have considerable 
influence over the final decision maker’s meaning construction in the second round. 
In this particular case, the data support a statement that the power of process is an 
important factor in influencing meaning construction.  We see that those who succeeded 
without obstruction (“The Proactive Players) were able to influence the process by early 
action.  Those who were reactive (“The Gang of Four”) did not manage to maneuver 
themselves into process power despite controlling most of the project resources because they 
did not control the project management team where all procedural decisions were made.  
However, The Gang of Four succeeded in the end because they had the power of resources.   
Having power over resources – especially the power of expertise, such as extensive 
knowledge of business execution – may be influential regarding others’ meaning 
construction.  Nevertheless it is not as influential as the power of process.  Without 
participation, influence is dramatically reduced, and with that the opportunity to exert the 
power of meaning. 
4.8.1 Sensegiving in convergent actions 
The middle managers that acted in a convergent manner had two entirely different 
starting points: (a) those who in advance of the project launch (“The Proactive Players”) 
managed to set the agenda for the change initiative, and (b) those who did not participate 
prior to the project launch (“The Unsuccessful Followers”), but who saw the change 
initiative as a confirmation of their perspective as to how the business should be run. 
“The Proactive Players” managed in advance of the project launch to set the agenda 
for the change initiative.  What did they do to manage this kind of maneuvering?  First of all, 
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they had the day-to-day hands-on control for the business and the daily challenges.  They 
also managed to coordinate their overall perceptions of what their challenges were.  
The workshop they arranged might be seen as a reciprocal sensegiving and 
sensemaking process within the group of motor vehicle claims managers.  By discussing and 
presenting their different views, these middle managers managed to create a shared 
perception of the changes they wanted.  These processes took place in a social setting, where 
both social and cognitive processes played an important role (Weick, 1995).  During this 
kind of interaction, each individual draws upon their own interpretative schemes that the 
middle manager has learned from experience and socialization (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 
Weick, 1995).  This workshop established an arena where middle managers were given the 
opportunity to socialize in a way that gave them a shared interpretation of the situation 
(Maitlis, 2005). 
Since no manager was superior in relation to the others, the question of power of 
resources did not play a significant role in this process.  No manager had extraordinary 
funding, significant slack, extraordinarily skilled employees (compared to the others), or the 
ability to control careers, rewards and punishment.  The power of process, on the other hand, 
may have been stronger.  Ideally, chairing a meeting may give significant power of process.   
This is done by influencing the agenda and not the least influencing who become speakers.  
However, there are no indications in the data that support that the power of process had been 
significant within the group of middle managers.  The development of a shared interpretation 
of reality was developed in an atmosphere of socialization where each individual participant 
was given the opportunity for an active participation in the development of this united 
understanding of the situation. This indicates that no individual in particular was in an 
extraordinary position to exert the power of meaning on their own.   
As subordinates related to the division management team, these middle managers had 
minor resource power, with the exception of expertise.  However, they have shown that their 
pro-active approach gave them a considerable power of process and by that, power of 
meaning.  By attending management team meetings and giving their point of view, they were 
able to both control and shape the management team’s perceptions of what challenges there 
were in the motor vehicle claims branch, and how these could best be solved.  This became 
the overall guideline for how to organize, not only the motor vehicle claims branch, but the 
entire claims handling division. 
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In the buildings and contents branch, the “The Unsuccessful Followers” trusted in the 
first instance that fair processes and an objective view (consultants) would secure a balanced 
sensegiving process and because of that did not take active persuasive steps in the beginning.        
The management team let the claims analysis and the organization project take care of 
different inputs regarding buildings and contents claims.  The convergent group took their 
first step in active sensegiving when they wanted a replay of the project appointments, and a 
second step when they produced a memo to the management team.  It seemed this was 
enough in the first place, since the first decisions were in favor of “The Unsuccessful 
Followers”.  Nevertheless, they did not succeed in the end because they did not engage in a 
directly active sensegiving process vis-à-vis the new head of division. 
4.8.2 Sensegiving in divergent action 
Different approaches were chosen by the two factions in the buildings and contents 
branch.  The divergent group (“The Gang of Four”) – by every means the most active one – 
saw the opportunity arising when the analysis and organization projects were organized.  
This was clearly stated by one of the managers as a question of influence.  Influence is about 
power and politics (Buchanan & Badham, 1999; Hardy, 1996).  Having influence means you 
are able to foster your will and objectives.  In this process, one party reveals a willingness 
and desire for having influence – and power.  From a sensegiving perspective, “The Gang of 
Four” took steps to gain the opportunity to influence the sensemaking of the project 
participants (consultants, staff members, management team, etc.) (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991).   
The divergent action group tried to exert the power of resources, the power of 
process, and the power of meaning (Balogun et al., 2005, Hardy, 1996).  Power of resources 
was exerted through deployment of resources in the project.  The project needed expertise 
and information, which this faction to some extent controlled.  They controlled the 
knowledge and expertise related to the costly time-consuming claims and surveyor 
procedures.  This expertise was deliberately positioned where they had maximum influence.  
Nevertheless, this was not enough to gain control, because their expertise was related to 
approximately 3,500 out of 34,500 claims.   
Expertise in handling the vast majorities of claims, on the other hand, was situated in 
the “convergent” group.  In summary, the divergent action group, despite a deliberate 
strategy in positioning resources in vital positions, did not manage to establish a power base 
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founded on resources.  The strategy regarding positioning vital resources played a more 
significant role regarding the power of process.  The divergent action group managed to get 
their players positioned importantly as heads of subproject, project resources, members of 
reference group, and members of steering committee.  This gave a significant power of 
process.  In this way, they managed to steer the analysis in the desired directions.  They 
managed to control who was actively participating in drawing conclusions and making 
recommendations in the project, and they managed to stay clear of their biggest opponents.  
By this type of maneuvering they managed to control who was participating in the processes 
and who was not.  Process power should have provided some power to influence the 
decision makers’ meaning construction, but it did not.  Even if “The Gang of Four” had both 
power of resources through expertise and power of process they did not manage to position 
themselves to influence the construction of meaning.  This was because the project 
management team, who had another opinion as to what were the best solutions for the 
organization, controlled the process of drawing the final conclusions for the project. 
Rewriting the consultants’ questions in the analysis project was an action well-suited 
to delegitimize the consultants and legitimize one’s own actions (Balogun et al., 2005).  
“The Gang of Four” elevated own expertise and experience at the expense of the consultants.  
By controlling what questions were asked, they controlled the information for which to look. 
They indirectly manipulated and controlled what information was given (Hardy, 1996).   The 
power of meaning was also executed by holding information back, and delaying distribution 
of information, memos and propositions to other members of the subproject.  They even 
disguised dissent within the group when launching information.   
As we have seen, this was not enough to get decisions in favor of their position.  
However, they managed to have a replay in order to get another decision.  Two explicit 
conditions led to this replay: (i) the appointment of a new head of division, and (ii) the 
appointment of one of “The Gang of Four” in the new division management team.  At this 
stage, the discussion had left the open scene and moved behind closed doors.  This person 
had no opponents, and was able to package the information in such a way that he controlled 
his superior’s sensemaking.  This sensegiving process may be considered as a “ …process of 
attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of… ” (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991, p. 442) the head of division to a redefined view of the organizational 
reality.  In this sensegiving process, he had the power of resources his position as the 
buildings and contents expert in the division management team gave him.  This power base 
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was extreme.  He was the newly appointed head of the buildings and contents section.  
Having been given this position, he was the one the head of division was dependant on in 
executing his strategy.  He was the expert, and he had a group of loyal experts as his trusted 
allies.  One might even say he also had some power of process, expressed by the fact that 
they were only two, and one – the middle manager – had set the agenda of what to discuss.  
He could guide the entire questioning process by the way he formulated his answers. 
4.8.3 Sensegiving and power 
In this study, we have seen how power of resources has had an impact on the power 
of process, and how these power bases have played a central role in subordinates’ 
sensegiving processes vis-à-vis decision makers.  These sensegiving processes have been 
materialized through political tactics, where the objective has been to influence decision 
makers’ meaning construction.  These sensegiving processes may be seen as execution of the 
power of meaning.  We see a strong link from resource power via process power to the 
power of meaning.  However, there are indications of direct links between resource power 
and the power of meaning as well. 
Nevertheless, this study shows that the final decisions were made by individuals and 
management groups who were in position of a formal legitimate “Weberian” power base (S. 
Clegg et al., 2006; Hardy & Clegg, 1996).  Despite this formal legitimate power, these 
individuals were exposed for subordinates’ political sensegiving activities, whose objective 
was to influence final decisions.  In this essay, we have seen the effectiveness of such 
politics, and not the least the relational aspects of power have been verified (Balogun et al., 
2005).  It has been demonstrated how changes in relations dramatically change power bases, 
and the central role organizational politics play in these relational power struggles.   
We know from theory that sensegiving is a top-down and a horizontal process (e.g. 
Balogun, 2006). However, this study has revealed the bottom-up aspects of sensegiving.  We 
have seen how both convergently and divergently acting middle managers have used 
political tactics to influence superiors’ meaning construction, which is practical bottom-up 
sensegiving. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
This essay has examined middle managements’ political actions during the 
implementation of a planned structural change. As several other studies have shown, middle 
managers play an important role in implementing planned change and their actions can either 
be convergent and hence support the change goals, or be divergent, meaning moving in a 
different direction compared with the plans. Although divergent actions can be both intended 
and unintended (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007), in this study, several middle managers 
made a deliberately divergent action response to the change initiative. Other middle 
managers loyally implemented the change and hence showed convergent actions.  
The analysis revealed how middle managers mobilize different sources of power and 
rely on different types of political tactics in order to influence other’s (superiors, peers and 
subordinates) sensemaking.    By mobilizing process and resource power, several middle 
managers were able to influence meaning making (Balogun et al., 2005; Hardy, 1996) and 
position themselves as major sensegivers, with great influence on others’ sensemaking 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).  We have seen that these sensegiving processes contain a wide 
range of political means to gain control over the processes, ranging from the active pre-
project political ploy involving taking control over process and meaning construction in an 
open process, to the more closed processes where secrecy and manipulation were important 
means for influence.     
The study shows the tight coupling between power, politics, sensemaking and 
sensegiving.  The study shows that those who are able to exert the power of process are able 
to have an influence over other people’s meaning construction.  The study also shows a tight 
link between the power of resources and the power of process; here, expertise is especially 
vital if actors manage to maneuver themselves into a position where they can control the 
process.  Expertise as a basis for exerting the power of resources also has an impact on an 
actor’s ability to exert the power of meaning.   
This study contributes to existing literature on power and politics by providing access 
to rich qualitative accounts from respondents taking part in political behavior, giving insight 
to how skilled political actors operate.  This study also contributes to the existing 
sensemaking and sensegiving literature through providing evidence for a tight coupling with 
power and politics, showing that sensegiving is politics in action.  Finally, the study 
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enhances existing strategy-as-practice literature by showing the tight coupling between 
practice, politics and change outcome.  
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5. The Gang of Four: Discourse Strategies to Legitimize 
Divergent Change Behavior* 
5.1 Abstract 
This essay examines how middle managers attempt to legitimize deviant and 
oppositional behavior during organizational change.  A critical discursive analysis 
perspective is adopted to identify the legitimating discourse strategies used by four middle 
managers – “The Gang of Four” – who acted in a coordinated way to prevent the 
implementation of a new organizational structure.  Despite an overall shared goal of making 
sure that the structural changes suggested were not implemented, each middle manager in the 
study described different reasons for their divergent change behavior.  They legitimized their 
actions using various discourse strategies.  Four different legitimating strategies are 
inductively developed: emotional, group-loyal, rational, and argumentative.  The emotional 
strategy is rooted in one particular individual’s anger at being ignored and not given a voice, 
the group loyal strategy is based on one particular individual’s loyalty to the management 
team of which he was a part, the rational strategy is grounded in statistical evidence, and the 
argumentative strategy is founded in the need to have a voice in the project. 
The study enhances our understanding of middle managers and change by explaining 
the role they play in changing the path of change and shaping the change outcome.  The 
study further contributes to the literature of discourse studies through a better understanding 
of legitimation, and to the strategy-as-practice field through improving our knowledge of 
how skilled players operate. 
5.2 Introduction 
Middle managers play a significant role during change (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Huy, 2001, 2002), both as recipients 
of change initiatives and as active implementers.  Power and politics also play an important 
role during change (Balogun et al., 2005; Buchanan, 1999, 2008; Buchanan & Badham, 
                                                 
* This essay was accepted for presentation at Academy of Management Annual Meeting 2009 (due to personal 
circumstances the essay was not presented). 
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1999, 2008; Gilmore, Ferris, Dulebohn, & Harrell-Cook, 1996; Hardy, 1996; Hardy & 
Clegg, 1996), and middle manager involvement in politics may have a significant impact on 
the change outcome.  Middle manager involvement in power and politics may be through 
convergent and active support or through divergent activities in relation to the organizational 
change initiatives.  If the behavior is against the interests of the organization, then political 
behavior is often characterized as self-serving and a means to achieve hidden goals 
(Buchanan & Badham, 1999, 2008), and therefore it becomes important to legitimize this 
type of behavior.  Organizational change is tied to power, politics and control (Brown, 
Gabriel, & Gherardi, 2009). 
Middle managers will react when their self interests and/or their beliefs of what is the 
best for the organization are compromised and engage in activity broadly labeled as 
resistance to change (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993; Brown et al., 2009; Dent & 
Goldberg, 1999a, 1999b; Eilam & Shamir, 2005; Piderit, 2000; Wolfram Cox, 1997; Zell, 
2003), setting out to sabotage the change, or getting the change decisions reversed (Brown et 
al., 2009; Eilam & Shamir, 2005; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007).   
The individual aspects of working through resistance lead the attention to the micro-
level phenomena we find in the concept of “the doing of strategy” (Johnson et al., 2003).  
Strategy-as-practice research deals with micro-practices of what people do, engaging in 
people’s strategy activity and how they influence strategic outcome, rather than focusing on 
strategy as something firms have (Hoon, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Johnson et al., 2003; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 
2007; Whittington, 2006, 2007).  This perspective suggests that strategy is shaped not only 
by top managers but also by a broader spectrum of managers and practitioners at multiple 
levels in the organization (Balogun, 2007; Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Hoon, 2007; Rouleau, 
2005).   Social practice is the core of the strategy-as-practice research stream (Whittington, 
2007).  Here it is focused on practice, the actual activities that are associated with strategy 
making (Balogun, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2004).  However, there is more to it than practice.  It 
also has to do with praxis, the work that comprises strategy in which strategy is formed (e.g. 
meetings, presentations, and talking) and practices that are the socio-cultural artifacts 
through which strategy work is done (e.g. Porter’s five forces, SWOT-analysis, PowerPoint, 
spreadsheets, and budget systems) (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; 
Whittington, 2007).  There is increasing research on practices regarding tacit and symbolic 
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practices through which strategy is constructed, practices such as narrative, rhetoric and 
discourse (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008). 
We know that discourse plays a significant impact on the formation of strategy 
(Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Laine & Vaara, 2007).  How 
change outcome is viewed and communicated is closely connected to discourse and 
discourse constructions (Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous & Hendry, 2000; Vaara, 2002; Vaara 
& Tienari, 2008).  Whether the change outcome is a result of convergent or divergent 
actions, the outcome has to be legitimated one way or the other.  Legitimation and discourse 
are connected through the fact that specific discourses serve legitimizing purposes 
(Fairclough, 2003; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; van Dijk, 1998; Vaara & Tienari, 2008); 
“discourses provide the “frames” with which people make sense of particular issues, and 
give sense to them” (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, p. 987).  van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) 
introduced four main legitimizing strategies, the way language is used and functions to 
construct legitimacy: (i) authorization, (ii) rationalization, (iii) moral evaluation, and (iv) 
mythopoesis.  However, these authors addressed the need for more focus on the micro-level 
discursive practices and strategies to construct sense of legitimacy.  A good, but 
underutilized approach, for exploring political play is discourse (Gordon et al., 2009; Grant 
& Hardy, 2004; Hardy, 2004; Hardy et al., 2000; Hardy & Phillips, 2004; Mantere & Vaara, 
2008).  One avenue that discourse (critical discourse) opens up to us to explore resistance is 
legitimation tactics (Phillips et al., 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006).   
Middle managers can be skilled political players (Balogun et al., 2005; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2005).  Therefore, in this study I adopt a discourse approach to explore how one 
specific group of middle managers, which named themselves “The Gang of Four” (referring 
to the former Chinese leadership), retrospectively legitimized their successful divergent 
political actions in a strategic change initiative.  I will specifically explore which micro level 
discourse strategy each of the four “gang members” used to individually legitimize their 
divergent political action, an action that may be seen as counterproductive regarding the 
overall change initiative objectives.  This case is rare as the researcher was given the 
opportunity to closely observe intense political activity. The focus on legitimation strategies 
applied by the individual managers in the “Gang of Four” was identified throughout the data 
collection process as an emerging and particularly interesting theme (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In 
analyzing the data, critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be applied.  This analytical 
perspective will be used to identify and analyze micro level discourses in individual 
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legitimation.  I explore how these micro-practices in strategy making influence the macro 
perspective in strategy in order to better get an understand of how individuals influence 
strategic outcome (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008).   
5.3 Discourse and Legitimation 
In the last couple of years a large stream of work in the social sciences has applied 
discursive approaches (Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous & Hendry, 2000; Mantere & Vaara, 
2008; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999; Vaara, 2002; Vaara et al., 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 
2008; Vaara et al., 2006).   Discourse is defined as: “any body of language-based 
communicative actions, or language in use” (Heracleous & Hendry, 2000, p. 1258),  which 
encompasses written and spoken text, visual images (e.g. pictures, art works), symbols, 
buildings and other artifacts (e.g. body language, dress code) (Fairclough, 2005; Phillips et 
al., 2004). 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995, 2005; Fairclough & Wodak, 
1997; van Leeuwen, 2008a; Wodak & Meyer, 2001) is a key analytical approach in many 
recent studies of discourse.  CDA is a theory (Fairclough, 2001) that analyzes the role 
“played by language in the construction of power relationships and reproduction of 
domination” (Vaara et al., 2006, p. 792).  Fairclough (2005) emphasized that CDA has two 
facets: first, it analyzes the relation between discourse and other social factors, and second, it 
analyzes the discourse elements of social events, social practice and social structures.  
Language is regarded as a social practice in CDA (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak & 
Meyer, 2001).  Further, it considers the context of language use to be crucial, especially 
since CDA emphasizes the relation between power and language (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).  
CDA consists of a series of different traditions and approaches (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, 
pp. 262-268).  In this essay however, an approach to CDA is based on the socio-cultural 
change and change in discourse (Fairclough, 2003; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997) and the 
discourse-historical method (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak & Meyer, 2001) subsumed 
in Vaara et al. (2006) in five essential features of CDA. One, CDA attempts to make visible 
problems that often pass unnoticed.  Two, CDA always takes place in a socio-historical 
context.  Three, CDA is intertextual where text and discourse acts are linked with others to 
shape understanding.  Four, discourse is not neutral regarding ideological content.  Five, 
CDA is the interplay of relationships between discourses, genres and styles in a particular 
social context.   This specific approach focuses on the discursive constructions of power 
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relations and social identities (Mantere & Vaara, 2008), which makes it very suitable for 
analyzing the discourses of power and politics during change. 
Legitimation plays a key role in organizations and in social life in general (Phillips et 
al., 2004; Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006).  Vaara and Tienari (2008, p. 986) 
defined legitimation as “creating a sense of positive, beneficial, ethical, understandable, 
necessary, or otherwise acceptable action in a specific setting”.  Here the key is that it is the 
discourse that is the legitimation-creating appliance. In other words, it is the discourse or set 
of discourses that creates legitimacy for specific positions or actions.  Legitimation has an 
interactive dimension because this is a discursive response when one’s legitimacy is 
challenged.  This is a discursive action provided for defending oneself for actions (past or 
present) that could be criticized by others.  Legitimation is an institutionalized justifying 
discourse the purpose of which is to verify institutional actors’ respect for established norms 
and values (van Dijk, 1998).  In this sense, legitimation is a power game.  Legitimation as a 
justifying instrument serves the purpose of verifying power relations within the organization.  
A premise for analyzing legitimation in an organization is that nobody has absolute power in 
an organization, which means that power somehow is restricted or limited.  This perspective 
leads to a notion that all institutional players routinely need to legitimate their actions (van 
Dijk, 1998).  van Dijk (1998) emphasized that legitimation is typically political as a 
consequence of the relation between institutional power and legitimation. 
Given the CDA and legitimation perspective presented above, the CDA perspective 
allows the discursive analysis to examine the actual discursive practices and strategies 
applied to legitimate political action within an institutionalized organizational setting.   
Through an analysis of individuals’ justification of own resistance to change, we enhance 
our knowledge of drivers for resistance, and hence add new insights to practitioners in 
strategy making.  
van Leeuwen (2008b) made a thorough introduction to what he calls four “major 
categories of legitimation”: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization, and 
mythopoesis.    This is a framework to answer the classical “why” questions: “Why should 
we do this in this way?” or “Why should we do this?” (p. 105).  Vaara et al. (2006) 
introduced an alternative model for analyzing discursive strategies in a media context, based 
on an argumentation that the van Leeuwen (2008b) model of discourse legitimating 
strategies cannot be straightforwardly used in a media setting.  Inspired by the above-
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presented frameworks I inductively develop four individual discourse legitimating strategies 
which serve as legitimating tools for divergent political activity in this study. 
5.4 The Study 
The study follows an embedded single case study design (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992; Van De Ven, 1992) in a large Nordic general 
insurance company (INSCO), where a strategic change initiative was followed for twelve 
months.  From the claims handling division in the Norwegian branch, real-time longitudinal 
data was gathered.  The primary methods for data collection were interviews and personal 
“diaries” (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Denzin, 1989; Taylor & Bogdan, 
1984), however other data sources such as small talk and follow-up talks via telephone, as 
well as secondary data sources such as internal company documents such as decision 
memos, consultancy reports and written inputs from middle managers outside the decision 
process were gathered to triangulate the data (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Two types of interviews 
were performed.  The techniques were adjusted during the data collection process as a 
consequence of the emergence of new and interesting themes (Eisenhardt, 1989), such as 
deliberate political actions from a group of divergently responding middle managers.  For 
one group of interviewees a structured, standardized, open-ended interview guide was 
applied (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003); another group was interviewed following a semi-
structured, open-ended  technique (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).  The structured interview guide 
consisted of questions regarding the change process: how the change program affected the 
middle manager’s personally, how the program affected their subordinates, what about the 
process worked well, what could have been done differently, did the middle manger have the 
opportunity to give input to the program, and how given inputs were received.  These 
interviews gave considerable insight into the ongoing power struggles and the emerging 
conflicts between different sub groups of middle managers and between sub groups of 
middle managers and the project organization.  The semi-structured interviews consisted of 
questions regarding: conflicting interests between different groups of middle managers and 
between groups of middle managers and the project organization, what were the conflicts 
about, how they met these conflicts, why did they engage in these conflicts, how the middle 
manager met suggestions from the project, their opportunity to give input, and how inputs 
were received.  These interviews gave rich data regarding power struggles and political 
tactics on one hand, and legitimation and justification of own position on the other.   Each 
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interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.  A total of 25 interviews were conducted.  Of 
these, 14 were semi-structured interviews and 11 were structured interviews.  All interviews 
were taped and transcribed verbatim.   
The data analysis started out with the writing of a narrative (Balogun & Johnson, 
2004, 2005; Langley, 1999) that pulled together inputs from diaries, interviews and other 
data sources to develop a “thick description”.  The first step in this process was to write a 
chronological account for the entire division.  The objective was to understand the diarists’ 
and the interviewees’ impressions and interpretations of the process.  The second step in the 
analysis was to write the description of three different groups of middle managers and how 
they met the change initiative.  The findings showed that the divergent actions by one group 
of middle managers involved extensive political skills, and this group was the most 
successful in influencing the change outcome. 
CDA is not a technique in itself, and may be seen as much as theory or rather as a 
theoretical perspective on language and a broader sense of discourse (such as body language 
etc.) than as a method.  This gives room for an analysis of the social processes, which is a 
broader spectrum than the language itself (Fairclough, 2001).  In this case, these broad 
analyses of social and political processes have taken place through the development of the 
thick description and the three narratives of the separate political action groups.  In this 
particular essay, it is the individual discourses (expressed through spoken text in interviews) 
that are analyzed.  In the analyses I search for answers to the “why” questions (van Leeuwen, 
2008b), i.e. why did you act politically, and why did you act divergently regarding the 
organizational objectives.  These questions will enlighten us as to how the four individuals 
(“The Gang of Four”) legitimated their own behavior.  In some instances it will be necessary 
to search for some “how” questions to establish the premises for the “whys”.   Although the 
analysis in this essay focuses more on verbal evidence as opposed to social processes, the 
social interactions that were observed will be included when evaluating the data and the 
findings.  
The four legitimating strategies that are presented in the findings section of this essay 
have been inductively developed based on how each individual in “The Gang of Four” 
responded when they were challenged regarding their own political actions regarding the 
actual change initiative.  When searching for characteristics for each of the four legitimating 
strategies, I was looking for explicit discourses where each individual tried to create a 
positive, understandable and acceptable perception of their actions (Vaara & Tienari, 2008).  
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I have a previous professional connection to three of the four respondents.  Until the 
autumn of 2003 (four years prior to the interviews) I was a member of the division 
management team of the claims handling division in INSCO-Norway.  When this essay was 
produced I had left the company.  While employed by INSCO, I was the manager for two of 
the respondents – though not simultaneously.  These close connections could have both 
advantages and pitfalls.   The pitfalls might be that the respondents exaggerate their own 
roles in the political ploy or on the other hand underplay their own role to make an 
impression on me based upon their perception of my position in the area of conflict.  
Another pitfall might be that I would be biased for one solution or the other, based upon my 
own perceptions of what is the best for the company.  To reduce the effects of these possible 
pitfalls, it has been necessary to gather a broad spectrum of data and do the wide-ranging 
three steps analysis as presented in this section.  The advantages my experience from INSCO 
may provide have two facets: the first is the advantage of having a high level of expertise in 
the area of interest and having established relations with a broad base of people in the 
organization, which leads to the second advantage, which may be that established personal 
relations are a benefit when it comes to openness in the interview situations – as an “internal 
trustee” they tell you more than they would to a complete stranger.   
5.5 Background 
Four middle managers in INSCO deliberately organized themselves as a group to 
secure their own interests in an organizational restructuring process.  The group was 
established before any organizational restructuring program had been introduced, but they 
suspected that such a program would be launched. This suspicion was based on their insider 
knowledge of the results of an analysis that had been performed. The group of deviant 
middle managers called themselves “The Gang of Four” with reference to the former 
Chinese leadership. 
[…] it is clear we are four – what was the name of the Chinese leadership in earlier 
days – “The Gang of Four”? Yes, that was when “The Gang of Four” came to life.  We 
have given each other various arguments, tested arguments; do these arguments stand 
the strain in a debate? We have speculated about which counter arguments will be 
presented; we have done a considerable piece of work, definitely… (Paul3) 
                                                 
3 All names used in the essay are fictitious to secure the anonymity of the respondents. 
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[…] we are four persons who have discussed these issues. It is me, it is [Paul], [Steve] 
and [George]. We did not plan to be this kind of “The Gang of Four” from the very 
start; it happened on the way. … mostly because we felt that the project management – 
at least I felt that the project management – ran over the arguments that I presented. 
(Eric) 
In the fall of 2006 the Head of the Claims Handling Division in INSCO-Norway 
initiated an analysis program called “claims analysis” to identify and reveal the potential for 
reducing costs and enhancing customer satisfaction.  In this process, three different informal 
groups of middle managers were established where two were rather loosely organized and 
one was a group of closely connected individuals.  The two loosely organized groups, which 
represented middle managers from the motor vehicle claims branch and the buildings and 
contents branch respectively, acted in accordance with their superiors’ decisions and loyally 
followed instructions given. On the other hand, the remaining group (“The Gang of Four”), 
who represented middle managers from the buildings and contents branch, acted divergently 
in relation to the decisions of their superiors.  The divergent actions happened from the very 
start of the program, and lasted throughout the entire program.  In the beginning of the 
program this group – in contrast to what was decided – placed themselves and their trusted 
allies in any project position they could, such as reference group and sub-project groups. 
However, it was decided that no managers could participate in these groups because they 
should take care of the day-to-day business. 
The organization project was expected by “The Gang of Four”, since they were 
aware of the preceding analyses. Once again, they managed to place themselves in vital 
positions.  Nevertheless the organization project proposed an organizational structure that 
contrasted the opinion of “The Gang of Four”.  Through intense political activity, “The Gang 
of Four” managed to get a decision regarding organizational structure in their own branch in 
favor of their own position.  This decision resulted in the implementation of different 
organizational structures in different branches in the division, a decision that was in conflict 
with the overall objective for the entire change program. 
In the following analysis I will analyze the discourses applied by each middle 
manager in “The Gang of Four” and how they attempted through their discourse strategies to 
legitimate their own political behavior. 
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5.6 Findings 
5.6.1 Paul – Emotional legitimation strategy 
Paul was the head figure in “The Gang of Four”.  He is an experienced manager who 
has been with the company more than 20 years, most of them within the buildings and 
contents branch in different middle management positions.  He has considerable experience 
in managing and participating in different change programs, and in accordance with this he 
must be seen as a senior and skilled player.  The strategy he uses when legitimating his 
divergent political actions I have labeled the “Emotional Legitimating Strategy”.  The 
characteristics of this strategy have to do with an emotionally based argumentation of why 
he took part in, or rather headed, the divergent political activity.  His actions were based on 
his anger at being sidelined in the process, that his extensive experience and rather senior 
position was overseen by the consultants and staff who were engaged as project team.   
When asked when the political actions started and who took part, he emphasizes his 
own motives and actions.   
What I have done? I have used my twenty-two years of experience within the [general 
insurance industry] where most of them have been within [the buildings and contents 
claims] branch.  With my knowledge of this branch I have tried to present arguments 
showing that the proposed solution is not the best way to handle our challenges.  I have 
tried to present advantages and disadvantages regarding both solutions. […] I have 
been determined regarding what solution to choose.  The other alternative has been 
without interest for me. Maybe I have been locked into one position, but I have used my 
knowledge of and my experience in [the branch] 
We can see he bases his argument in relation to his position as an experienced 
manager within the branch.  Further he emphasizes what he did himself, underlining his own 
role as a key player in the political ploy. 
Let us begin at the start of the claims analysis last autumn.  When it was to start, the 
question was: who should participate?  I was thinking: what are we going to do now?  
We are going to reveal gaps.  The gaps revealed will probably result in a process where 
we are going to have a second look at the organization one way or the other.    What we 
choose to do after such a process will result in working processes that will last for at 
least some years: three, five, seven, or whatever it will be.  It may be important for me 
to engage a kind of A-team in the claims handling profession. […] Then I chose my A-
team.  Of course I did, because I wanted to have influence.  I get that through the 
participating actors.  I will not be a passive observer for twelve months, and see such 
things happen. 
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He emphasizes the reason he took an early active approach in the power play was the 
need (or wish) to have extensive influence on the development of the area where he has a 
significant position.  He also emphasizes the close link between himself and his trusted allies 
in “The Gang of Four” and other trusted allies.  Here he reveals some of his political activity 
and how he secured influence and information though others. 
I always made sure I had someone in place – I have had someone in place all the time. 
[…]  I have been more involved than anyone else; it is a deliberate choice. Damned if I 
will sit on the sidelines! [I] have been involved in positioning [and] influencing, to put 
it that way.  During the last twelve months I have had a very close dialogue with three 
people.  In addition, I even had a couple [more] in the analysis project itself.  
He accounts for his own actions and the role he played in the political ploy, and 
legitimizes his actions by referring to solutions that he and others have established in the 
organization during the last couple of years.  The engagement in the ploy has to do with the 
need to defend the solution in which he has significant ownership, solutions he and they 
worked for through their formal organizational roles.  Placing himself on the sideline and 
just waiting to see what happens is not in line with his value system.  He was up for a fight 
for his convictions. 
Why did [I] not sit on the sideline like all the others? That is because I thought it might 
be wise to take part in the game, and where this game was ending.   If I had been a 
“good boy” waiting on the sideline, we wouldn’t have gotten where we are today.  
Then, what I and many others have been working for the last couple of years would not 
have been here for two years.  I do not accept that.  When argumentation doesn’t work, 
you have to take another approach.  
Another issue that triggered the political behavior is what may be seen as being 
ignored by the project management and the project group.  When the project group collected 
data for their analysis, they did not interview the section managers who also were members 
of the division management team.  Paul repeatedly refers to how being left out of the key 
processes by the project group triggered his political actions.  He claims that he and his 
fellow heads of sections, through their formal positions, had an interest in having their 
perspectives presented for the project, and that their opinions should have been taken into the 
overall consideration.  From his point of view, it seems that the project group had no interest 
in hearing their opinions.  
 Should I not fight for what I believe in?  Should I not have the opportunity to have an 
influence? […] Let me give you a banal example – this fight is more like a war.  The 
project has not even bothered to interview those who have been heads of sections, 
asking for example, what do you think about the future? […] Seen from the main 
direction, what are your thoughts, do you have some contributions to the project?  It 
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has not been interesting to get an idea of what we knew, what we were thinking, or 
anything else. […] When they don’t reach out their hand; please come and tell us 
whatever you like!  Then I say OK, we can start with something else.  That is what I 
have done; I have been hurrying hard with my three trusted men.  And they have had an 
extraordinary loyalty.    
He follows up his perception of being overseen and neglected by the project, and uses 
this as an argument for why he initiated his fight against solutions suggested by the project.  
These experiences nevertheless have triggered what may be seen as an adjustment of his 
value system when he is holding out lessons learned and his failures of judgment.  His self 
evaluation takes him to a point where he is clear that such political activity may be 
unnecessary in the future, from his point of view, if only he is more accurate when projects 
are initiated and more outspoken when issues are debated. 
Do not refrain from listening.  Do not fail to see, do not neglect.  Such behavior only 
triggers your entire inventory of emotions, and it triggers a fight you’ve never seen 
before.  That was what they got, at least from my side.  I have learned something for the 
next time something like this happens. There are two things I would do: first, the 
mandate must be crystal clear on what responsibility the project is to have, and second, 
I will not keep my mouth shut.  I will not be the nice and polite guy in meetings, even if 
it costs me my job.  That is the only way to move ahead. 
So far the discourses used to legitimate his actions have been centered on two issues: 
neglect and influence.  In both these issues, his discourses are very emotional and value-
based.  He cannot hide his anger at being overlooked and his anger over having his own 
influence reduced when the claims analysis project was established. 
Loyalty is another perspective he draws on when he is legitimizing his actions.  He 
problematizes to whom he is to be loyal: superiors, company, project, customers etc.  He is 
absolutely aware of the risk he is running, the risk of being defined as disloyal within a 
company setting.   
First, if I had chosen somebody else to participate in the claims analysis project, these 
things would never have come up in this way.  If George and Eric had not been engaged 
[in the project] we would not have had the results we now have.  Somebody may think 
this is disloyal.  Disloyal regarding what?  Where should I put my loyalty? 
However, he emphasizes that his political actions have to do with loyalty, loyalty to 
“those who actually pay his wages – the customers”, not to the project management or to 
consultants.  He has to be loyal to what he believes is the best solution.  [“Those who 
actually pay our wages” is an internal company discourse for customers].  He claims that he 
is focused on the best solution for the company and the customers.  He legitimizes his own 
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actions by continuously pointing out how beneficial his solutions and ideas are for the 
company.  He never lets go of what is the basic foundation for his intense engagement in this 
political ploy: what is best for the company.  He does not once refer to what is best for him 
on an individual level, but he emphasizes that he will fight hard for what he believes in, and 
for what he has been struggling for years.   
When you do what I have done, you cannot do it in the open.  When issues are not 
handled openly, you could start to question participants’ loyalty, I think.  In some cases 
you might.  In this particular case, I could have said the same, but to whom should I be 
loyal?  Should I be loyal to the views of a project manager and some consultants, and 
the direction they want me to take? I cannot!  From my point of view, that is 
misunderstood loyalty.  I have to be loyal to what I believe is the best solution; I cannot 
be loyal to anything else.  From this perspective I have the opinion that it is my duty to 
work for that solution.  If I choose not to work for what I believe in, then you may 
question my loyalty: loyalty to those who actually pay our wages. 
It is especially interesting to see how he holds out the efforts he had to make to take 
care of the interest of the customers.  However, his argumentation is again focused on his 
own position, what he believes is the best solution.  Again, he is arguing through a discourse 
with a rather strong emotional undertone. 
5.6.2 George – Group Loyal Legitimating Strategy 
George played a significant part in “The Gang of Four”.  He headed one of three 
surveyor departments within the buildings and contents branch.  He had been at INSCO 
approximately five years, serving all of them in the same position.  Before entering INSCO, 
he had several years of experience from the same position within a competing company.  
The strategy he used when legitimating his divergent political actions have I labeled the 
“Group Loyal Legitimating Strategy”.  The characteristics of this strategy have to do with 
loyalty to the management team of which he is a part.  He supports the unified solution “The 
Gang of Four” is struggling to implement despite not being convinced this is the best 
solution.  He bases his legitimation on being loyal to his allies and nearest colleagues. 
George is not as dedicated to the solution as the rest of “The Gang of Four”. 
[Some of us] found a solution that would have been even better for INSCO.  The 
solution chosen was something in between what I would have done and what the project 
would have done. 
When confronting him with why he engaged so heavily in the actions performed by 
“The Gang of Four” he refer to being loyal to decisions within the management team of 
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which he was a part; the management team of the back office section buildings and contents.  
Loyalty is a key in his legitimation of his own participation in “The Gang of Four’s” 
political ploy.  So even if he thought there were better solutions for how to organize the 
buildings and contents branch in the future, he supported and worked for “The Gang of 
Four’s” solution with reference to loyalty to the decision.  His loyalty may be seen as a 
value-based choice. 
It is only because I have been loyal to what we [The Gang of Four] have decided. 
He argues strongly and supportively in favor of the actions that took place as a part of 
the political ploy performed by “The Gang of Four”.  He calls attention to what he sees as 
necessary contextual conditions for enhancing the level of claims handler skills in the 
complex and time consuming claims (back office claims).  He emphasizes the need for 
having the back office claims handlers [the specialists as they started to call them] assembled 
in one milieu, so that they would have the possibility to share knowledge and experiences, in 
contrast to what would be the case if the specialists’ milieu was divided, and they were split 
between the other departments.  This indicates that he further legitimates his own 
participation in the political activity through rational arguments, for example by expressing 
the need for dividing the claims handlers into one specialist and one “generalist” milieu.  
Although it seems that he is working for what he thinks is the second best solution, he 
supplied rational and supporting arguments for the solution. 
If [employees] are going to have some kind of development and have some kind of 
advanced skills, it is necessary that they be placed together in one milieu.  This is far 
better than the alternative where two to three are placed [in Bergen] and two to three 
are placed in Trondheim.  The ones in Trondheim will not have anybody to confer with, 
and in the end the quality will decline. [The main office with all specialist support is 
placed in Bergen. au.] 
Another issue legitimating his support for and active participation in the political 
actions was related to the fact that he participated together with the majority of “The Gang of 
Four” in the analysis that occurred before the reorganization project.  The subproject 
buildings and contents had an overrepresentation from the back office milieu. 
If you take a look at who was doing the analysis [in the claims analysis project], you 
will soon see where the analysis is taking us. […] Eric headed the subproject from the 
start of the analysis project.  Then I entered the field.  Our superior was Paul.  In 
specific tasks during the process, the same individuals were represented.  We had a 
couple of workshops, where only those who worked in the subproject participated; the 
back office milieu [complex and time consuming claims] was overrepresented.  
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The conclusions drawn in the workshops arranged by the analysis group were not 
supported by the project management; they wanted another solution.  The project 
management recommended an organizational solution that was very different from the one 
the subproject buildings and contents had proposed.  When referring to this issue, he is 
suggesting that the project management was prejudiced regarding the organizational model, 
and that they did not even consider the suggestions from the analysis project.  Similar to 
Paul, George clearly expresses annoyance regarding how the main project group handled (or 
rather refused to handle) the input he and his allies had put forward. 
I do believe it is because the project [management] wanted another solution. They did 
not even look at the conclusions drawn in the subproject analysis, or glance at the 
conclusions from the workshops. […] This may be because they already, in advance, 
had thought of another conclusion.  
When legitimating own actions and support he attacks what he perceives as a 
prominent artifact regarding the organizational culture.  He condemns what he recognizes as 
an overall attitude throughout the entire organization; organizational members focus on self 
rather than what is best for the company.  He does not count himself as a member of that 
culture, despite having an important managing role in the claims handling division.  He 
expresses moral indignation at the focus on self rather than the business when it comes to 
choosing organizational solutions.  In his indignation, he is questioning his colleague’s 
loyalty to the company.    
That is because there is a dysfunctional culture in INSCO.  Employees are not 
concerned with what is best for the company; they are mainly concerned with what is 
best for themselves and their departments. […] You may disagree as much as you wish 
[…], but as long as you get your paycheck from INSCO […], then it is a part of your 
job; you better deliver! […] But there are many who only think of self and their [own] 
best [interest], and don’t bother of the rest […] Now and then, they should have 
concentrated on getting a picture of the whole. 
This explicit discourse shows that George is of the opinion that decisions regarding 
this project have not been driven by objectivity, but by subjective individual interests.  
However the interesting issue in this particular case is the fact that he is one out of four who 
deliberately fought a decision of future organizational structure, a decision that was founded 
in the overall claims handling strategy. 
Last but not least, he also focuses on the same issue, which was described by others 
as being ignored by the project, the fact that the “leader of the gang” (Paul) experienced not 
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being heard.  He emphasizes the efforts the leader made without managing to bring his 
argument and suggestions through to the project group. 
Paul did a tremendous effort for buildings and contents.  I do believe it was a tough 
battle.  I believe he was very alone in his struggle; he presented argument after 
argument, but did not get through. 
This gang member’s engagement seems to be focused on what he considers is 
loyalty, loyalty to the “Gang” and loyalty to the company.  The latter is shown when he 
confronts what he considers is a dysfunctional cultural artifact in the organizational culture.  
However, it seems that his loyalty to the “Gang” at this stage is stronger than the loyalty to 
the company.  He supported what he thought was the second best alternative, he did not fight 
for the solution he considered being the overall best solution. 
5.6.3 Eric – Rational Legitimating Strategy 
Eric was the least experienced of the four.  He did not head his own department.  He 
was a branch expert serving as an associated member of the back office section management 
team.  The strategy he uses when legitimating his divergent political actions have I labeled 
the “Rational Legitimating Strategy”.  The characteristics of this strategy have to do with 
always referring to statistical and measurable facts when arguing.  Throughout the entire 
legitimation, he consequently refers to statistical facts to legitimize his own actions.  This 
rational approach seems to narrow his perspectives and limit his ability to evaluate other 
perspectives.  
From the very start of the project, Eric was determined that an organizational model 
that had similarities with the existing organizational structure was a favorable model.  Here 
the claims handlers were divided into two milieus: one large unit handling the fast track 
claims, which constituted the vast majorities of the claims [the front office section], and one 
small and specialized back office unit handling the complex, time consuming and costly 
claims [the back office section].  With this starting position, he entered the analysis project, 
and tried to convince the project management team that the existing organizational solution 
was the best way to solve the complete set of challenges in the buildings and contents 
branch.   
Before the start of the analysis project I had gathered some data that showed that after 
all between 80 % and 90 % of our claims represented individual compensations less 
than 10.000 NOK. […] It shows that the low cost claims involve most of the manning.  
There was little consideration about how one should solve this issue.  Who is going to 
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work with the low cost claims? Are we going to have a first line [front office] and a 
second line [back office], or is everybody going to work with these particular claims?  
How are we going to solve this issue?  They never answered my questions regarding 
these issues.  That was when I started to be skeptical as to whether anyone in this 
particular project was able to come up with a solution that would allow for all issues in 
an optimal manner. 
I also gave some signals that it might be wise to prolong the established diversification 
between different handling procedures, the fact that some claims need more attention 
and follow up than others, that is to say completely different framework conditions that 
the fast track/low cost claims.  I tried to give some input that we had to consider this 
question and that we needed to focus on the [different needs].  Once again I did not get 
any response.  The signals that came back, were that we should think of a general 
solution for the entire claims handling division; all branches are going to have a 
similar organization as a starting point.  This perspective made me somewhat uneasy. 
He bases his position initially on a rationalistic discourse by referring to some 
numerical analysis he had done before entering the analysis project.  However, his 
adversaries in the project management seemed to not take these rational issues into 
consideration.  When not getting a positive response in what he considered as a rational and 
objective argumentation for his position, and instead finding the opposite, he found good 
reasons for taking active part in the political ploy.  Said in other words, he legitimates his 
action based on what he sees as a rejection of a rational argumentation.  When he explains 
why the project management took the position they did he emphasizes that they had a 
different objective than a pure rationalistic one.    
He gave his explanation as to how “The Gang of Four’s” suggestions were rejected.  
The focus on internal issues such as equality between employees and the necessity to keep 
out the differences between what was seen as an A-team vs. a B-team, rather than focus on 
what he sees as rationally founded organizational needs were subjects emphasized by this 
gang member.  He could not defend the position of the project management because he was 
convinced they had not been through a thorough analysis of what was the total expected 
delivery by the buildings and contents branch.  Again, through a slightly different discourse 
he legitimizes his own actions rationally.  
I do not see that argument as valid, because they had not at any point in time been 
digging into the matter and getting an overview of what buildings and contents really 
should deliver in total.  It was a one-sided customer focus, but no reasons for why it was 
wise that everybody should do everything.  We suggested solutions, and presented 
reasons for why it ought to be as we suggested.  These suggestions were only brushed 
aside based on one thought: “now it is important, especially out of consideration for the 
customers, but also in consideration for the employees in buildings and contents, that 
there should no longer be an A and a B team.  It was important to get rid of this division 
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because there had been a great deal of focus on the conflict between the front office 
section and the back office section [in the former organizational model].  It became an 
important issue for the project management to erase the division between the two 
milieus through the chosen solution: not to continue the old comprehension of an A and 
a B team.  The solution that came then was that everybody should handle all claims. 
The project management’s rejection of what he considered rational arguments led to 
the mobilization of Paul and his allies in “The Gang of Four”. He continuously legitimizes 
the actions that were taken through a rationalistic discourse.  He consequently refers to data 
and how their argumentation is substantiated in data.  From his point of view, the 
establishment of “The Gang of Four’s” divergent activity was grounded in what he considers 
as a neglect of facts from the project management.  From that point “The Gang of Four” 
intensified their struggle to gather data that supported their position.  
This was when we started to work out some strategies ourselves.  We started to gather 
more data to substantiate why our solution would be a wise solution always trying to 
support our position with data.  Historically based data and thoughts of what is 
important when different types of claims are to be solved. 
Not only does he legitimize the behavior of his allies and himself by using discourses 
that accentuate what they did and others did not do – “we did something the others did not 
do, we systematized facts”, but he effectively delegitimizes the project management and 
their objectives by stating that they did not analyze objective facts, they had other objectives.  
He consequently applies rationalistic discourses to underline the position he and his allies 
took.  They collected data extractions and systemized the different claims segments (which 
in this context means grouping claims regarding the size of compensations, where the 
segments are as follows: (i) < 30.000 NOK, (ii) 30.000 – 100.000 NOK, (iii) 100.000 NOK – 
1.5 MNOK, and (iv) > 1.5 MNOK), claims type (damages caused by water, burglary, fire 
etc.), and the numbers of claims in each segment and type.  These data were subsumed in a 
memo “The Gang of Four” presented to the project steering committee.  He also emphasized 
that they could present evidence for which claims they could document expenditure cuts, and 
that those savings were directly linked to the working practices in the back office 
departments. 
We did something the project management did not do at the same point in time: We 
gathered data extractions of the claims we have within the buildings and contents 
branch.  We found how many claims there were within each segment, and what claim 
type they were.  Based on these data, we produced a memo where we introduced 
concrete suggestions […] to solutions; how it is possible to optimize the working 
processes within the different amount segments, and why it is important to continue the 
division as a front office and a back office milieu.  Even if the project management 
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decided not to take the content of the memo into consideration, I think it was necessary 
to produce the memo to be able to have come to where we are today.  We had a 
document from which we could make our arguments.  A document where we could refer 
to figures, where we could show previous achievements, and where we could present 
expenditure cuts.  […] Where we have the best opportunities to reduce expenditures!  
We could refer to expenditure cuts in the back office section, expenditure cuts realized 
as a consequence of their working practices.  Working practices that are time 
consuming, but that give considerable expenditure reductions in claims where you 
should spend a considerable amount of time. 
Through the consequent application of rationalistic discourses he appears convincing 
when he explains the reasons for his engagement in political actions.  He has no tendencies 
to argue emotionally.  It seems that his engagement is solely based upon a conviction that the 
solution he and his allies represented is the best solution for the company. 
5.6.4 Steve – Argumentative Legitimating Strategy 
Steve together with Paul was maybe the most active player in “The Gang of Four”.  
He was heading one of two back office departments within the buildings and contents 
branch.  He had been at INSCO approximately ten years, serving all of them as a department 
manager.  Before entering INSCO, he had several years of experience from the same branch 
in a competing company.  The strategy he used when legitimating his divergent political 
actions have I labeled the “Argumentative Legitimating Strategy”.  The characteristics of 
this strategy have to do with him stressing the need for debate before any decisions are 
made.  He consequently emphasized the need for debating solutions and bringing in different 
perspectives in the debate.  It is emphasized that the original process in the change initiative 
had not been willing to do so.   Underneath the upfront argument regarding the necessity of 
having a debate, his own ambitions to have a voice in the project are evident. 
He emphasizes that he has another position than the project management and the 
consultants.  It is stated that members of the project management and the external 
consultants had their own agenda in the project, and that they failed in their attempt to have 
their ideas implemented.  He suggests that it was the project and not “The Gang of Four” 
who had an agenda in having their own solution implemented.  In this way he is projecting 
the self-serving aspect onto the project and not “The Gang of Four”. 
What is obvious is that the project team as a project team, which consists of a couple of 
individuals from the claims division supportive staff and a couple of individuals from 
[the consulting company], has had their own dynamic and their own agenda.  They had 
their ideas, which they fought a hard struggle to support.  They had their ideas of how 
things should be, and things have not fallen out like they wished, that is a fact! 
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The [project team] had a very clear plan, and [they] have, in some issues, been 
defeated. 
In his discourse he is rather confrontational regarding his view of his opponents’ 
position and motives.  Despite that “The Gang of Four” had placed their members and 
trusted allies in various positions and through that had considerable influence on the analysis 
and the conclusions in the analysis project, their efforts did not work regarding the 
recommendations for future organizational structure.  When the project team launched a 
suggestion of future organization, Steve considers them in conflict with the conclusions in 
the analysis.  He proposes that these suggestions have other foundations than the claims 
analysis, and if anyone says anything else, they are out of line.  He emphasizes that he knows 
the analysis better than anybody, he has even written questions for the analysis. 
We [The Gang of Four] participated wherever we could participate.  I was in all the 
time.  To a great extent it was we, I, who made the questions for the CDA-analysis 
[Categorical Data Analysis] in the buildings and contents branch, even the ABC-
analysis [Activity Based Costing].  I took an active part in the analysis.  I tried to 
participate wherever I could.  When we reached the time for analyzing the most 
challenging and interesting phenomenon   […], how in the future we are going to be 
organized and structured […], it did not hinder the organizational committee to present 
their own ideas and thoughts.  Where these [ideas] came from, and why [they came], is 
difficult to say.  However, they were there.  They [the organizational committee] will 
probably claim they found some ideas in the [results of] the CDA-analysis.  That is 
bullshit!  I know the [analysis] far better than they do.  They have no backing in such a 
claim; honestly, we have had several discussions regarding this issue.  They cannot get 
away with it! 
He has little trust in the project management.  He claims that they have had their own 
agenda all the way, and that the project has fought hard to get it their way. 
It is obvious that [the project team] has had their own agenda, which has been crisp 
and clear.  There are some issues they have been willing to fight a hard struggle for, 
and things have to some extent been pushed to extremes. 
However, he and his allies (”The Gang of Four”) have been represented wherever 
there has been a position where they have had an opportunity to get their voice through, they 
were represented.  Or as he states it; “wherever we had an opportunity to say something, we 
said it”.  Here he emphasizes the need to be heard, being able to use his voice.  An 
interesting issue in his discourses is his clear distinction between the ability to use his voice 
and the authority to make decisions.  The latter seems at this stage in his argumentation not 
to be the important issue for him, but it is of great importance for him to being able to use his 
voice without having to fight for the chance of being heard. 
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We have participated wherever we could get a seat, in working groups, in reference 
groups, wherever we have been given an opportunity to give voice, we have let 
ourselves be heard. 
I do not say we need to make the decisions or to have the final word, but we should at 
least be heard in this process. [It is important] to be heard without having to fight for 
the opportunities to have a voice. 
He is clear that in this process there have been no opportunities to debate alternatives, 
where those who are going to live with the solution have had an opportunity to debate 
different solutions.  When he gives an account for his position, he accentuates his respect for 
the project team’s professional capability, but he has no respect for their knowledge of 
claims handling and surveying.  There has been no room for brainstorming regarding 
solutions, and he considers this as a great loss.   He is not explicit regarding legitimation for 
his participation in the divergent actions in this discourse, but the underlying accusation that 
there was no debate regarding different solutions, leaves an impression that his motivations 
for his actions are the lack of debate and involvement.   
The opportunity this process has blocked is the opportunity to evaluate other 
alternatives.  This, I think, is a loss.  We have not had any discussions where those who 
are going to live and work with the solution have had an opportunity to give their view 
on what is really possible to do, and what is not, and what alternatives we have. […] 
They do not have a clue!  Take it as it is! They are very skilled but […] they are the ones 
in the division who know least about claims handling in [the division].  That is a fact, 
and it is OK.  They are extremely skilled and intelligent people, they know a lot, but 
regarding [claims handling] they do not know very much.  They have never done claims 
handling, they have always seen it from a helicopter perspective. […] The brain 
storming about what we can do, and how we may do it has faded away.  That is the real 
loss in this case.  Where have all the good ideas gone?  There has not been any room 
for them, not any place for them to pop up.  That is a pity!  
His expertise regarding buildings and contents claims is evident in the next quotation.  
He shows through the application of rationalistic arguments that he knows his business.  
When commenting on the organizational structure proposed by the project, he holds out that 
there is nothing new and revolutionary with that one.   The proposed solution, from his point 
of view, does not have a proper solution for the medium-sized claims (>100.000 NOK and < 
1.5 MNOK).  Here we can see tendencies of a rationalistically founded legitimation for his 
actions. 
Their solution is the most unexciting organizational structure in a claims handling 
organization ever.  It is neither new nor revolutionary.  It is basic.  It has been tried 
several times before. […]  Medium-sized claims are not properly taken care of in this 
solution. […]  That is a fact – not a theoretical one – because we have seen it, and tried 
it. […]  We have promoted another solution. We have been through the figures, but they 
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have not been interested in the first place [in our view]. 90 % of the buildings and 
contents claims cost less than 30.000 NOK. 3 % cost more than 100.000 NOK.  These 3 
% cost more than 50 % of our claims compensation; summarized, they cost more than 
the 90 % [low cost claims].  You have to start using your brains then.  There are 
different approaches, different perspectives on how to handle these matters.   
The debate and the chance to be heard are both central to his legitimation of own 
actions.  As in the next quotation where he discusses a memo sent from the subproject – 
buildings and contents – a memo there was no consensus about, he gives an impression that 
a “counter memo” that was sent from his opponents was all right.  He gives an impression 
that it was a good thing that the steering committee received different views regarding future 
organization of the division.  What he attacks is the project management, which he insinuates 
had no interest in that debate. 
In the first place, the subproject team buildings and contents claims presented a memo.  
There was not even consensus in the subproject regarding the memo. […] That is 
somewhat problematic and that is a pity. […]  Our objective was to present the 
arguments. […]  Then the steering committee needs to have it presented in a proper 
manner, so that they are able to evaluate [the different perspectives] based on [these 
inputs].  That was the basic idea [when the memo was produced].  However, […] what 
happens then is that the managers in [the front office section] do not agree with our 
perspective, they have very different opinions regarding some issues.  They produce and 
send their own memo.  In the end, I believe, they were sent together to the steering 
committee.  There were two different perspectives presented in two different ways with 
two different starting points.  From my point of view, I think this was all right.  This way 
all perspectives are in the open, and the argumentation is presented for the steering 
committee by what one could call the owners [of the argumentation]. […] I do not think 
the project team wanted it this way […], they wanted to control the flow of information 
themselves. 
In this quotation he reveals something new in his argumentation.  Here we see that he 
starts debating whether presented facts are objective or subjective, and he concludes that it is 
a matter of subjectivity.  This discourse is still building up under the perception that for him 
the most important reason for his engagement in “The Gang of Four’s” struggle for their 
solution is the debate, and the opportunity to have a voice in the process.  However, here he 
is discussing that the arguments used are subjective, not objective.  This statement may lead 
to thought that there are other underlying reasons for his engagement in “The Gang of Four” 
than having the possibility to be heard.   
The presentation of facts is one thing, but facts are not always neutral and objective.  It 
depends of course on how you present the facts, what you chose to present, and what 
you choose to emphasize. […]  From the perspective of our position within the buildings 
and contents branch, we wanted to present what we thought was important, what we 
thought was critical, what we thought was important that we took care of etc. […] I do 
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believe there are different opinions, different perspectives from where issues are 
viewed.  As a starting point I think that is straight. […] There are different arguments, 
but they need to challenge each other […].  Then we are able to present the differences, 
so that those who are going to make the decision are able to balance the different views 
against each other. […] From my point of view we have managed to enforce the debate 
against the will of the project team.   
5.6.5 Four Legitimating Strategies  
This case study reveals four individual legitimation strategies used in an 
organizational change setting.  The need to legitimate one’s own actions occurred as a result 
of four individual’s deliberate political actions.  The political actions were a divergent 
response to a management supported change initiative.  Though the legitimating strategies 
were diverse, the overall foundation for their divergent political activity was based on two 
different issues on which “The Gang of Four” showed a unified interpretation; what was 
considered as a rejection of their expertise (especially the expertise of Paul – the gang 
leader), and what they considered as the project team’s biased position regarding future 
organizational structure.  
All members of “The Gang of Four” were explicit in their opinion that the project 
team were biased regarding one organizational solution, the solution “The Gang of Four” 
least wished.  It is striking that no one could provide any evidence that this was a fact.  They 
assumed that the project team had an idea with no support in any analysis or data.  But, if the 
words of Steve – “I do believe there are different opinions, different perspectives from where 
issues are viewed” – are representative for his personal position, then at least one could 
expect a more nuanced perspective from his point of view.  Nevertheless, they were all very 
clear that the project had made up their mind before the analysis, and not after.  Maybe the 
issue on a biased position may be turned the other way around.  Maybe it was “The Gang of 
Four” who was biased regarding a future organizational model?  If we look into George’s 
position – he wanted another solution, different from both alternatives – then it might be 
possible to draw a conclusion that it was “The Gang of Four” (or the majority of them) who 
was biased. 
All in all, maybe the strongest trigger regarding the divergent behavior is to be found 
in what may be seen as a slight arrogance from the project team, the sidelining of the most 
experienced managers.  This sidelining was interpreted as a rejection of expertise and 
seniority (both regarding time of service and position).  Was it the process of deciding that 
no managers should appear in the project that was the problem?  This decision was the same 
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for all branches, not only the buildings and contents branch, a decision everybody else 
respected – even the buildings and contents branch managers that represented the opposition 
to “The Gang of Four”.  Nevertheless, it seems that it was the process more than anything 
else that triggered the divergent actions.  Despite “The Gang of Four’s” mutual 
understanding and opinion of what were the key triggers of the divergent political activities, 
they legitimated their behavior very differently. 
What characterizes this particular case is how harmonized “The Gang of Four” was 
regarding objective.  However, how they legitimized their participation in the political ploy 
that led to a quite different decision than the project-initiated one is very diverse.  In Table 6 
below the four different legitimating strategies applied are summarized. 
Legitimation strategies Characteristics 
Emotional Anger for not been given the opportunity to 
give voice  
Group-loyal Loyalty to the management team of which he 
is a member 
Rational Argumentation based on statistical evidence 
Argumentative Discussion is a means to give voice 
 
Table 6: Legitimating Strategies 
The diversity between the different legitimating strategies may be connected to how 
affected the different “gang members” would be by the final solution.  Only two “gang 
members” would be directly affected by the changes.  Paul– emotional legitimation – was 
from the very start fighting for his own position as head of the back office section buildings 
and contents.  If the solution proposed by the project would have been effectuated, his 
position might be challenged.  This may have affected his desire to have a voice in the 
project, and may serve as an explanation of why he engaged in the political ploy in the first 
instance.  The other person who directly would be affected by the solution proposed by the 
project was Steve – argumentative legitimation.  He was heading one of the two back office 
departments in the branch.  If “The Gang of Four” had lost their struggle, he would have 
been facing a completely different challenge as a possible department head in a call center 
department.  That may account for his desire to have a voice in the project.  George – group-
loyal legitimation – on the other hand was the head of one of three surveyor departments.  
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He and his department would not in any circumstances be affected by any of the proposed 
solutions.  His legitimation does not reflect any need to have a personal voice in the project, 
rather that his group (“The Gang of Four”) should have one.  He chose to fight for the 
solution his management team colleagues thought was the best solution and not the solution 
he himself thought was the best one.  Finally Eric – rational legitimation – did not have any 
formal management position.  He was an associated member of the back office section 
management team because he was holding the position as branch expert.  He had no 
subordinates that were affected by the changes, and he was not affected by the changes 
himself.  His position would have been unchanged whatever organizational model was 
chosen.  He approached the project with the perspective of the expert with a high level of 
statistical knowledge of the composition of the entire base of claims.  His narrow statistically 
founded approach does not allow for other broader reflection.  Despite very different 
legitimating strategies, there are still some very interesting similarities between some of the 
discourses.   
The need for having a voice in the project was very evident in two of the legitimating 
strategies despite a very different approach and articulated motivation.  Paul and Steve with 
respectively emotional and argumentative legitimation founded both their argumentations in 
having a voice in the project.  Paul did not try to disguise his objective to have his distinctive 
mark (“fingerprint”) on the final solution.  In his argumentation he referred all the time to 
two issues: he wanted and demanded to have a personal voice in the project, and what was 
best for the company and the customers.  Steve, on the other hand, tried to disguise his desire 
to influence the final solution by holding out that his main objective was to secure a debate, 
and to make sure that every aspect of the alternatives was illuminated.  He emphasized that 
there are no such things as objective facts in issues like the ones in this case, which more 
than indicates that he has his own agenda as well.  If every issue should be debated, why did 
they not take George’s preferred solution into consideration?  Paul and Steve had different 
legitimating strategies, but their objective was to have a voice in the project.  Paul is not able 
to hide his personal and self-serving motivation in the project despite that he refers to the 
customers and the company when he is legitimating his actions.  His personal and emotional 
engagement is still obvious.  Steve, on the other hand, tried a more sophisticated legitimation 
strategy where the self-serving and personal ambitions are less clear.  However, it is still 
about the desire to have a voice in the project and by that being able to have influence. 
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The question of loyalty has been raised by two of the gang: Paul and George.  The 
loyalty Gorge refers to is most of all the loyalty to the gang.  His entire legitimating strategy 
is based on this group loyalty, despite him trying to link his perception of loyalty to the 
company as well.  In the latter, he is not very convincing since he has supported and even 
been fighting for a solution he thinks is the second best solution for the company.  His 
group-loyal legitimating strategy does not seem to be self-serving in view of the fact that he 
is not directly affected by any of the alternative solutions.  Paul, on the other hand, refers to 
loyalty to the customers and the company as a secondary legitimating strategy.  When he 
refers to loyalty he is concerned about the customers, and what he thinks is the best solution 
for them.  Another facet of loyalty he introduces is loyalty to himself: what he believes in, 
what he thinks is the best solution.  He is not concerned about being loyal to the project.  
When the question of loyalty is raised by these two individuals, they have very different 
perspectives of the loyalty by which they legitimize their actions.  George focuses on loyalty 
to the management team because he has other preferences regarding how to organize the 
business.  Paul focuses on loyalty to himself and his own beliefs and to what he thinks is best 
for the customers. 
Eric is the only individual who has a rationalistically founded legitimating strategy.  
He establishes his entire legitimation on what he considers as unquestionable facts.  From his 
point of view, there is only one answer to the question of how to organize the section.  He 
bases his position on fact and his (and his allies) interpretation of these statistical data.  No 
questions are raised as to whether these data could be interpreted from another point of view 
or not.  It is not considered if an alternative approach could lead to a completely different 
conclusion (which may be exactly what their opponents did).  In contrast to his fellow ally 
Steve, who is clear that “facts are not always neutral and objective”, the rationalistic 
approach he has chosen narrows his perspectives and does not allow for other perspectives 
than his own.  Steve who may be the one of the respondents who show some kind of 
acknowledgement to the fact that there may be different ways to evaluate the data, which 
may lead to alternative conclusions, is the other respondent who to some extent uses 
rationalistic discourses to back up his position.  However, it is striking to see the contrast 
between how these two individuals use their knowledge of the statistical facts in their 
discourses. 
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5.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Studies where researchers are given the opportunity to closely observe intense 
political activity are rare.  Buchanan (1999) emphasized the difficulties researchers have to 
find “rich qualitative data to this topic” (p. S 75).  Studies emphasize the unexplored nature 
of organizational politics, particularly regarding individuals’ subjective experience 
(Buchanan, 1999, 2008; Ferris et al., 1996).  These “leave us with a limited understanding of 
the logic underpinning such behavior as it is understood by initiators” (Buchanan, 1999, p. S 
75) .  This study gives a considerable insight into applied tactics followed by individual 
legitimation and justification of why these tactics were applied, and as such is a reply to the 
call for studies examining the individual logic of political behavior.  On the other hand, this 
study confirms findings in recent studies studying resistance to organizational change 
through legitimating discourses underpinning anger, frustration, and helplessness on one side 
and legitimating discourses related to the individuals’ self-concepts and self-continuity being 
threatened on the other (Eilam & Shamir, 2005; Zell, 2003).  Nevertheless, other 
legitimating discourses are not to the same extent pinpointed in the literature on resistance.  
Especially, discourses in the legitimating strategies categorized as “Group-loyal” – 
supporting an initiative he thought were the second best – and “Rational” – pure rational 
(though maybe subjective) justification –enhance our understanding of resistance. 
There has been call for more studies on micro-level discursive practices and 
strategies to construct a sense of legitimacy (Vaara et al., 2006).  This essay examines 
thoroughly individual discursive legitimating practices, and as such enhances our knowledge 
of legitimation as such. 
Individual legitimating discourses of divergent actions (or resistance) are symbolic 
practices from which strategy is constructed (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabkowski & 
Whittington, 2008).  These are micro practices that show and enlighten what individuals 
actually do when engaging in strategy, which as such are strategy-as-practice (Jarzabkowski, 
2004; Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007; Whittington, 2006, 
2007). This study also enhances the strategy-as-practice literature by examining and showing 
how individuals through political activity shape strategy, and how their ex post legitimating 
strategies enhance our understanding of individual drivers in strategy making.  Knowledge 
of how skilled political players operate and how these players affect strategy making through 
their political tactics is another side of what this study reveals.   
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This study reveals how middle managers through the extensive use of political tactics 
are able to alter the path of an intended change.  Four explicit legitimating strategies have 
been identified: emotional, group-loyal, rational, and argumentative strategies.  These 
strategies were applied to individual discourse in an attempt to legitimize deviant actions 
aimed to prevent an organizational change from being implemented.  The individuals 
participating in the divergent actions used different discourse strategies to legitimize and 
defend their actions.  There are very few studies of discursive legitimacy in general, and 
even fewer in organizational context (Vaara et al., 2006).  This study contributes to the 
understanding of discursive legitimacy, especially regarding individual legitimating 
strategies when resisting change initiatives. 
One advantage with this study is that in this study we had access to four rich accounts 
of political behavior.  The study gives an impression of how skilled political actors operate 
and why they took the actions they did.  By having access to these accounts it is possible to 
enhance the understanding of individual divergent responses to change, and how these 
individuals legitimated their actions.  These rich descriptions were given because of 
previously close professional connections between three of the respondents and the 
researcher.  Nevertheless, this is also this study’s most prominent limitation.  However, this 
study is based on a rich collection of data, where the story of the four individuals is 
confirmed by other respondents, both peers and subordinates, which mostly represented the 
opposing side in the conflict.  
Another limitation is the possible idiosyncratic nature of a single case study such as 
this.  However, the single case study is justified when the case study is a revelatory case – 
the opportunity to observe and analyze a phenomenon that previously have been inaccessible 
to scientific investigation, or when the case represents an extreme or a unique case (Yin, 
2003).  There are few studies that investigate discursive legitimation strategies (Vaara et al., 
2006), which supports the revelatory case approach.  This case is also a unique case because 
of the close relations and interdependence in “The Gang of Four”.  By choosing the 
embedded design cross-case analysis  is possible and by that the internal validity is enhanced 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Future research should continue to focus on individual discourse legitimating 
strategies in an organizational context.  Most studies regarding discourse legitimation 
strategies in an organizational context are related to more aggregated discourses such as 
discourses in the media (e.g. Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006).  
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6. Conclusion 
The findings from this study support the notion that middle managers play a 
significant role during organizational and strategic change. Without active and goal-oriented 
participation from middle managers, no real change will happen.  However, middle 
managers may also play a destructive role and hinder or alter the achievement of the change 
objective.  Even if middle managers actively engage in oppositional activities, they may 
have the best interests of the company in mind.  This dissertation shows various facets of 
middle managers’ responses to change initiatives.  Some responses show cognitive, 
emotional and intentional responses in line with the top management’s intentions.  On the 
other hand, others illustrate cognitive, emotional, and intentional responses that collide with 
the intentions of the top management.  Responses to change are something in between the 
very positive and the very negative, where there are great varieties in the individual 
responses regarding the three dimensions of responses introduced by Piderit (2000). 
Through three empirical essays where middle managers responses to change 
initiatives have been examined from different theoretical angles, further insight has been 
developed extending the current literature on change, middle management and responses to 
change.  My findings support and extend the recent literature that emphasizes the importance 
middle managers play in organizations.  However, my findings also suggest that middle 
managers may play a distinctively destructive role if they respond negatively in one or more 
of the response dimensions: cognitive, emotional or intentional.  This dissertation has 
enhanced our understanding of individual multifaceted responses to change initiatives.  Our 
knowledge on how individuals’ political micro-practices affect the change outcome, and 
even alter the path of change, is enhanced.  It further extends our knowledge of how 
individuals legitimize their actions when they through political actions manage to alter the 
path of change so that the change outcome does not correspond with the intended change 
outcome.  Finally, this dissertation shows how framing and discourse within groups affect 
the group participants’ subjective perception of changes.  The implication for practice is an 
enhanced understanding of the necessity for managers to be aware of phenomena such as 
politics and discourse when planning and managing change initiatives. 
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6.1 Lessons Learned 
This project was developed as a result of my own experiences regarding middle 
managers and implementation of change.  My cognitive position at the start of this project 
was that middle managers had a significant impact on the change outcome, a position 
manifested in the positive middle management literature.  This position has been 
strengthened and verified through this project.  Nevertheless, this project has broadened my 
perspectives on responses to change.  Middle managers are not only key implementers of 
change; they may well serve as key obstructers to change.  The findings in these studies 
show that some middle managers obstruct changes out of self-interest, which provides 
support to the more pessimistic and negative stream of literature on middle management. 
Seeing this project in retrospect, I have reflected on what could have been done 
differently.  First of all, if I were to start a project like this once more, I would not use 
structured, standardized, open-ended interview guides.  I would have preferred using semi-
structured interview guides, letting the respondents to greater extent form the content of the 
interviews. In this way, I probably would have had access to an even broader and richer set 
of data.   
Nevertheless, if I were to use a structured interview guide in a subsequent project, I 
would use a shorter interview guide with fewer questions.  The one I applied in my project 
contained questions of such a scope that each structured interview lasted at least 90 minutes. 
The lesson learned is that if I had focused my scope in the interview guide, I might have had 
the time to do even more follow-up interviews, or at least have had the opportunity to 
contact the respondents in hallway conversations, or telephone conversations one or two 
times more after the initial interview.  
I think it would have been an advantage to do a preliminary study with a couple of 
interviews and a couple of diarists before rolling out the study onto the entire organization.  
In this way, the interview guide and the preformatted diaries could have been prepared and 
adjusted for the interesting questions that emerged.  Nevertheless, both diaries and structured 
and semi-structured interviews worked well and contributed to a broad and rich set of data. 
There is one issue where I am very satisfied with the study.  When the political ploy 
in project number two was identified in the second interview I performed, I was able to 
change the interview technique in the other interviews, where people involved directly or 
indirectly in the ploy were interviewed.  In this way, I managed to combine data collection 
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processes that could take care of more than one research question.  Doing this enhanced the 
scope of the study, and gave a richer set of data.  The follow-up interviews and small talks 
that followed the main interviews is another area where I am happy with the development.  
Through these interviews and conversations many unclear matters could be verified or 
abandoned.  
For the particular research questions examined in the different essays, qualitative 
methods seemed very effective.  The data gave insights into different and complex inter-
human processes that would have been very difficult to explore through quantitative 
methods. 
6.2 Strengths and Limitations of This Study 
Perhaps the most prominent advantage with this study is the access to rich individual 
accounts of political behavior.  Such accounts, where researchers are given the opportunity 
to closely observe intense political behavior, are rare.  It is especially difficult to find rich 
qualitative data regarding organizational politics (Buchanan, 1999).  These accounts enhance 
our understanding of individual responses to change, and how these individual responses 
lead to different political actions.  These rich descriptions were given because of previously 
close professional connections between a number of the respondents and the researcher.  
Nevertheless, this is also this study’s most prominent limitation.  However, this study is 
based on a rich collection of data, where the stories told are confirmed by other respondents 
and other data sources. 
Another advantage with this study is access to unguided conversations and 
discussions regarding strategic change initiatives.  Through conversation analysis, we are 
able to enhance our understanding about how middle managers are able to influence others’ 
perception of strategy.  How strategic initiatives are assessed is not solely a question of 
objectivity, but rather a subjective matter, based on how individuals’ assessments are 
influenced by others. 
In one of the studies on which this dissertation is based, an embedded single case 
design was applied (Yin, 2003).  A limitation may be the possible idiosyncratic nature of 
single case studies. However, single case studies are justified when the case is a 
representative case, an extreme or unique case, a critical case in testing well-formulated 
theory, the longitudinal case, or a revelatory case – the opportunity to observe and analyze a 
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phenomenon that previously have been inaccessible to scientific investigation (Yin, 2003).  
This particular single case study met three of these justification criterions.  The first criterion 
to be met is uniqueness.  The rich qualitative data regarding organizational politics has 
already been discussed as an advantage regarding this study, as such data is rare.  The second 
criterion to be met is the longitudinal case.  The case was studied at two different stages in 
time: first throughout the project including analysis, design and implementation phases, and 
secondly after implementation.  The third criterion that was met is the revelatory case.  As 
rich qualitative data on organizational politics are rare, this specific study reveals a 
phenomenon that previously has been difficult to observe closely. 
Both studies are from the same company in a small market with rather unique macro 
economic conditions.  This may lead to possible idiosyncratic findings and conclusions.  
Nevertheless, through extensive literature studies and reviews it is possible to find support 
for the generalizability of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
A third limitation may be that the studies conducted for this dissertation were carried 
out by only one researcher.  To cope with this limitation, multiple data sources and multiple 
data collection techniques have been applied.  This was in order to secure a broad range of 
data making it possible to triangulate data to enhance internal validity.  Another technique 
that was applied to reduce this limitation is cross case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
6.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
This study reveals how discourse constructions may serve as power tools influencing 
others’ sensemaking and their perception of change outcome (Hardy, 1996).  Hence, 
discourse constructions are closely tied to mechanisms for power and politics (e.g. Buchanan 
& Badham, 1999).   Further studies should be conducted to widen our knowledge of how 
discourse in general and discourse constructions specifically serve political purposes and 
how these political processes influence change outcome. 
In this thesis we have seen a clear connection between sensegiving and 
organizational politics.  There has been remarkably little focus in the literature linking these 
theoretical concepts.  I therefore suggest that future research should focus even more on how 
organizational politics are used as a tool in influencing others’ meaning construction or 
sensemaking. 
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A continued focus on individual discourse legitimating strategies in an organizational 
context is a topic for future research.  Most studies regarding discourse legitimation 
strategies in an organizational context are related to more aggregated discourses such as 
discourses in the media (e.g. Vaara & Tienari, 2008; Vaara et al., 2006). 
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Appendix A: Methods 
Research Design 
Doing this case study research, investigating organizational politics and how middle 
managers use discourse to influence others and to legitimate own behavior, some design 
requirements are essential.  The first and fundamental requirement is an organization to 
which the researcher is provided access.  The second requirement while studying 
organizational change is access to real change processes where the researcher is given the 
opportunity to gather real-time evidence of the change process.  Longitudinal data is a 
premise to capture the political ploy that emerges through change when conflicting interests 
meet.  The third and final requirement is access to data sources.   Studying sensitive and 
controversial issues such as politics and discourse require respondents who actually are 
willing to share their experiences.   As rich qualitative accounts from respondents taking part 
in political behavior are rare (Buchanan, 1999), such accounts must be provided to enhance 
the quality of the study.  Access to secondary data sources such as internal documents is 
another vital data source requirement.  
Access to the organization was secured through invitation from former colleagues.  
As an insider, there were no formal restrictions to access or to whom I could contact.  In one 
study, access to respondents and hence data was provided as a consequence of engaging the 
researcher as a lecturer in an internal seminar for middle managers.  In another study, access 
to real-time data was secured through an explicit invitation to follow a change program over 
time gathering longitudinal data.  Data were collected from multiple sources, both primary 
and secondary sources.  Being an insider established openness between the researcher and 
those who were researched, helping the researcher to get close to the case and the political 
activity in which each individual engaged. 
Two research projects with different designs have been pursued: (1) a modified focus 
group study, and (2) an embedded case study. The first study was of middle managers in the 
general insurance business.  Studies were performed within one company, which I will refer 
to as INSCO.  INSCO conducts business in four Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland.  It is among the top three companies of general insurance in the 
region, with 4,500 employees.  The Norwegian branch has 1,800 employees, mainly situated 
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in the country’s largest cities.   The study examined an organizational change in the 
Norwegian claims handling division, which has approximately 350 employees.  The 
company had been through several strategic change processes in the last decade, such as 
mergers, organizational restructuring programs and changes in working practices and 
business procedures.  The study was conducted on a group of first line middle managers and 
their superiors (higher level middle manager) attending a strategy seminar.  In this practicing 
group of middle managers there had been a relatively low turnover over the last seven years.   
During the seminar, a practical exercise was arranged by the researcher as unguided 
focus group interviews or dialogues (Patton, 2002).  The objective for this exercise was to 
engage the middle managers in an evaluation loop from past change programs regarding 
reasons for success and failures, process issues and skills issues, so that the division 
management could receive feedback and enhance the division’s ability to implement changes 
in the future.  To do this, it was necessary to let the groups create a mutual understanding of 
change programs that were successful and change programs that were failures.  The study 
was conducted as modified focus group interviews due to restricted time and access to 
respondents in this particular case.  Modified focus groups are meant as focus group 
interviews without moderator in this instance; hence, they must be seen as self-governed 
groups.  Not equipping the groups with a moderator was a question of limited resources – 
both in time and manpower on one side and creating as open an atmosphere for discussion as 
possible on the other.  The objective of not using a moderator was to limit the impact on the 
discussion of one specific individual’s perception of reality, and to have as open a discussion 
as possible without the limitations and biases a pre-defined moderator or group leader could 
bring to the discussion. 
A structured open-ended interview guide was used (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003) to give 
the focus groups a tool to guide the discussion.  The overall guiding premise in this interview 
guide was to create an agreement of one change program that the group defined as a success 
and one that the group defined as a failure.  To ensure open and effective discussions, the 
interview objects were, as far as possible, randomly placed in groups where they shared 
similar background (middle managers in the same company), but were not familiar with each 
other’s work (worked in different sections and departments).  Six groups with five 
participants each were appointed.  The interviews were arranged simultaneously, as it was a 
condition from the company that the practical exercise would be conducted simultaneously.  
As a consequence of only being a single researcher and having six simultaneously working 
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focus groups, one person in each group was given the responsibility to tape-record the 
discussion and document the discussion in writing in a preformatted PowerPoint 
presentation, formatted in accordance with the interview guide.  No one was specifically 
given the responsibility to be a group leader.  This was based on the same logic as for not 
having a moderator:  Establish an open discussion without the possible limitations and biases 
a predefined group leader could bring to the discussion.  However in each group, a leading 
figure emerged throughout the discussion, without any formal appointment from the 
researcher or acceptance from the other participants in the group. 
The exercise lasted for three hours.  All data from the group interviews were 
transcribed verbatim, totaling approximately 400 pages, together with the Power Point 
presentations. 
The focus groups followed the structured interview guide, however, the unguided 
discussions led to interesting findings that emerged through the discussions.  One interesting 
finding was that in two different instances, one group defined a project as a success and 
another group defined the same project as a failure.  Fortunately, these findings represented 
four different focus groups, securing a rich set of data.  Data from the two remaining groups 
are not analyzed in this dissertation. 
The second study was an embedded single case study (Balogun, 2003; Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004, 2005; Pettigrew, 1992; Van De Ven, 1992) in the same Nordic insurance 
company (INSCO), where a strategic change initiative was followed for twelve months.  
From the claims handling division in the Norwegian branch, real-time longitudinal data was 
gathered.  The primary methods for data collection were interviews and personal “diaries” 
(Balogun, 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 2005; Denzin, 1989; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984), 
however other data sources were gathered to triangulate the data such as small talk and 
follow-up talks via telephone, as well as secondary data sources such as internal company 
documents including decision memos, consultancy reports and written inputs from middle 
managers outside the decision process (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Two types of interviews were 
performed.  For one group of interviewees a structured, standardized, open-ended interview 
guide was applied (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003); another group was interviewed following a 
semi-structured, open-ended  technique (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).  The techniques were 
adjusted during the data collection process as a consequence of the emergence of new and 
interesting themes (Eisenhardt, 1989), such as deliberate political actions from a group of 
divergently responding middle managers.  Each interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.  
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A total of 25 interviews were conducted.  Of these, 14 were semi-structured interviews and 
11 were structured interviews.  All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
The data collection techniques applied were chosen based on very different reasons.  
The focus group technique was chosen as a consequence of external conditions such as 
access to a large number of possible respondents in a limited time frame and limited physical 
area combined with limited resources.  This particular design was chosen to secure input 
from all possible respondents and to provide access to a broad range of data.  The multiple 
data collection techniques applied in the second study were chosen to secure the ability to 
triangulate data to create a better understanding of ongoing processes throughout a change 
process, enhance validity, and contribute to better conclusions. 
Data Collection 
In this section data collection methods will be described. I will especially focus on 
describing the sources of data and strengths and weaknesses of the approach chosen as well 
as lessons learned regarding the different data collection techniques applied in the two 
studies. 
Focus Group Interviews 
The focus group interviews (Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003; Patton, 2002) were 
organized as a structured interview using a preformatted, open-ended interview guide 
(Patton, 2002; Yin, 2003).  One challenge I met was that the six focus groups had to do the 
interviews simultaneously.  This reduced my opportunity to observe and guide the interviews 
in each group.  Not being present reduced my opportunities to guide the discussions in the 
direction I wanted.  On the other hand, this gave the participants the freedom to let the group 
processes guide the discussion.  This provided me with a richer set of data than if I had been 
present and guiding the discussions.  Another facet of not being present was how group 
dynamics evolved in the different groups.  Issues such as status, redistribution of power and 
dominance could occur (Balogun et al., 2003).  One advantage of not being present in each 
group was that the structured interview guide acted more as a discussion guide rather than as 
a script to a strict and disciplined interview.  This broadened and opened up the discussions, 
which gave wider and richer data that allowed new and interesting themes to emerge.  To 
compensate for my absence in the respective groups, a group coordinator was appointed.  
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Their task was to take care of the tape recorder and simultaneously try to document the 
groups’ different conclusions in writing.  However, what was experienced was that one 
person, in most instances one other than the group coordinator, took an informal leadership 
in the group.  The informal group leaders strongly influenced the discussions in each group.  
This is thoroughly discussed in the essay “Discourse Constructions in Retrospective 
Sensegiving and Sensemaking”. 
The ways in which the unguided focus groups informally organized themselves, with 
at least one person leading the group processes, had important implications for my findings.  
My findings show the impact these informal leaders had on the overall conclusions in the 
group.  These unguided groups contributed to the materialization of new research themes.  If 
the groups had been guided by me or a research assistant this may well have led to a more 
structured debate and process within each group giving each participant an opportunity to 
give stronger voice to alternative suggestions in each group. On the other hand, such a 
structured process could have limited the scope of each discussion and obstructed the 
surfacing of interesting research themes. 
Interviews 
In the second study, the first interviews were conducted following a structured, 
standardized, open-ended interview guide (Patton, 2002, pp. 344-347; Yin, 2003, p. 90).  
The interview guide that was developed for this specific study was designed to give data that 
would enlighten one specific research question.  During the first three interviews, themes 
emerged that were outside of the original scope of the study. These themes were of such 
great interest that the interview strategy was changed. The possibility to pursue interesting 
emerging themes is one of the strengths of qualitative research. Interview techniques were 
adjusted during the data collection process as a consequence of the emergence of these new 
and interesting themes (Eisenhardt, 1989).   The new theme that emerged was deliberate 
political action from a group of divergently responding middle managers.  This led the 
research in the direction of power and politics rather than the initial research theme: middle 
management change management skills.  Out of a total of 25 interviews, only 11 were 
structured interviews.  The structured interview strategy was suitable for answering the 
original research question, but less suitable to providing the rich data that supported the new 
and emerging themes. 
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Fourteen interviews followed a semi-structured interview guide (Patton, 2002; Yin, 
2003).  These interviews were conducted among middle managers who were directly or 
indirectly involved in a political ploy that emerged as a consequence of the change initiative 
investigated.  As an opening sequence in every interview following the three first interviews, 
respondents were invited to comment upon the political ploy.  The interview technique was 
adjusted according to whether the interviewee had a relation to the political ploy or not.  
Those who had a relation to the ploy were interviewed following a semi-structured interview 
guide. 
My experience is that structured interviews, following a structured interview guide, 
are very well suited to provide good data regarding one specific research question.  
However, the structured interview limits the scope of data, and by that the richness in the 
data.  This reduces the possibility for new and perhaps more interesting themes to emerge.  
On the other hand, interviews following a structured interview guide provide the researcher 
with organized data, which may be an advantage when analyzing the data. 
The semi-structured interviews gave the respondents a less limited scope in their 
stories.  This enhanced the richness in the data showing a wider set of nuances regarding the 
emerging research question.  Data gathered through semi-structured interview guides 
enhances the complexity in the data and by that the data analysis.  However, which interview 
strategy is the most suitable will vary from case to case, depending upon the research 
question and research theme.  Whether it is an interview following a structured or a semi-
structured interview guide, the really important issue is to secure the openness in the 
questions.  The purpose of qualitative interview techniques is to make sure that the 
interviewees’ perception of the world is expressed in their own words and their own 
terminology (Patton, 2002). 
Diaries 
Personal “diaries” (Balogun, 2003; Balogun et al., 2003; Balogun & Johnson, 2004, 
2005; Denzin, 1989; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984) were collected in the second project.  The 
personal “diaries” were personal reflections related to the change process recorded by the 
recipients in preformatted MSWord files, where five explicit themes were reflected. (i) What 
have you been working with over the last two weeks? (ii) What has been working well in the 
project so far, and what is the reason it has been working well? (iii) What has not been 
working well in the project so far, and what is the reason it has not been working well? (iv) 
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What challenges for the project do you see in the following weeks?  (v) Is there anything 
related to the project that you are lacking in order to be able to do your job as effectively as 
possible? (Resources, skills, guidance, information, etc.)  A total of 29 diarists were 
recruited, consisting of 3 heads of sections (middle managers), 14 department heads (middle 
managers), and 12 ordinary claims handlers, where 3 participated in the project organization.  
The diarists were instructed to send their diaries by e-mail to the researcher every second 
week, starting May 18, 2007 and ending December 22, 2007. 
Using a preformatted structured diary, I limited the input each respondent could give 
through these.  However, the objective in structuring the diaries was to ease each 
respondent’s workload regarding the diaries to enhance the probability that they would do 
the job.  The experience throughout the project was that some of the respondents dropped 
out, while others needed several reminders to send in their diary. 
The combination of diaries and interviews supplied me with information-rich data 
that could be cross-verified through triangulation (Table 7), which enhanced the overall 
quality in the data set. 
Secondary and Other Sources 
To further triangulate the data (Eisenhardt, 1989), secondary data sources were 
collected, including internal company documents such as memos and consultancy reports.  In 
addition, more informal conversations between the researcher and middle managers took 
place over the telephone, over a cup of coffee, or as a quick chat in the hallway or in their 
offices. 
The written data served well as verification of data gathered through interviews and 
diaries.  The informal conversations over the telephone, in the hallway or over a cup of 
coffee were very useful to enlighten different issues presented in the data.  My experience is 
that these informal meeting places were very valuable as a means of clarification and 
verification of other data sources.  The richness in my data would have suffered if these 
informal processes had not been conducted.  In Table 7, examples of richness in data are 
presented, verifying that the same issues have been found in various data sources.  By 
gathering data from various sources the reliability in the data is secured. 
 
 150 
Interviews Diaries Secondary and other sources 
We desperately needed to rethink our 
approaches. The front office motor 
vehicle claims departments were 
totally ineffectual (the Norwegian 
expression would be that we were 
"running on the wheel rim”).  We 
were not coping with the volume, 
with quality regarding customer 
treatment and adjustments, and with 
being up to date.  Nor were we able 
to satisfy our employees’ call for 
development and more challenging 
tasks. 
I find it striking that it is the 
employees [including head of 
departments] themselves […] that 
have expressed the need for changes 
and reorganization.  I perceive that 
the management team has preserved 
its “side” from [year] 2000 – which 
was outdated a long time ago.  In 
other words, the change pressure has 
come from inside, which is rather 
exceptional.  At the same time, this 
may be an advantage for the 
implementation as the classic change 
resistance will be eliminated. 
For motor vehicle claims customers it seems that factors 
other than the actual claims handling have a lot to say 
regarding their overall satisfaction with the company. 
 
We cannot accept being ranked as 
the poorest performer by the garages.  
If we don’t elevate our performance 
to a level where we are the best 
performer in our professional 
dialogue with the garages without 
any competition, they will prioritize 
our competitor’s customers, and not 
ours. 
In the two weeks since 
implementation (15.Oct.07), I do 
feel an impression of a positive 
development in the organization.  
There are NO queues on the 
telephone.  This is how I dreamt it 
should be… 
The reason for this, in my opinion, is 
that the division management team 
did not deflect the wishes of some 
employees to keep their old habits.  
A leader has to accept making some 
decisions that can seem painful for 
some – until they get familiar with 
the new situation… 
 INSCO COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 
Average 
time to 
response 
in sec 
55  30 33 20 
Number 
of test 
calls 
95 45 54 42 
Average time for response – Motor vehicle claims in 
Norwegian insurance companies (source ppt presentation 
created by a middle manager and surveyors, to be 
presented to the division management team) 
Then I chose my A-team.  Of course 
I did, because I want to have 
influence.  I get that through the 
participating actors.  I will not be a 
passive observer for twelve months, 
and see such things happen. (Middle 
manager back office buildings and 
contents claims back office group) 
I have this feeling that the division 
management team is governed by the 
project and not the other way 
around.  The organizational solution 
is well wrapped in the analytical 
conclusions, and this gives us 
limited possibilities to launch 
creative input. 
For several weeks I tried to convince “Vince” that it was 
necessary to have a new look at the organization.  He was 
so convinced we had the right organization related to our 
objectives. 
I gathered my most trusted staff 
members and started a process where 
we wanted to document the necessity 
to organizationally divide the 32000 
[fast track] easy claims and the 2000 
– 2500 more demanding claims.  A 
memo to the project was composed.  
Eric and George – especially George 
– got undeservedly a lot of credit for 
this process.  The truth is that I was 
the man behind this, and I used the 
channels I had into the project.  We 
stuck together in this effort the four 
of us – “The Gang of Four”. 
The memo was produced as an input 
to the OD project in [the division].  
In week 20, this memo was 
submitted on a consultative round to 
the reference group of the OD 
project.  I took care of the 
submission and the follow-up 
procedures regarding [the division 
management team].   
There are several reasons for the subproject committee to 
conclude that there is a need for a back office department.  
We have considered issues such as claims costs, customer 
satisfaction, working procedures, claims frequencies, the 
necessity for focusing, and the need for having a 
specialist milieu. 
They must have done something, 
and we [their opposition] must 
have been a bit naïve, I have to 
admit that, in believing our 
initial arguments were 
outstanding.  [Representatives 
for] the division management 
team presented arguments in 
favor of [our preferred] solution.   
One hour before attending [a 
reference group meeting] I received 
a call from the subproject manager 
[buildings and contents] [member of 
“The Gang of Four”] who was to 
inform the meeting about a memo 
they had produced.   
To enhance the quality of claims handling in both front 
and back office sections, we suggest that today’s  
customer focus in the front office section and cost focus 
in the back office section are to be integrated. […] Our 
opinion is that the best way to meet this challenge is to 
integrate qualification from both the front office section 
and the back office section in future departments. 
How did this happen? I didn’t accept 
[the proposed solutions regarding 
future organizational model].  [The 
[T]here is established an 
organization project, where I’m a 
member of the reference group.  The 
I’m sure I would have done some other appointments… 
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new head of division] understood the 
seriousness in what I told him. 
organization project is, as a matter of 
fact, a staff and consultancy project.  
They have obviously a clear opinion 
of how even the buildings and 
contents claims area are to be 
organized, and they have their own 
agenda related to this.  We, of 
course, do not agree. 
The experience is that no change has 
occurred.  […] At least three, or two, 
of [my subordinate managers] have 
an opinion that this is a sanctioning 
of what we used to have, there has 
been no change. […] This is the 
leadership challenge, to have them to 
take the same direction as I do. 
I did believe and hope that we in the 
buildings and contents claims area 
should not end up in the situation we 
now have.  I’m disappointed and 
frustrated regarding the process so 
far.  My opinion is that we have 
underestimated the significance of a 
broad representation [in the project] 
and an open an honest process.   
I believe [the head of division] was afraid of losing 
George [head of second line department].  To be sure to 
keep him, this decision was taken. 
We have had a latent conflict within 
[our] field for years.  The back office 
guys look at themselves as more 
qualified than our front office 
employees, despite that they have the 
same formal and practical 
qualifications.  We have what we call 
an A and B team.  My impression is 
that the division management team 
doesn’t want the conflict on their 
table. 
Even at the start of the claims 
analysis project the [front office] 
leaders were skeptical about 
George’s [back office leader] 
participation in the project.  We 
preferred claims handlers as project 
participants.  We notified [our 
superior] “Vince” about this, but he 
didn’t want a replay on this issue.  
As we feared George now wears 
several hats, both as a participant in 
the reference group and as a 
subproject participant. […] 
We did not participate in the process at all.  Claims 
handling analysis should do the job, period. 
 
Table 7: Example of Richness of Data Gathered From Different Sources 
Preliminary Conclusion 
One of the great challenges and advantages in doing qualitative research is how to 
handle the new and interesting themes emerging during the data collection process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  During my data collection processes, I found a broad spectrum of 
interesting and challenging themes emerging.  This led to changes in both data collection 
techniques (changing from structured to semi-structured interviews), and the overall research 
question.  My intended research question was: What skills should middle managers hold to 
be effective implementers of organizational change?  While interviewing middle managers 
taking part in organizational changes, it was the different responses to different change 
initiatives that struck me as the most interesting perspective in the data.  First, the new 
findings led to a widening of the scope of the second study.   Secondly, it resulted in a 
changed overall research question from focusing on middle management change 
management skills to focusing on middle management political micro-practices in responses 
to change initiatives. 
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Data Analysis 
The two different research projects performed were organized differently.  The first 
project was a focus group interview project organized at one specific point in time that 
invited middle managers to retrospectively debate different change initiatives.  The second 
project was a project organized as a strategy process research project (Langley, 1999; 
Pettigrew, 1992; Van De Ven, 1992). 
The approach chosen to the data analysis was inductive.  In the first project, the 
themes emerged through the transcription process of the focus group interviews.  Through 
the transcription process, the groups’ different perceptions of the same changes were 
immediately identified, which guided me in the direction of analyzing why these perceptions 
were so different. For the second research project, a “thick description” was developed to 
capture the story in the project and to find themes to investigate (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; 
Langley, 1999).  Developing a “thick description” is important to capture clear and 
embedded picture of the changes.  When studying sensitive issues such as politics in 
organizational change, it is important to capture and understand the context at multiple levels 
regarding the change initiative.  To capture and understand middle managers’ actions, it is 
necessary to get an insight into what is happening within their own organizations at their 
own level, levels above and underneath them, as well as it is important to get an insight into 
what is happening in the external environment.  This is especially important as what is 
considered as illegitimate political action in one organization may be seen quite differently 
in another.  When analyzing interviews and diaries in this project, the convergent and 
divergent responses as phenomena emerged early on in the process.  The respondents could 
easily be divided into two different categories, those responding divergently and those 
responding convergently.   As a consequence of the “natural” categorization of the data, I 
decided not to use qualitative analysis software.  I nevertheless spent a considerable amount 
of time and effort in learning how to use NVivo 2.0, which I applied to my focus group data.  
However, I found the added value of using this kind of software on my data was limited, so I 
decided not to use this software in my data analysis. 
In the first project, data was categorized in different categories for each focus group: 
success, failure, middle management skills, senior middle managers and junior middle 
managers.  For each focus group, a narrative (Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990) for a success 
story and a failure story were put together, assembling and using the different respondents’ 
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inputs given through the focus group interview.  For each success and failure story, the 
different responses were coded in accordance with how the discourses were framed and the 
issues the different discourses emphasized.  Then, a first-order analysis (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991; Van Maanen, 1979) was written up for four focus groups, where respectively two and 
two groups discussed the same project, one as a failure and one as a success.  Then a second-
order analysis (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Van Maanen, 1979) was performed doing cross 
case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) to find similarities and differences between the different 
narratives.  In the second-order analysis (Van Maanen, 1979), I tried to find a deeper 
understanding of these connections by looking at the evolving patterns of discussion among 
the interviewees.  This is a more theory-based analysis where the first-order findings are 
“examined for underlying explanatory dimensions” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991, pp. 437-
438). 
The second project was first developed to capture the entire complexity and different 
actions that took place during the process investigated and this provided a “thick 
description” (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Langley, 1999).  From this process, the data was 
organized in accordance with two completely different responses to the change initiative: 
convergent response and divergent response.  As the interviews and diaries were analyzed, 
the respondents could naturally be divided into two broad categories: divergent responses 
and convergent responses to the change initiative, and the data were organized into these two 
broad categories.  In each category, several subcategories were identified and established, 
subcategories related to departments and/or branches.  In the divergent behavior category, 
one specific subcategory distinguished itself because the individuals who represented this 
category managed to get an alternative change outcome than the one intended.  In the 
category convergent behavior, two subcategories evolved: one that included statements 
about open and direct conflict with those representing the divergent responding category, 
and another that included statements of proactive and convergent behavior.  For these three 
categories, the data were coded in accordance with: how they behaved and what their 
emotional, cognitive and intentional attitudes were, how did they act and respond, what did 
they do, why did they do it, who did actually do what, and how did they legitimize their 
actions.  Based on this broad coding, a first-order analysis (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Van 
Maanen, 1979) was written up for each category by pulling together accounts from diaries, 
interviews, small talk, official documents and other written, secondary data sources.  In the 
second-order (Van Maanen, 1979), the determination of a deeper understanding was 
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attempted by performing a more theoretical analysis where the first-order findings were 
examined to find deeper patterns and dimensions based upon a theoretical perspective (Gioia 
& Chittipeddi, 1991). 
As presented above, the main data analyzing strategy applied was the narrative 
strategy (Langley, 1999).  Recent literature applying qualitative research methods (Balogun 
& Johnson, 2004, 2005; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007; Stensaker & Falkenberg, 
2007; Stensaker et al., 2007) has used an analytical approach based on the narrative strategy.  
In these works, a first-order and second-order data analysis presented in Van Maanen (1979) 
was applied.  This strategy is associated with the construction of a detailed story, based on 
the raw-data – the first-order analysis (Langley, 1999).  These stories are vital to the 
generation of insight because they help us to organize large amounts of data.  By writing up 
narratives or pure descriptions for each case investigated, it is possible to obtain each unique 
story as a stand-alone entity (Eisenhardt, 1989).  These narratives should be constructed 
before one tries to generalize patterns from cases or from across cases.  
The first and second-order approach was thoroughly introduced and debated in a 
sensemaking perspective in Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991).  Here, first-order analysis was 
emphasized as being a narrative or a story developed through a journalistic approach.  The 
objective is to create a story as near the reality of what happened as possible.  To be able to 
do so, different data collecting techniques are applied, often in a longitudinal perspective.  
The data collection techniques used may be: interviews (Stensaker & Falkenberg, 2007), use 
of diaries (Balogun & Johnson, 2004), document analysis (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), 
active participation in day-to-day business (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Lüscher & Lewis, 
2008), and observations (Maitlis, 2005).  Applying multiple techniques enhances the level of 
precision (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, despite the use of multiple data sampling 
techniques, a first-order data analysis will be subjective, notwithstanding every effort to 
make it as objective and neutral as possible.  It will be marked by how the members of the 
organization interpret what is going on in the organization and the researchers’ 
interpretations of the observed (Van Maanen, 1979).  It is essential to get the first-order 
analysis as correct as possible, or else it may lead to second-order concepts that are “thin, 
hollow and perhaps altogether faulty” (Van Maanen, 1979, p. 542) 
The second-order analysis is a theoretical analysis of what has been unfolded in the 
first-order analysis.  Here, the researcher examines the first-order findings for underlying 
explanatory dimensions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991), “interpretations of the interpretations” 
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(Van Maanen, 1979, p. 541).  The objective is to discern deeper pattern dimensions of 
understanding, patterns not necessarily perceptible to organizational members (Gioia & 
Chittipeddi, 1991).  In this way, theory emerges from the first-order data.  
The narrative strategy may lead to theoretical contributions that are high in accuracy, 
but are seen as low in simplicity and generality (Langley, 1999).  Langley recommends 
researchers to combine the narrative strategy with other data analysis strategies to enhance 
both simplicity and generality.  It is possible to develop a novel and generalizable theory 
through the use of a narrative approach to data analysis.  However, researchers can enhance 
the possibility of actually developing a strong theory this way by combining the narrative 
approach with other techniques.  It is possible to develop a strong theory through single case 
approaches based on a narrative approach, given the use of supplemental evaluation 
techniques.  Nevertheless, Van Maanen’s (1979) warning regarding the need for and the 
importance of an accurate interpretation and reconstruction of what actually is studied is 
important to have in mind. 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity assessments in qualitative research serve two purposes: (i) that the research 
is credible in the eyes of other researchers, and (ii) that the research is credible in the eyes of 
those researched.  In this project, the first category consists of construct validity and internal 
validity.  Construct validity refers either to (i) what extent the a-priori specification of 
constructs that are measured against the data adequately represents what is intended by the 
theoretical accounts of the constructs being measured or (ii) developed constructs, constructs 
that inductively are constructed and defined through the data analysis.  Internal validity 
refers to what extent conclusions about causes of relations are likely to be true.   The second 
category consists of descriptive validity, which refers to the accuracy of the data and to what 
extent enough descriptions have been provided to adequately establish an understanding of 
the setting (Maxwell, 1992), and interpretive validity, which refers to what extent those 
researched agreed with the interpretations that were made.  
Construct validity was secured through a constant comparison of data and constructs.  
Through extensive use of quotations as empirical evidence it is possible to evaluate the 
empirical data to constructs.   As new constructs inductively emerged during the project, 
multiple sources of evidence and a broad set of indicators served to increase the validity of 
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these emerging concepts.  These emerging constructs are supplemented with definitions and 
empirical examples. 
Process research serves as an effective tool to show causal relationships.   The 
longitudinal nature of one of the studies strengthened the relationships of the concepts.  
Patterns of relationships among concepts were found over time, which strengthened internal 
validity. 
The descriptive validity of the data was secured through data collection from a wide 
range of respondents through different data collection techniques and from other secondary 
sources.  The respondents represented different departments and different organizational 
levels with different responsibilities.  Facts were verified by comparing responses from 
different individuals responding through different channels (interviews, diaries, small talk, 
and secondary sources). 
During semi structured interviews, small talk and follow up conversations, 
interpretations of data were tested on respondents to secure interpretive validity.  The 
interpretations presented in these settings were mainly verified by respondents.  When 
interpretation disagreements occurred, the issue was raised in other settings where the 
interpretation was verified.  No conclusions are presented that have not been verified by 
organizational members. 
External validity assessments have been used to test whether the findings in the study 
are generalizable outside the explicit case studied.  However, the problem regarding 
generalizable findings has been the most prominent barrier in doing case research (Yin, 
2003)  Two tactics may be applied to enhance external validity: (i) using theory in single 
case studies generalizing findings to theory rather than other cases, and (ii) using replication 
logic in multiple case studies trying to generalize findings from one case to the following 
cases.  In this study both tactics have been applied.  Findings have been analyzed through 
existing theory to see if it is possible to explain the finding through theory.  In multiple and 
embedded case studies, findings also have been cross case compared in a replicating fashion.  
In one of the cases, theory was inductively developed, which represents an attempt at 
generalizing to theory, which then in turn can be tested on other contexts to establish 
external validity. 
The question regarding reliability is whether another researcher would arrive at the 
same conclusions, if the same procedures were followed.  The objective is not for others to 
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replicate the research, but rather to assess the reliability of the conclusions.  The 
methodology applied is thoroughly presented in the data collection and data analysis 
paragraphs in this introduction.  All of the data are stored electronically both as word 
processing files and audio files, so that it is possible for other researchers to access.  As 
presented in Table 7 above, data from different data sources has been triangulated to enhance 
the reliability of the data. 
Personal Connection to Organization Analyzed 
I had been a member of the division management team in the claims handling 
division in INSCO.  I left the management team in the autumn of 2003, three years prior to 
the data collection in my first project (the focus group interviews), and four years prior to the 
interviews in the second project.  This experience has given me a considerable insight into 
the business performed in the object of analysis.  This insight has been a great advantage 
when interviewees addressed business specific issues.  Further, this insight has been helpful 
when interpreting data. 
In addition, my former connection to the milieu investigated has given me a 
considerable advantage regarding access to interviewees.  Everybody who was asked to 
participate either as diarist or as interviewee, or both, gave a positive response.  Later on in 
the process when it was necessary to do follow-up conversations or to gather written 
material, my personal connection to the interviewees seemed to be an advantage.  Another 
advantage I experienced was that established personal relations were a benefit when it came 
to openness in the interview situations – as an “internal trustee” they told me more than they 
would to a complete stranger. 
My prior connection to the organization might also lead to some pitfalls. The most 
challenging pitfall to avoid was the limitation my own practical experience in the company 
might have on my interpretations of the data.   A second pitfall might be that I would be 
biased toward one solution or the other, based upon my own perceptions of what would be 
the best for the company.  A third pitfall might be that the respondents would exaggerate 
their own roles in the political ploy, or on the other hand, underplay their own role to make 
an impression on me based upon their perception of my position in the area of conflict.    To 
reduce the effects of these possible pitfalls, it has been necessary to gather a broad spectrum 
of data and do a wide-ranging data analysis. 
